Destination Vulnerability Assessment for Khao Lak, Thailand

Emma Calgaro, Kannapa Pongponrat and Sopon Naruchaikusol
Destination Vulnerability Assessment for Khao Lak, Thailand

Sustainable Recovery and Resilience Building in the Tsunami Affected Region
Project 4: Sustainable Recovery and Resilience Building Strategies in the Tourism Industry

Emma Calgaro, Kannapa Pongponrat and Sopon Naruchaikusol

(1) Department of Environment and Geography, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
(2) Mahidol University International College
(3) Stockholm Environment Institute
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of text boxes, figures and tables</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of abbreviations and acronyms</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive summary</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part I</strong> Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 The 2004 tsunami and its impact on Thailand’s tourism destinations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Project rationale</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Conceptual framework</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 research design and methods</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part II</strong> Khao Lak</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 A destination in its infancy</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Main markets and attractions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Governance structures influencing the development of Khao Lak</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 The impacts of the 2004 tsunami on Khao Lak</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Recovery of Khao Lak</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part III</strong> Destination vulnerability assessment of Khao Lak</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Exposure</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sensitivity</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Responses and system adaptation</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part IV</strong> Taking stock and moving forward: strategies for building more resilient tourism in Khao Lak</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Establishing governance processes structures to enable public-private interaction and engagement</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Improving equity, inclusion and downward accountability</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Building capacity at the local level</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Strengthening business associations and increasing membership of micro and small enterprises</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Improving the skill base needed for participation in tourism livelihoods</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Creating more accessible funding sources for micro and small businesses (Thai and Foreign)</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Streamlining business registration procedures and improving access to worker insurance</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Providing disaster and risk preparedness training at the local level</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Improving infrastructure and environmental management</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>References</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendices</strong></td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1: Open-ended interview design and implementation</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2: Case history design and implementation</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3: Focus group discussion design and results</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4: Tourist map of Khao Lak showing business types and facilities</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 5: Andaman tourism recovery plan zoning and building regulations</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TEXT BOXES, FIGURES AND TABLES

Box 1: The birth of a new tourism destination 15
Box 2: Phang Nga Development Strategy Goals 18
Box 3: Snapshot of livelihood portfolios in Khao Lak in 2007 29
Box 4: Phuket Action Plan Strategies 59

Figure 1: Countries affected and the height of the tsunami waves 1
Figure 2: Destination Sustainability Framework 6
Figure 3: Research tasks and design 13
Figure 4: Location of Khao Lak 16
Figure 5: Market share in Khao Lak 17
Figure 6: Scaled governance structures influencing tourism development in Khao Lak 18
Figure 7: Annual tourist flow growth rates for Phang Nga Province 1999-2007 20
Figure 8: Number of rooms in Khao Lak 2004-2008 20
Figure 9: Hotel occupancy rates in Khao Lak 2004-2007 20
Figure 10: Seabed displacement caused by earthquake 23
Figure 11: Tsunami wave pattern and surface elevation as it approached the Thai Andaman Coast 23
Figure 12: Inundation levels along the shoreline of Khao Lak 24
Figure 13: Run-up heights along Khao Lak’s coastline 24
Figure 14: Maximum flow depths in Khao Lak reached 7 to 8 metres 25
Figure 15: Bathymetry and topography of Khao Lak along the Khao Lak beachfront 25
Figure 16: Satellite image comparison of Khao Lak’s pre- and post-tsunami topography and inundation levels 25
Figure 17: Laem Pakarang house exhibits collapsed masonry infill walls with RC frames intact 27

Table 1: Methods summary 11
Table 2: Population of greater Khao Lak area (Khuk Khak Sub-district) 14
Table 3: Numbers of businesses in Khao Lak 14
Table 4: SRDP Pilot Projects affecting Khao Lak 57
Table 5: Short-term NGO-led programmes designed to increase skills levels and aid livelihood diversification 61
Table 6: Long-term NGO activities designed to increase skills levels and aid livelihood diversification in Khao Lak 63
Table 7: Khao Lak Stakeholder Groups 80
Table 8: Open-ended Interview Participants in Khao Lak, Thailand, January-February 2007 91
Table 9: Case histories undertaken in Khao Lak 98
Table 10: Focus Discussion Participant Groups and schedule 102
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATRP</td>
<td>Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOT</td>
<td>Bank of Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community-based Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CULT</td>
<td>Credit Union League of Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVA</td>
<td>Destination Vulnerability Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>circa or around</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETC</td>
<td>Ecotourism Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTUB</td>
<td>Federation of Trade Unions of Burma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSB</td>
<td>Government Savings Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVCA</td>
<td>Global Value Chain Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBLF</td>
<td>International Business Leaders Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITB</td>
<td>Internationale Turismus Börse Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP Foundation</td>
<td>Foundation for the Health and Knowledge of Ethnic Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLR</td>
<td>Minimum Loan Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDWC</td>
<td>National Disaster Warning Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOAA</td>
<td>US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFHLS</td>
<td>Phuket Federation of Hotel and Labour Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTA</td>
<td>Phang Nga Tourism Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reinforced concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTG</td>
<td>Royal Thai Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRDP</td>
<td>Sub-regional Development Plan for the Tsunami-affected Andaman Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>Tsunami Action Group for Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAO</td>
<td>Tambon Administration Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAT</td>
<td>Tourism Authority Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THB</td>
<td>Thai Baht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVC</td>
<td>Tsunami Volunteer Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Tourism Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was produced for sub-project 4 ‘Sustainable Recovery and Resilience Building Strategies in the Tourism Industry’ undertaken by Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) as part of SEI’s Programme ‘Sustainable Recovery and Resilience Building in the Tsunami Affected Region’. The programme was undertaken in collaboration with Macquarie University Sydney between 2007 and 2009 under SEI’s Risk, Livelihoods & Vulnerability Programme with financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). We would like to thank all those who kindly participated in the project by offering their time, insights and experiences, particularly the communities of Khao Lak, Patong Beach, and Phi Phi Don. We would also like to thank Elnora De La Rosa, Dusita Krawanchid, Delia Paul and Matthew Chadwick at SEI for providing invaluable support in the final writing and editing stages of the report.
On 26 December 2004, one of the most destructive tsunamis in recorded history hit 11 countries in the Indian Ocean and killed more than 270,000 people. Thailand’s burgeoning tourism industry was severely affected; the tsunami caused extensive damage to the southern provinces of Ranong, Phang Nga, Phuket, Krabi, Trang and Satun along the Andaman Coast. Due to the severe impact of the tsunami on tourism and the importance of tourism to the Thai economy, considerable efforts are necessary to restore tourism activities and consumer confidence, and to enhance the resilience of tourism-dependent communities to socioeconomic and environmental risks.

This report presents an assessment of vulnerability to the 2004 tsunami of Khao Lak in Phang Nga Province, the worst affected Thai tourism destination in terms of physical damage and lives lost. Identifying and understanding the factors that contributed to the community’s vulnerability to the tsunami provides the foundational knowledge needed to develop and apply effective resilience building strategies for Khao Lak and other tourism communities. In the absence of a robust framework for guiding the analysis of destination vulnerability, a new framework is introduced that incorporates the strengths of vulnerability research, advances in sustainability science, innovation from resilience theory, and the specificity of tourism sector approaches. The new Destination Sustainability Framework also introduces geographical theories of place and relational scale to better understand the importance of contextual influences that shape destination vulnerability and overcome hierarchical notions of scaled actions. The results of this analysis indicate that tsunami vulnerability in Khao Lak is a product of multiple dynamic and interacting factors, including geographical exposure, destination-specific development characteristics, social structures, and governance. Underlying the social factors and processes are competing stakeholder agendas and actions that are based on (different) cultural norms, institutional preferences, and power structures.

Khao Lak’s inability to withstand the tsunami and the high level of destruction relate to the direction of the incoming tsunami waves, the bathymetry and coastal morphology, and the nature of the infrastructure development along the shore. The waves approached the coast from due west, largely uninhibited by natural barriers. The velocity and height of the waves increased due to the shallow offshore shelf that created a shoaling effect, coupled with a coincidental high tide. Khao Lak’s low-lying coastal plain afforded little protection from the wall of water that reached a height of up to 10.6 metres. Onshore wave penetration, physical damage and deaths were highest in the northern extremity of Khao Lak where the land is extremely flat. The close proximity of buildings to the beachfront and their beach-facing positioning exacerbated natural exposure levels while building materials determined damage levels: wooden structures with shallow footings were completely destroyed, while reinforced concrete structures were more robust, and remained.

Khao Lak’s capacity to withstand the tsunami and to cope with the short-term affects (its sensitivity to shocks) related to four destination-specific characteristics: (a) a high dependency on tourism as a primary livelihood source; (b) high seasonality; (c) a heavy reliance on the marketing strategies of international tour operators; and (d) the fragility of destination images to negative exposure. Compounding these destination sensitivities were the resort town’s young developmental history, limited access to liquid financial assets and low levels of insurance, limited hazard awareness and preparedness, staffing problems, and weaknesses in governance structures and processes. Khao Lak is a relatively newly established destination; much of its growth has taken place after 2000. Because many businesses were new ventures, entrepreneurs tended to have low financial reserves in the form of savings and credit histories that were not well established. This situation created difficulties for many in accessing financial capital after the disaster, and this has slowed the recovery process, stifled earning capacity and deepened financial sensitivities to future shocks or stressors. As a destination in its infancy, Khao Lak also lacks the strong market presence of its highly branded and popular neighbouring destinations of Patong and Phi Phi Don; this affects the destination’s ability to attract a wide client base. Khao Lak relies on two specific markets: Swedish and German families and retirees. Stressors in both supply countries, such as economic recessions (as of November 2008), affect demand from these countries and increase the economic vulnerability of the Thai tourism sector.
Those businesses able to access the capital required to rebuild were faced with an additional challenge: staff shortages. Low skill levels in tourism, hospitality and languages among the local populace along with the death of qualified staff has created staff shortages in Khao Lak, leaving resorts with inadequate staff numbers to run newly built resorts. Without adequate staff, services and customer satisfaction decline, leading to a drop in tourist numbers as they will divert business to alternate resorts or destinations. Many full-time staff that survived the tsunami and chose to continue to work in Khao Lak derived a reduced income from workers insurance (part-time and contractual staff are not covered by insurance). Some were fortunate to benefit from full-salaries paid by employers during the rebuilding phase, donations and provincial government funding provisions.

Yet disaster outcomes are not solely negative; they create opportunities for change, innovation, and transformation, all of which are vital for creating more sustainable and resilient futures. The tsunami prompted swift action from the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and local industry groups and generated a massive multi-scaled and multi-institutional response from national governments, tourism industry bodies, non-government organisations (NGOs), and individuals. The RTG provided short-term emergency aid and support to disaster-affected populations. Taking a longer-term perspective, the government also supported the sustainable recovery of affected tourism destinations through the introduction of the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan (ATRP). The ATRP aimed to restore business operations and tourist confidence and to increase the resilience of Thailand’s tourism sector and affected destination communities to future shocks. The Plan focuses on three key strategies: (a) the creation of special credit funds to finance the rebuilding of tourism businesses and revive lost livelihoods; (b) the introduction of an integrated tourism development strategy that incorporates disaster preparedness with improved tourism development design; and (c) the launch of multiple marketing drives to reassure the travelling public and to attract tourists back to the Andaman Coast. Confidence and long-term disaster preparedness was further enhanced by the establishment of the Indian Ocean Early Warning System and the launch of the National Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre. The Sub-regional Development Plan for the Andaman Coast in 2007 cemented multi-sector sustainable development intentions until 2020. The restoration of the biophysical environment at Khao Lak was also included in the government’s recovery plans.

Local tourism industry representative bodies were instrumental in petitioning for more funding to hasten the rebuilding process, influencing development plans, and contacting core markets in efforts to restore confidence and business. The Phang Nga Tourism Association used its close relationships with the Phang Nga Provincial Governor and select parliamentary members to secure financial support for the post-tsunami recovery and ensure that Khao Lak business interests were included in revised development deliberations. Established business relationships between resorts and international tour operators were also used to reaffirm long-term marketing and room allocation commitments. The newly formed Khao Lak Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Group attracted political attention to the plight of micro and small businesses and used international business networks to raise funds and recapture lost market share among independent travellers.

Local marketing initiatives by the Khao Lak community and the RTG were complimented by multi-scaled international responses and the collective financial support from individuals. The World Tourism Organisation coordinated the tourism sector’s multinational Phuket Action Plan that focussed on marketing, financial assistance, skills training and risk management while NGO activity in Khao Lak concentrated on financial assistance, skills training and risk management programmes. Yet some of the most defining factors in Khao Lak’s ongoing recovery have been the strength of family and social networks, the ingenuity of resourceful business owners, and the resilience of the destination’s large repeat-client base. Strong family networks in Khao Lak provided financial and emotional support to affected family members that helped fortify resolve to rebuild. However, foreigners and Thai nationals lacking these support structures were found to be more isolated and vulnerable. This is particularly the case for Burmese workers who have few legal rights and are highly vulnerable to financial exploitation by some employers and the police. Some resourceful business owners turned the negative exposure from incessant media disaster reports to their advantage by highlighting their plight to international markets that, in turn, generated
much interest and consequent tourist flows. The tragedy of the tsunami also prompted an outpouring of support from loyal repeat clients who returned with family and friends to provide much-needed business. International volunteers that flooded into Khao Lak to help the area’s recovery did the same and, in doing so, created new tourism supply markets.

Key challenges in the recovery process
Despite this outpouring of support from governments, industry, NGOs and individuals, the distribution of aid and the effective implementation of longer-term support has been hindered by numerous obstacles that compounded pre-existing sensitivities and continue to do so, creating new sensitivities, and heightening destination vulnerability. Some of the obstacles are:

- Weaknesses in governance structures and processes have not been sufficiently addressed and continue to undermine the implementation of new planning and development strategies. Budgetary constraints, coupled with a lack of staff capacity and expertise in local government agencies has hindered the implementation and enforcement of developmental regulations pre- and post-tsunami. Corruption has led to uneven distribution of emergency aid and has produced anomalies in development approvals. Infrastructure provisions remain poor and early warning systems do not consistently work due to faulty technology. These enduring problems have eroded trust and rapport between local government authorities and communities.

- Marketing support from the Tourism Authority of Thailand was limited.

- Complex credit application processes limited the effectiveness of post-tsunami financing schemes, particularly among foreign business operators. Those that did secure loans face increased debt levels in a destination that is yet to reach pre-tsunami occupancy rates and business flows, causing higher levels of financial vulnerability to future stressors, including ongoing political instability in the country and current economic downturns.

- NGO support to Khao Lak’s tourism community has been marred by a bias towards supporting ‘traditional’ livelihoods that may no longer be economically viable, over tourism businesses that are often seen as rich and even unscrupulous.

Recommendations for building resilient tourism communities
This destination vulnerability assessment of the tourism community of Khao Lak reveals that the community’s resilience to the tsunami is bolstered by strong family networks and loyal clientele, active and strong community leaders and tourism representative bodies, and resourceful and adaptive entrepreneurs. Yet there are still areas for improvement pertaining to governance structures and processes, infrastructure provisions, credit availability and low insurance levels, limited marketing support and disaster preparedness.

To address these issues, 10 recommendations are proposed that aim to build long-term resilience against future shocks by enhancing Khao Lak’s existing strengths and reducing its vulnerabilities:

1. Establish enabling governance processes and structures that advance public-private interaction and engagement;
2. Improve equity, inclusion and downward accountability;
3. Build capacity at the local level;
4. Strengthen business associations and increasing membership of micro and small enterprises;
5. Improve the skill base needed for participation in tourism livelihoods;
6. Create more accessible funding sources for micro and small businesses (Thai and foreign);
7. Streamline business registration procedures;
8. Improve access to worker insurance;
9. Provide disaster preparedness training for staff working in the tourism sector; and
10. Improve infrastructure and environmental management.
LAND FOR SALE
ขายที่ดินแปลงนี้
2 ไร่ 1 งาน 98 ตาราง
Contact Here
07-2633462-2675378
01-0834875-9788115
PART I INTRODUCTION

1 THE 2004 TSUNAMI AND ITS IMPACT ON THAILAND’S TOURISM DESTINATIONS

On the morning of 26 December 2004, the subduction of the Indo-Australian tectonic plate beneath the overriding Burma plate generated the Great Sumatra-Andaman megathrust earthquake with a magnitude of 9.3 some 255 km south-south-east from Banda Aceh in Northern Sumatra (McKee, 2005). The vertical uplift of the seafloor along the 1200 km fault triggering one of the most destructive tsunamis in recorded history (British Geological Survey, 2005). The multiple tsunami waves radiating outward from the length of the rupture line reached up to 30 metres in height, devastating countless coastal communities in 11 countries bordering the Indian Ocean, killing more than 283 100 people, with 14 100 still listed as missing (ADPC, 2005, NGDC, 2009a, UNISDR, 2006). The local time was 07.58 (00.58 UTC). Figure 1 shows the maximum heights of the tsunami waves and the countries they affected. Many of the devastated areas were popular tourism destinations filled with international tourists at the height of the high season. The worst affected destinations were those located in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Indonesia and Thailand.

Thailand’s burgeoning tourism industry, accounting for 6.4 per cent of Thailand’s GDP (USD 17.3 billion1) and 10.6 per cent of total employment, sustained the greatest loss from the tsunami disaster (WTO, 2005a). The tsunami caused extensive damage to six provinces located along a 400 km stretch of the Andaman Coast in southern Thailand: Ranong, Phang Nga, Phuket, Krabi, Trang and Satun. Those living along the Andaman coast are highly dependent—directly or indirectly—on the tourism sector (WTO, 2005a, WTTC, 2008). In 2004, these provinces generated 17 per cent of Thailand’s total tourism revenue (UN, 2005). The tsunami not only claimed the lives of thousands of tourists and industry workers, but also left the livelihoods of the affected destination communities in disarray. A total of 8212 people were killed, including 2448 foreigners

---

1 The exchange rate used throughout the report is 1 USD = 39.22 THB

Figure 1: Countries affected and the height of the tsunami waves
Source: Spiegel Online, downloaded from http://www.spiegel.de/flash/content/0,5532,9709,00.html on 13 August 2005.
from 37 countries (UN, 2005). Those that survived the event faced further challenges. More than 97 per cent of Thailand’s damage was incurred by private properties, with much of this damage and loss falling on the tourism industry (Scheper and Patel, 2006, TEC, 2005). The tsunami destroyed 25 per cent of the total room capacity resulting in an estimated tourism infrastructural loss of USD 340.9 million (UN, 2005). Tourist arrivals in the affected provinces decreased by 53 per cent in the 6-month period following the disaster event causing revenue losses of USD 1.4 billion at a time when funds were needed the most for rebuilding and staff remunerations (UN, 2005). Approximately 120,000 tourism-related jobs were lost and incomes significantly reduced (UN, 2005, Young, 2005).

2 PROJECT RATIONALE

Given the economic importance of tourism to the affected Thai coastal communities, a revival of the tourism industry is vital. It not only provides employment and investment opportunities to these communities, but the industry’s recovery can help stimulate trade, business and construction activities. In the aftermath of the tsunami disaster, the provision of immediate emergency relief, the restoration of basic services and the rebuilding of damaged infrastructure in destination communities were of paramount importance. That said, it is not enough to respond to the immediate disaster. As the immediate needs of the affected communities are tended to, attention must be redirected toward longer-term preparedness strategies that aim to reduce vulnerability and increase a community’s capacity to cope and respond to future shocks (ACTPPR, 2005, Miller et al., 2005). For this to occur, it is necessary to identify and address the drivers of vulnerability in the affected communities and build on existing capacity (Miller et al., 2005: 1, Wisner et al., 2004). Long-term resilience plans aimed at securing future sustainable livelihoods cannot be operationalised successfully without understanding the underlying socio-political processes and environmental linkages that form the foundations of vulnerability (Clark et al., 2000, Pelling, 2003, Thomalla et al., 2006, Turner et al., 2003). Vulnerability assessments underpin adaptive strategies and preparedness (Birkmann, 2006).

However, longer-term disaster mitigation can be problematic to achieve. First, the competitive rather than cooperative nature of aid assistance can heighten vulnerability levels instead of curtailing them (Larsen et al., 2008, La Trobe and Venton, 2003). Second, external institutions have limited funds to support and monitor long-term changes (Rice, 2005, La Trobe and Venton, 2003). Third, localised institutions may be limited by restricted budgets and human capacity to undertake this transformative role alone at the required scale (Mileti, 1999, Miller et al., 2005). Finally, there is the dilemma of balancing the opportunities for reform versus the realism of speed in post disaster planning (Davis, 2006).

Recognising this long-term need, this project aims to support the sustainable recovery of the tourism industry in Thailand by undertaking an integrated study of the factors that heighten social vulnerability in the affected destination communities with the immediate objective of identifying appropriate actions for building capacity and enhancing informed decision making processes in the long-term management of the coastal zone. This study forms one component (Sub-Project 4) of a wider SIDA-funded project entitled “Sustainable Recovery and Resilience Building in the Tsunami Affected Region” which supports the post-tsunami recovery in Sri Lanka and Thailand through the generation of knowledge and capacity building. The three destination communities included in the Thai project are: Khao Lak (Phang Nga Province), Patong (Phuket Province) and Koh Phi Phi (Krabi Province).

Building upon a preliminary Destination Vulnerability Assessment (DVA) undertaken in Khao Lak in 2005 (Calgaro, 2005), this report presents the findings from the DVA of Khao Lak and provides recommendations for appropriate capacity building actions based on the community’s long-term needs.

---

2 Destination vulnerability refers to the vulnerability of destination communities that host and deliver tourist experience in a given place, such as Khao Lak or Patong beaches in Thailand. Destination vulnerability differs from the vulnerability of the industry as a whole that spans destinations, tourist supply countries and the various businesses that promote and compile tour packages and those that transport tourists to destinations.
3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Vulnerability and the processes that create and perpetuate it

Adopting an interdisciplinary approach to vulnerability analysis, vulnerability is regarded as an inherent multidimensional characteristic of the coupled human-environment system and is defined as:

“The degree to which an exposure unit [human groups, ecosystems and communities] is susceptible to harm due to exposure to a perturbation or stress, and the ability (or lack thereof) of the exposure unit to cope, recover, or fundamentally adapt” (Kasperson et al., 2001: 7)

Vulnerability is place-specific, highly scaled, dynamic and differential, whereby a population’s characteristics, the multiple stressors it is susceptible to, and its capacity to respond and adapt continuously change over space and time (Adger, 2006, Downing et al., 2006, Smit and Wandel, 2006, Vogel and O’Brien, 2004). These evolutionary changes are determined by three interconnected dimensions of a given location: exposure, sensitivity, and resilience (Turner et al., 2003, Clark et al., 2000).

Exposure is largely a product of physical location and the character of the built and natural environment (Pelling, 2003: 48, Villagrán De León, 2006: 13) and is defined as the degree to which an exposure unit (who or what) comes into contact with stressors or shocks (Clark et al., 2000: 2). Sensitivity is defined as the degree to which a household or group are affected by exposure to any set of stresses (Clark et al., 2000) and reflects the capacity of a population to anticipate and withstand the immediate impacts of a hazard (Pelling, 2003: 48). Sensitivity is characterised predominantly by pre-existing conditions of the social and ecological system that may be improved or exacerbated by responses and adaptation strategies post-shock.

Resilience is defined as the ability of an exposure unit to absorb recurrent external stresses without losing its fundamental structure and function (Adger et al., 2002). Resilience is a direct expression of the strength of the coupled human-environment system reflecting its immediate response, self organisation, learning, and adaptive capabilities (Carpenter et al., 2001).

Vulnerability is largely determined by a lack of options due to the unequal distribution of power and resources in society (Jäger et al., 2007, Birkmann, 2006). An individual’s or group’s ability to anticipate, withstand, and recover from shocks over time is intrinsically linked to access and entitlements to socio-political, economic and environmental resources (Adger and Kelly, 1999, Pelling, 2003). The more access and control a household or group has to resources, the lower their vulnerability to shocks.

Fundamental to this conceptualisation are the contested actions and outcomes that link human agency and scaled structures of power over time and space. The political economy of resource access and distribution is determined by: (a) the competing actions and agendas of multiple social actors, and (b) the strength and effectiveness of multiple-scaled governance systems and social networks that confer access to some, while restricting entitlements and influence to others (Adger, 1999, Pelling, 2003, Wisner et al., 2004). Underlying these unequal entitlement patterns are historically-embedded power structures, cultural norms and supporting ideologies and doctrines that permeate and bind the very fabric of society (Bankoff, 2003, Cannon et al., 2003, Cutter et al., 2000). Identifying patterns of access and entitlement goes a long way in deciphering differential vulnerability but perceptions help to explain why certain actions are taken over others. Perceptions and assumptions are highly differential, contextual, socially-constructed and are influenced by several factors including: access to information, historical experiences, personal characteristics and values, ideologies, culture and economic circumstances (Baker and Coulter, 2007, Cioccio and Michael, 2007, Cutter et al., 2000, Johnson and Covello, 1987). Understanding the multiple narratives that underlie the contested choices and scaled actions of government, industry, and civil society enables the identification of both causal problems and alternate trajectories and afford opportunities for action, change and transformation (Leach, 2008).

3.2 Destination Sustainability Framework

The need for a framework to assess destination vulnerability

Comprehensive assessments of the vulnerability or resilience of destination host communities are rare (see Calgaro, 2005, Calgaro and Lloyd, 2008), as are robust frameworks for guiding destination assessments. Tourism research has produced some conceptualisations explaining causation of industry vulnerability, most notably the Analytical Framework for Vulnerability in the Tourism Industry (Nankervis, 2000). This framework
Grounded in ecology, resilience thinking accepts uncertainty and change as a constant condition of the socio-ecological system. Its focus, then, is on adapting to and co-existing with multiple changes and cross-scale interactions that unfold at different speeds (gradual versus rapid transitions) over time (Berkhout, 2008). Emphasis is placed on process—those that determine differential outcomes of the adaptive cycle, ecological thresholds, socio-ecological relations and the consequences of disturbance responses that feed back into the system (Miller et al., forthcoming, Nelson et al., 2007). Holling’s ‘lazy eight’ conceptualisation of adaptive cycles captures the essence of how adaptive cycles change and is characterised by four phases: growth and exploitation, conservation, collapse or release, and reorganisation (Holling, 2001). Resilience is constructivist in its approach, championing multiple voices and the existence of multiple stable states, reflexivity, adaptive governance, and diverse framings of sustainability (Turner, 2008). Its reframing of risk and change as predictable and unpredictable constants in the socio-ecological system (as opposed to seeing risk and disruptions as unacceptable and abnormal) is progressive. Finally, its emphasis on feedback consequences of actions taken following a disruption enables anticipation and adaptation to change over time and space (Miller et al., forthcoming). However, this approach has some detractors.

Resilience, as a concept, successfully explores the processes of how to transform through social, institutional and organisational learning (Miller et al., forthcoming) but does not delve into deeper questions on why some choices and responses are taken over others, the reasoning for their success or failure (including why appropriate responses fail), and who these actions serve and marginalise (Adger, 2008, Jasanoff, 2008, Leach, 2008, Shah et al., 2008, Turner, 2008). It lacks theoretical depth in analysing the social dimension of the socio-ecological system including the political economy of resource and power distribution and usage within the socio-economic system and the consequences of these patterns over space and time (Leach, 2008, Miller et al., forthcoming). There is a pressing need to move beyond socio-ecological system processes to focus on agency, power and accountability: the role actors have on creating and perpetuating vulnerability, to examine relationships and networks, and to consider the multiple framings or narratives, and ideologies that drive actor choices and competing actions (Jasanoff, 2008, Shah et al., 2008). Contemporary vulnerability and sustainability science approaches do this. Finally, it is highly conceptual, problematising its usage in guiding the assessment of sustainability challenges and informing policy and practice (Berkhout, 2008, Jasanoff, 2008, Miller et al., forthcoming).

The longer research history of vulnerability—that encompasses advances from food security, development, and hazards—prompts deeper analysis into who is vulnerable or resilient, to what, and why. Vulnerability research offers a more sophisticated analysis into why some choices and responses are taken over others, the reasoning for their success or failure (including why appropriate responses fail), and who these actions serve and marginalise (Adger, 2008, Jasanoff, 2008, Leach, 2008, Shah et al., 2008, Turner, 2008). It lacks theoretical depth in analysing the social dimension of the socio-ecological system including the political economy of resource and power distribution and usage within the socio-economic system and the consequences of these patterns over space and time (Leach, 2008, Miller et al., forthcoming). There is a pressing need to move beyond socio-ecological system processes to focus on agency, power and accountability: the role actors have on creating and perpetuating vulnerability, to examine relationships and networks, and to consider the multiple framings or narratives, and ideologies that drive actor choices and competing actions (Jasanoff, 2008, Shah et al., 2008). Contemporary vulnerability and sustainability science approaches do this. Finally, it is highly conceptual, problematising its usage in guiding the assessment of sustainability challenges and informing policy and practice (Berkhout, 2008, Jasanoff, 2008, Miller et al., forthcoming).

The longer research history of vulnerability—that encompasses advances from food security, development, and hazards—prompts deeper analysis into who is vulnerable or resilient, to what, and why. Vulnerability research offers a more sophisticated analysis into why some choices and responses are taken over others, the reasoning for their success or failure (including why appropriate responses fail), and who these actions serve and marginalise (Adger, 2008, Jasanoff, 2008, Leach, 2008, Shah et al., 2008, Turner, 2008). It lacks theoretical depth in analysing the social dimension of the socio-ecological system including the political economy of resource and power distribution and usage within the socio-economic system and the consequences of these patterns over space and time (Leach, 2008, Miller et al., forthcoming). There is a pressing need to move beyond socio-ecological system processes to focus on agency, power and accountability: the role actors have on creating and perpetuating vulnerability, to examine relationships and networks, and to consider the multiple framings or narratives, and ideologies that drive actor choices and competing actions (Jasanoff, 2008, Shah et al., 2008). Contemporary vulnerability and sustainability science approaches do this. Finally, it is highly conceptual, problematising its usage in guiding the assessment of sustainability challenges and informing policy and practice (Berkhout, 2008, Jasanoff, 2008, Miller et al., forthcoming).
Both models acknowledge that population characteristics, the multiple stressors populations are exposed and susceptible to, and their capacity to respond and adapt are influenced by human and environmental influences operating outside the focal population. These frameworks also acknowledge that adaptive capacity is contingent upon the pre-existing characteristics (including a system’s strengths and weaknesses) of the affected system. Therefore, both short and long-term responses and consequent feedbacks that dominate adaptive capacity and resilience research are included in the frameworks. Together, these actor-approaches enable the identification of appropriate entry points for action along with negotiation and decision-making processes (Miller et al., 2008, Miller et al., forthcoming). Yet vulnerability approaches also have limitations in assessing the causal factors underlying destination vulnerability.

Vulnerability approaches are highly normative, where risk reduction is sought so as to maintain equilibrium within the existing socio-ecological system (Adger, 2008). This is beneficial when looking at calculable risk to a select population or institution but downplays uncertainty and the possibility of alternate stable states (Nelson et al., 2007). Second, the consequential feedbacks of actions taken following a disturbance and their impact (positive or negative) on the system over time are a recent feature of vulnerability approaches but require greater emphasis. Resilience thinking highlights the importance of both short- and long-term feedbacks in simultaneously determining resilience for some, while causing emerging vulnerabilities for others. Third, the nested representation of scale in recent frameworks, such as the Turner et al. Sustainability Framework (2003), is questionable. Both Vulnerability and Resilience offer nested and, sometimes, hierarchical interpretations of scale. However, scaled relationships, actions, processes and the structures within the social dimension of the socio-ecological system are more fluid and relational. Finally, vulnerability approaches tend to favour the social dimension of the socio-ecological system over the geophysical domain and, in doing so, downplay the biophysical live support system that sustains development (Folke, 2006, Miller et al., forthcoming).

In light of the merits and detractors of each approach, a new Destination Sustainability Framework is presented in the next section that draws upon the strengths of vulnerability research, advances in sustainability science, innovation from resilience theory and the specificity of tourism sector approaches. It also introduces geography theories of place and relational scale to better understand the importance of contextual influences that shape destination vulnerability and overcome hierarchical notions of scaled actions.

**Presentation of the Destination Sustainability Framework**

The purpose of the Destination Sustainability Framework (DSF) presented in figure 2 (page 6) is to guide the identification of the multiple factors and scale processes that create and perpetuate destination vulnerability along with the social actors and agendas that drive action and non-action. Highlighting these factors and processes creates entry points for adjustments change and transformation. Accordingly, the scope of this analytical tool is on localised destination populations where vulnerability and resilience are experienced.

**The main elements of the Destination Sustainability Framework**

The DSF comprises five main elements: (i) the shock or stressor, (ii) the three interconnected dimensions of vulnerability—Exposure, Sensitivity, and Responses and System Adaptation—that form the core of the DSF, (iii) the dynamic feedback loops that express the multiple outcomes or consequences of actions taken (or not taken) in response to the shock of stressor, space, (iv) the root causes and drivers that influence settlement characteristics and natural resource use patterns, livelihood choices, resource and power distribution, plus human responses to the shocks and outcomes, and (v) the scale and timeframes within which socio-ecological change occurs. The role of each element in analysing destination vulnerability and resilience is detailed below.

**Shocks and stressors**

Events, irrespective of the origin or scale, disrupt and destabilise the existing system, making them the natural starting point for the analysis of destination vulnerability. The Shocks and Stresses element (to what) is shown as piercing the socio-ecological system through the Exposure dimension of the DSF. The event does not cause vulnerability but the nature of the shock

---

3 This framework was developed by Emma Calgaro as part of her Ph.D. thesis currently being undertaken at Macquarie University, Sydney (to be completed in 2010).
or stressor does influence how the system is affected over space and time. Like Turner et al., 2003., the DSF makes an important distinction between shocks and stressors. Shocks are rapid onset events, such as terrorist acts, including bombings, natural hazards and health epidemics. These are most likely to be unanticipated events (in terms of frequency and size), whereas stressors are slow-onset events that are often manifestations of human-environment interactions and place increasing pressure on the localised system over time. These include: climate change and responses, environmental degradation, changes in biophysical elements (the removal of coastal grasses and trees, and alterations to the geological terrain), economic downturns, and changes in travel and product trends.

**The core interconnected dimensions of vulnerability**

Vulnerability is place-specific. Therefore, the three interconnected dimensions of vulnerability form the heart of the DSF: Exposure and Sensitivity that encapsulate pre-existing environmental, socio-political and economic conditions, and Responses and System Adaptation which incorporates short-term coping responses to a shock or stressor, as well as the long-term adjustments and their consequences. The replacement of the term ‘resilience’ with ‘responses and system adaptation’ was done in order to limit
current confusion between resilience as a general term and resilience theory and approaches (see Miller et al., forthcoming). The factors that contribute to exposure, sensitivity and responses and adaptation are then broken down into commonly used subgroups that reflect the key determinants of the three dimensions. The subgroup headings and listed factors enable the easy identification of key assessment and analytical focal points for practitioners and researchers but the lists are not exhaustive.

**Exposure:** Exposure as the first dimension of vulnerability presents an inventory of the destination’s defining characteristics including: (i) the population (who are the main stakeholders involved in the creation and delivery of the tourist product offered in the focus destination), and (ii) the characteristics and health of both the biophysical and built environment. The focus destination population and their characteristics differ markedly but is made up of the following common sub-groups: households; accommodation providers and staff (small, medium and large); tour operators, travel agencies and guides; support service providers, including spas, beach service providers and localised transport; restaurants, cafés and bars; souvenir and general shops; and localised tourism representative bodies and government departments. Destination characteristics are further moulded by the natural terrain, supporting ecosystems and the built environment that collectively reflect the tastes of the dominant tourist groups and the localised interpretations of these. Biophysical characteristics (e.g., flat terrain, removal of natural vegetation resulting in erosion, etc.) and development type and patterns (large sea-facing windows or wooden structures, for example) greatly affect exposure levels to natural hazards, climatic changes and environmental degradation but may be a smaller consideration for economic downturns and negative travel trends.

**Sensitivity:** The sensitivity dimension of the DSF captures the pre-existing economic, social and political conditions that shape anticipatory and immediate response capabilities to shocks. This involves an exploration of the political economy of access and entitlements to resources and their distribution at the time. Particular factors influencing tourism destination sensitivity to shocks or stressors include tourist flow seasonality, livelihood portfolios and dependency on tourism, localised and global economic trends, markets and marketing strategies, destination developmental histories, positioning and destination image. Common sources of economic capital include the accumulation of liquid and fixed assets, credit histories and insurance, employment opportunities, business stability, and access to welfare safety nets in times of unemployment. Human capital includes knowledge, skills, and labour ability. High skill levels enable greater employment flexibility if employment opportunities are interrupted while knowledge about trends and risk facilitate preparedness. Social capital embodies networks and connectedness, group membership, relationships, and levels of trust and reciprocity. Kinship and tourism business networks promote cohesion, connectedness, reassurance, and stability in times of need. They can also promote greater access to financial capital and power networks. However, social relationships and networks can also foster social exclusion manifested through dominant power structures and historically-embedded cultural norms (DFID, 1999a). Power and its distribution is formalised through government structures and processes that regulate asset distribution and influence preparedness levels through the regulation of knowledge and strategy (DFID, 1999b). Hence, the analysis of these processes and structures requires an understanding of roles and responsibilities, knowledge of rights and relationships between groups and organisations (DFID, 1999b). Yet the role of human agency in determining resource access and distribution cannot be discounted as there exists a cyclical relationship between actor actions and the government structures that help determine action outcomes. Finally, the inclusion of physical and environmental sensitivities here acknowledges that social and economic development cannot take place without a functioning life support system (Nelson et al., 2007, Folke, 2008). Key factors include access to natural resources, access to lifeline infrastructure and communication systems, and biophysical alterations and changes.

**Responses and System Adaptation:** A household’s or community’s capacity to respond, recover and adapt to shocks and their consequences is dependent upon anticipatory actions for preparedness, including resource stockpiling, immediate and short-term coping capacities, followed by longer-term adjustments and adaptations. The final dimension of the vulnerability—Responses and System Adaptation—features both the immediate and short-term coping responses and longer-term adjustments, and acknowledges their consequent feedbacks. Impact and coping responses (short-term) to shocks depends on the set of available capital including the effectiveness of governance.
structures, levels of preparedness, and capacity to learn (Tompkins and Adger, 2004, Villagran De Leon, 2006). This component of the DSF therefore bridges the Sensitivity and Responses and System Adaptation dimensions to acknowledge the aforementioned relationship. Reactionary in nature, immediate impact responses to shocks include emergency service actions and the provision and distribution of emergency aid. Short-term coping actions that flow on from initial impact responses include financial aid strategies and trauma support. Short-term coping mechanisms usually give way to longer-term adjustments and adaptation measures that can involve reflection, self-organisation, social learning, and embracing emerging opportunities for transformation. In spite of this, positive change is not guaranteed.

Feedback loops
The outcomes of action, inaction and failed actions (or the combination of all three) feed back into the system and determine new levels of exposure and sensitivity to future shocks and stressors. The monitoring of the consequences of differential system feedbacks over time and space is arguably the most important aspect of the adaptive cycle but the least understood. Actions can produce both positive and negative outcomes. Interventions that address pre-existing weaknesses in the system, and increase preparedness, social cohesion, learning and exchange can enhance access and entitlements to resources and redress power inequities. This in turn decreases future exposure and sensitivity levels to shocks and stressors and enhances resilience. These positive outcomes are portrayed by the black arrows. However, adjustments and mitigation strategies are not always possible or wanted. Lack of adaptation and/or the failure of adaptive strategies are a function of institutional capacity and knowledge systems, as well as human agency, involving choices based on perceived likelihood of future risk and the socio-economic cost of implementing and managing strategies. Inaction in the face of adversity and the acceptance of pre-existing limitations merely compounds exposure and sensitivity and increases vulnerability levels (shown by pale blue arrows). The choices of which actions to take (if any), consequent trade-offs between choices and the competing needs of population sub-groups, as well as their success or failure are coloured by value systems and dominant ideologies, perceptions of risk and probable gain (socio-political and financial), power system configurations and human agency. Together, these conditions form the context of human-environment interaction.

Contextual influences that shape destinations and their vulnerability
The pale blue circle that encompasses the three dimensions of vulnerability and, in part, the shock represents the context within which destinations are formed and their vulnerability and resilience to shocks and stresses created and perpetuated. The context includes both place or destination characteristics and the wider influences that shape it. Understanding the nature of place and destination creation enables the identification of the actors (who contributes to vulnerability creation, perpetuation and resilience) and the causal processes (why) some actions are taken instead of others that shape its vulnerability and resilience to shocks.

Places are more than physical locations and politically demarcated spaces; they are dynamic, elastic, and contested landscapes that have multiple identities, meanings and interpretations dependent upon multiple viewpoints and socio-ecological interactions that evolve over space and time (Agnew, 1997, Massey, 1993, Massey, 1994, Pritchard and Morgan, 2000, Young, 1999). Place, as a socio-political construct of multiple meanings and interpretations by multiple actors interactions, is perfectly demonstrated in the creation of tourist destinations. They encapsulate the enduring tourist images of desired experiences that are represented and packaged by tour operators and then reinterpreted and constructed by the destination host community (Knox and Marston, 2004, Pritchard and Morgan, 2000, Young, 1999). The place and the experience it provokes are then reinterpreted by interactions between the destination and the travelling public.

The actions of actors involved in the creation of destinations are influenced by multiple factors, including political and economic ideologies, religious doctrines, cultural norms and power systems, values, perceptions of risk and resultant choices, and the agendas and expectations of the both tourism industry stakeholders and tourists. These contextual influences permeate the fabric of a destination and influence the nature and intensity of disruptive events, actions, reactions, and consequences and, in turn, vulnerability and resilience. They are power-laden and deeply rooted in culture, history, religion and ideology. These, along with the enabling contemporary processes and structures, shape every aspect of the tourist destination and help explain the causal factors that underlie vulnerability and
resilience over time and space. They shape governance structures and reinforce dominant ideologies, influence developmental decisions and destination characteristics, determine differential access and entitlement to resources and the value and use of available resources, influence business decisions, and shape perceptions of risk, as well as short- and long-term responses to stressors and shocks. These dynamic socio-ecological interactions evolve over time and space.

**Scale and time**

The final element of the DSF that encircles all the remaining elements represents scale and time. This continuous and non-linear time-space element acknowledges that places and their vulnerability and resilience are dynamic and evolve with people’s choices, outcomes, and persistent cause-and-effect relationships that play out at different speeds over time and space (Adger, 2006, Folke, 2006, Jäger et al., 2007, Smit and Wandel, 2006, Turner et al., 2003). The interpretation of time as a fluid and constant element of social meaning and organisation is not new but this representation of scale is. Scale as fluid and dynamic replace hierarchical and nested depictions of scale that are evident in resilience theory (see Holling and Gunderson, 2002) and existing vulnerability frameworks (Turner et al., 2003 is one example) to show scale as a reflection of multidimensional social processes and organisation. This relational depiction of scale is grounded in geographical theories of relational scale that explores the discourse of scale, engaging in how scale is defined and used to manipulate power and facilitate social action.

Relational Scale deconstructs naturalised scales of social organisation—categories of household, local, sub-national, national, regional, global—to reveal the subjectivity of social relations and explore how social actors simultaneously use multi-scaled social processes and supporting structures to either reinforce the differential access to power and resources within a given society or create new landscapes of power, recognition and opportunity (Ellem, 2002, Herod and Wright, 2002, Howitt, 1993, Sadler and Fagan, 2004). These actions are not necessarily directed at one scale; entry points for action can exist at multiple scales simultaneously. The social actors that recognise this and take advantage of all opportunities experience greater levels of success. Relational scale does not devalue, deny or exclude naturalised scales of social organisation. The angle taken by actors depends on the agendas or positionality of the social actors involved. Put simply, knowing which political buttons to press, what social pathways to use, and at what scale(s) is crucial in bringing about a favourable outcome. Scale and scaled actions, relationships, and supporting structures, then, are dynamic and relational, not nested, hierarchical or privileged.

Recognising scale as an expression of power and control over capital, relational scale adds depth and dynamism to the DSF. First, it provides a greater understanding of the scaled processes social actors use to gain access to the resources they need to fulfil their objectives and agendas. Second, these politicised and agenda-driven actions also illuminate the creation and perpetuation of social inequality and differential vulnerabilities within destinations. Finally, the identification of key actors with a vested interest in tourism development and the multi-scaled structures they work through provide planners, policy makers and community members with a clear directive regarding the type of resilience strategies required, the target audience, and the most appropriate scales for policy action and execution.

### 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

#### 4.1 Research design overview

Vulnerability reduction is a dynamic process not just an outcome. So monitoring this process and how it evolves over space and time is vital to understanding root causes, as well as charting the success of interventions, social learning, adaptation and transforming processes (Adger, 2006). Accordingly, 11 tasks were identified to capture the dynamism of vulnerability and guide the research process. These are summarised in figure 3 (page 13).

#### 4.2 Case study analysis and site choices

Case study analysis was chosen as the overarching method for assessing destination vulnerability given that both vulnerability and tourism destinations are socially-constructed and place-based. Case study analysis has come to dominate vulnerability assessment based on its capacity to deconstruct complex and place-based phenomena within its real life setting (Kitchin and Tate, 2000, Kyburz-Graber, 2004, Yin, 1994). The added advantage of comparative case studies is that they enable the identification of both commonalities and place specific differences that influence different patterns of vulnerability in destination communities. The choice of three destinations at different stages of development provided an opportunity to explore the
relationship between development levels, destination placement and popularity, sustained damage resulting from the tsunami event and vulnerability. The three case study areas were selected based on (i) the level of damage sustained from the tsunami, (ii) the destinations developmental histories, and (iii) the differential stages of recovery achieved. Khao Lak sustained the greatest losses in terms of lives lost and rooms destroyed. This destination is also the newest out of the three destinations included in destination vulnerability assessment (DVA); tourism development did not begin to flourish until 1996. Phi Phi Don also sustained heavy losses (1400 rooms in 34 facilities were destroyed) but benefits from a more established destination history dating back more than 20 years and a prominent international tourism market position. Patong Beach is one of the oldest, wealthiest and one of the most established destinations in Thailand. Tourism businesses benefit from a very high international tourism profile that has generated strong returns over a 30 year period (Bell et al., 2005). Damages sustained to tourism infrastructure were the lowest in Patong with estimates ranging from 10 to 20 per cent compared to 90 per cent in Phang Nga.

4.3 Case study methods
Six complimentary methods were included in the case study research strategy to help deconstruct the complex factors and relationships that influence and drive destination vulnerability over time and space: Document and Map Analysis, Exploratory Literature Review Field Observation, Open-ended Interviews, Case Histories, and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The methods were chosen based on three criteria: (i) their capacity to deconstruct the multiple drivers of destination vulnerability identified in the conceptual framework; (ii) human resources available; and (iii) time constraints. The advantages of the three main field-based methods (Open-ended Interviews, Case Histories, and FGDs) in deconstructing destination vulnerability along with timeframes and research staff involved is outlined in Appendix 1,2 and 3 respectively.

The research was undertaken in two distinctive phases. Desk-based research, including an Exploratory Literature Review and Document and Map Analysis, provided information on damage sustained in each destination site and institutional responses and created foundational knowledge pertaining to the underlying causes of destination vulnerability. Supplementary documents, including new environmental and building regulations and recovery plans, were collected throughout the second phase of research undertaken in the field over a total period of 4.5 months (six weeks of this being spent in Khao Lak). Open-ended interviews, case histories, field observation and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) provided in-depth knowledge on the scaled causal factors driving vulnerability in the affected destination communities, the role of social actors and governance processes in influencing vulnerability levels and recovery strategies, and facilitated the identification of appropriate actions for building adaptive capacity and livelihood resilience. The purpose and deployment of each method is summarised in Table 1: Methods summary.

4.3 Research implementation challenges
The process of operationalising a research strategy in a post-disaster destination setting presented numerous challenges including participant availability, disinterest, suspicion, and interview fatigue. However, the interview process and FGDs also afforded opportunities for sharing experiences, social learning and an outlet for frustrations and grief.

Seasonality and availability: The interviews were conducted between January and mid-April 2007, constituting the high season in Khao Lak, Patong and Phi Phi Don. People were busy with clients, which placed time constraints on them, hindering their availability and prompting frequent cancellations and rescheduling. This problem was most noticeable in Patong and to a lesser extent Phi Phi where demand has returned to pre-tsunami levels. Availability was less of a hindrance in Khao Lak where tourism numbers are lower. That said the undertaking of Focus Group Discussions during Khao Lak’s low season proved difficult because many tourism businesses close during this time (April-September). This problem was particularly acute among foreign business owners, many of whom return to their home countries for the low season.

Lack of interest, suspicion and interview fatigue: Lack of interest in participation was largely due to two factors: (i) suspicion surrounding research goals, data usage and confidentiality; and (ii) interview fatigue. Suspicion regarding the study goals, the agendas of the researchers, and the usage of the collected data hindered our success in securing interviews with small business owners and staff. Suspicions were often paired with a fear of self-implication and recrimination when broaching power relationships and governance anomalies. Interview fatigue was another ground for
disinterest in participation. There were two reasons for interview fatigue. First, people did not want to relive the disaster through discussions; instead they wanted to focus on normalcy and the future. Second, people found themselves ‘over-researched’ and subject to multiple enquiries (by government officials, NGOs, the media and research groups) which resulted in little feedback or change.

Interest, shared experiences and healing: The undertaking of interviews and FGDs also prompted much curiosity from tourism community members interested in promoting change and social transformation following the disaster. Two main factors underpinned community interest: the research (\(i\)) created a chance for community members to share their experiences and stories, and (\(ii\)) provided opportunities for contributing to and obtaining more information about shared community experiences needed to promote change. The interview process also provided an opportunity to express trauma and to voice disappointments and frustrations arising from inaction by government bodies and NGOs following multiple interviews and meetings and consequent feelings of isolation.

Table 1: Methods summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Sources, Participants and Deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory Literature Review</td>
<td>• Inform theoretical framework and research strategy</td>
<td>SOURCES:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish criteria for selecting case study sites</td>
<td>• The vulnerability and risk literature sourced from food security and development, climate change, risk and natural hazards, political ecology and anthropology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide an overview of the factors and processes that heighten</td>
<td>• Development studies literature on sustainable livelihoods particularly the DFID SL Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vulnerability in destination communities both pre- and post-tsunami</td>
<td>• Human Geography (relational scale and place theory) and Tourism Studies literature focusing on development cycle of tourism destinations and destination vulnerability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Shape and inform the interview questions and structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document and Map Analysis</td>
<td>• Identify the most appropriate case study sites based on level of</td>
<td>SOURCES:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>damage sustained (including natural environment and physical</td>
<td>• Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) press releases and statistics detailing destination hotel capacity and tourism flows and recovery strategies and implementation updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>infrastructure, economic losses and tourism flow declines)</td>
<td>• Government summaries and reports detailing government assessments, responses and updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ascertain developmental history of Khao Lak</td>
<td>• Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Reports detailing institutional responses and operational procedures; these included: recovery and rebuilding plans, NGO operational frameworks and reports on short-term recovery plans and long-term resilience building strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide an overview of the factors and processes that heighten</td>
<td>• Maps of damage sustained and destination tourist maps detailing business types and distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vulnerability in destination communities both pre- and post-tsunami</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Shape and inform the interview questions and structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify stakeholder participants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ascertain institutional responses to the tsunami in case study areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Field Observation
- **Purpose:**
  - Identify main tourism stakeholder groups in Khao Lak
  - Gain an understanding of relationships between different stakeholders in the post-tsunami environment
- **Sources, Participants and Deployment**
  - **Sources:**
    - Maps of damage sustained and destination tourist maps detailing business types and distribution
    - Observation in the host communities
  - **Deployment:**
    - Observations were carried out through the fieldwork period during interviews, community meetings, and when surveying area for damage and choosing participants
    - Observations were noted on a daily basis in fieldwork diaries

### Open-ended Interviews
- **Purpose:**
  - Establish developmental process of tourism in Khao Lak pre-tsunami and document post-tsunami changes
  - Ascertain institutional responses to the tsunami in Khao Lak
  - Identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions that influence vulnerability levels in Khao Lak
  - Investigate the interconnected nature of identified socio-political and environmental factors and the way they are constructed across a range of scales
- **Participants:**
  - The 101 participants span the spectrum of stakeholders that influence and contribute to tourism development in Khao Lak, as well as those playing a role in the recovery:
    - Private sector
    - Public sector
    - NGOs assisting with the local recovery
- **Deployment:**
  - Participants were chosen using hotel listings, tourism stakeholder listings provided by NGOs working in Khao Lak, snowballing techniques and random sampling guided by map and field observations

### Case Histories
- **Purpose:**
  - Establish developmental process of tourism in Khao Lak pre-tsunami and document post-tsunami changes
  - Ascertain institutional responses to the tsunami in Khao Lak
  - Identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions that influence vulnerability levels in Khao Lak
  - Investigate the interconnected nature of identified socio-political and environmental factors and the way they are constructed across a range of scales
- **Participants:**
  - 10 case histories were undertaken with:
    - Founding and long-term members of Khao Lak’s tourism community
    - Key informants who are active in the governance of Khao Lak and/or belong to minorities
    - Random stakeholders who embraced the opportunity to talk in length about their experiences
- **Deployment:**
  - Participants were chosen using snowballing techniques and random sampling

### Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
- **Purpose:**
  - Ascertain livelihood options pre- and post-tsunami
  - Identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions that influence vulnerability levels in Khao Lak
  - Investigate the interconnected nature of identified socio-political and environmental vulnerability factors and the way they are constructed across a range of scales
  - Gain feedback on preliminary findings
  - Identify current community needs and explore community-led solutions to building capacity and resilience
- **Participants:**
  - The 7 stakeholder groups included in the FGDs were chosen from the private sector stakeholder groupings used to guide the interview sampling. They represent dominant stakeholder groups and existing informal stakeholder collectives.
- **Deployment:**
  - Participants were chosen from the interviewee lists and using snowballing techniques
  - Methods used included: Situation Assessments of problems, solutions and their ranked importance; Rich Picture Diagrams to understand cause and effects of identified problems; and Resilience Building Goals
Figure 3: Research tasks and design
PART II  KHAO LAK

1  A DESTINATION IN ITS INFANCY

Khao Lak is located on the west coast of Thailand in the southern province of Phang Nga, approximately 98 km north of Phuket. It is bordered by Khao Lak National Park to the east and Andaman Sea to the west and encompasses an area stretching from Khao Lak Beach up to Laem Pakarang, as shown in figure 4 (page 16). Much of the tourism development is built on a 12 km strip of flat land that extends up to two km inland to the foot of the bordering escarpment. Khao Lak is not one homogenous community; it is made up of several loosely connected tourism development hubs, beginning with Khao Lak Beach to the south, Nang Thong, Bang Niang, then extending up to Laem Pakarang, Pakweep Beach and Bangsak Beach to the north. However, most tourism development is concentrated in Nang Thong and Bang Niang that together form the heart of the tourism destination community. The population of the greater Khao Lak area is summarised in Table 2 with Khao Lak’s main centres highlighted in dark blue.

Table 2: Population of greater Khao Lak area (Khuk Khak Sub-district)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>2006 Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ban Pak Weeb</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Bang Kaya</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Naibann</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Khuk Khak</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>1178</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Bang Niang (1)</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Bang Niang (2)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bang Niang)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban Bang Lah Own (Nang</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thong)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2385</td>
<td>2298</td>
<td>4683</td>
<td>3369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tourism is the largest and most lucrative industry in Khao Lak, attracting 321 938 visitors in 2004 when the destination was at the height of its popularity (TAT, 2004). Alternate livelihoods, most commonly used as secondary sources of income by some, include rubber, fruit and palm oil plantations, construction, and fishing. But the rapid rise in Khao Lak’s popularity as a tourist destination did not happen by chance. Box 1 outlines Khao Lak’s unfolding developmental history and the events and processes that transformed it from a small village to an up-and-coming international destination.

Khao Lak’s destination community consists of two main types of businesses: accommodation providers and support businesses. In early 2008, the number of businesses in Khao Lak is outlined in Table 3. Guesthouses, small and medium resorts form the backbone of the Khao Lak tourism industry, most of which are owned by locals from the surrounding area. The large 4- and 5-star luxury resorts are recent additions to Khao Lak’s tourism industry, most of which were built after 2000. However, the balance still lies with the smaller establishments. Benefiting directly from Khao Lak’s mass market tourism boom, a multitude of businesses developed to support the needs of the tourist. The types of supporting businesses found in Khao Lak include restaurants, souvenir shops, tailoring and health spa facilities, taxi services, local tour guiding businesses and scuba diving companies (see Appendix 4 for a tourism map of the area detailing the various business types).

Table 3: Numbers of businesses in Khao Lak

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Business Type</th>
<th>Business numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hotel/resort/bungalow</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Tour operator</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Restaurant (food and beverage)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Pub and bar</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Retail (grocery) shop</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Diving shop</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Massage and beauty salon</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Laundry</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Souvenir shop</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Cloth shop</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Box 1: The birth of a new tourism destination

Emulating the development patterns of most Thai tourism destinations, Khao Lak started from small-scale spot development that began on Nang Thong Beach in 1988. The first 10 bungalows were constructed by a German man called Gerd and his Thai wife Noi. Khao Lak and its undiscovered charm attracted the German naturalist tourist market seeking untouched landscapes to explore. However, at this time ‘Khao Lak’ as a place did not exist. It was not until the successful marketing launch of Khao Lak Laguna Resort in 1996 that transformed Khao Lak from an undiscovered ‘sleeping’ tourism community to an internationally renowned tourism destination.

Khao Lak Laguna Resort was the first to feature in the brochures of two prominent European tour operators: Neckermann Reisen in Germany and Star Tours operating in Scandinavia. Needing a unique destination profile, the name ‘Khao Lak’ was taken from the mountain that overlooks the valley and used by the tour operators to epitomise the tranquil and untouched destination product that featured in their brochures. The identity of ‘Khao Lak’ continues to transpose the original names of the villages that have adopted tourism as their primary livelihood source. Prominent and constant exposure in the brochures of Europe’s largest tour operators is responsible for Khao Lak’s exponential growth from 100 rooms in 1996 to 5312 in December 2004.

The tourism boom that took place in the late 1990s attracted investors from all over Thailand while some foreign investors that came as tourists never left. Khao Lak was a cheap investment alternative to more well-established destinations, like Patong, Hua Hin and Ko Samui, where high costs and competition for land and shop space had made them unaffordable. Tourism development spread to Bang Niang in 1999 which quickly developed into the second most populated tourism hub and rivalling Nang Thong. Poor landowners capitalised on rising land prices in Bang Niang by subdividing the land into small plots and selling much of it to new investors keen to take advantage of the tourism boom. At the time of the tsunami, many Bang Niang businesses were, therefore, relatively new or in the finishing stages of building.

Prior to the tsunami, Bang Niang was characterised by small plots filled by a myriad of smaller bungalows and restaurants made out of basic materials. Any gaps in the landscape were filled with shrubs and trees. Some larger resorts on the foreshore completed the new destination landscape that was understated and relaxed. The more established village of Nang Thong has a mixed and populated feel with a greater number of shops and larger resorts. As the popularity of Khao Lak grew, tourism development expanded further north to Laem Pakarang, Pak Weep Beach and Bang Sak Beach.

Due to its short developmental history, many of the business owners and workers in Khao Lak are originally from the greater area. This is particularly the case in Nang Thong with many of the 36 original families working in tourism. Bang Niang has a higher proportion of outside migrant business ownership (including Western expatriates) as does the northern hub. However, the feel of Khao Lak remains very local, welcoming and friendly, which is one of its main attractions.

2 MAIN MARKETS AND ATTRACTIONS

“We have no motor boat on the beach. No parasailing, no jet-skis. We don’t have red-light, nightlife entertainment districts, no prostitutes. Family tourism, ecotourism ... You can’t build on the beach, you can’t put beach chairs on the beach, you can’t have beach vendors on the beach ... This is Khao Lak. This is very, very special. It’s still a village ... It’s not mass tourism here ... It was the declared goal for Khao Lak to do it different from the beginning. And they’re good with it ... [W]e have high class tourism here, Khao Lak is one of the high class areas in Thailand ... You are part of the locals.” (Tour Operator Representative, personal communication, 2 February 2007).

Positioned within the competitive Thai tourism market as an alternative to its bustling neighbouring destination of Phuket, Khao Lak is marketed as a peaceful haven for nature lovers who want to relax and dive. Khao Lak’s main markets are largely Eurocentric as shown in figure 5 (page 17). Germany and Sweden remain Khao Lak’s main markets (31 per cent and 15 per cent respectively) with the U.K., Switzerland and Finland

---
4 Interview Nos. 18 and 23 in Table 8
Figure 4: Location of Khao Lak
The Asian market is small, while Thais only stay in Khao Lak for long weekends and public holiday periods.5

There are two types of tourists that are attracted to Khao Lak. The first group are predominantly families and retirees wanting to escape the European winter. This market is wealthier and is prepared to spend more for tranquillity and beautiful surroundings. Main activities include: swimming and relaxing on the sparsely populated beaches, snorkelling, trekking or mountain biking through the mountainous hinterland, elephant treks, adventure tours (including rafting and canoeing), and short trips to Phang Nga Bay or Khao Sok National Park. The second group are dive enthusiasts that use Khao Lak as a base for the diving destination of the Similan Islands. Located 80 km from the coast, the Similan Islands are rated as one of the top 10 dive destinations in the world. The importance of this niche market is well recognised and guarded by the Khao Lak tourism community that work hard to maintain this distinction.6

3 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF KHAO LAK

The two main groups that control tourism development in Thailand are: the Royal Thai Government (RTG) aided by subordinate levels of government and the private sector (Leksakundilok, 2004, Smith, 2000). Figure 6 shows the main governmental departments and private sector stakeholders that influence tourism development in Khao Lak.

The national government oversees the way in which tourism is promoted and developed through tourism policy formulation, planning regulations and marketing strategies (Parnwell, 1998, Hall, 2001). The reasons for this ardent interest are: to attract foreign investment, maximise earnings and project a favourable national image (Brickshawana, 2003, Leksakundilok, 2004). Three interlinked governmental bodies oversee and manage tourism’s expansion in Thailand:

- **Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT):** The TAT creates and projects a strong national and domestic tourism image achieved through constant marketing activities (Higham, 2000, Phayakvichien, 2005).

- **Ministry of Tourism and Sport:** Formed in 2003, the Ministry of Tourism and Sports oversees the direction of tourism policy from the national level. Its Office of Tourism Development guides policy through the five-year Tourism Development Plans (TDPs) that correspond to the National Economic and Social Development Plans (NESDP) that steer national development (NESDB, 2004, Pupphavesa et al., 2007).

- **Provincial and local governments:** With the reorganisation of tourism policy structures and processes in 2003 provincial and local governments were awarded control over design

---

5 Interview No. 41 in Table 8
6 Interview Nos. 18, 71, 80 and 86 in Table 8
and implementation strategies that match localised needs and resources (Brickshawana, 2003, Phayakvichien, 2005). The Phang Nga Provincial Government tailors central plans to suit localised goals but the responsibility for implementing and managing tourism development lies with the Tambon Administration Organisations (TAO) operating at the sub-district level (Leksakundilok, 2004). Khao Lak is governed by three TAOs: Bang Muang and Khuk Khak and Bang Lamkan. These TAOs also assist with the production of tourism signage, maintaining natural beachside resources, improving English skills, and promoting tourism activities and ecotourism through established networks7 (ASIST-AP, 2004). Yet their main role is the provision of basic infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, water, and waste management.

Yet despite solid governmental policies, tourism development in Thailand is largely driven by the private sector. The private tourism sector consists of three main groups that operate at the international, national, sub-national (regional), and local level. The formal tourism sector, consisting of accommodation providers, inbound and outbound tour operators, local tour operators, travel agencies, and transport companies, specialise in selling core components of the tourism experience. Support businesses, such as photo developing shops, souvenir and clothing shops, restaurants and bars, convenience stores, and health spas and massage parlours, cater

---

7 Interview Nos. 34 and 53 in Table 8

---

**Box 2: Phang Nga Development Strategy Goals**

**Source:** Bang Muang TAO, 2007

**Phang Nga Development Vision:** To be a world tourist destination and premier agricultural area in Andaman coastal zone.

**Provincial Strategic Goals:**
- To maintain quality tourism
- Transform critical situations into opportunities for the rearrangement of tourism destinations
- Concentrate tourism marketing strategies on diving activities
- Promote long stay and spa tourism
- Develop infrastructure
- Ensure tourist safety and improve communication systems
for the tourists’ every day needs and desires. The products and services that these industry practitioners offer to the tourists are determined by the wants and needs of the client and, as with any business, profit margins. Supporting these multi-scaled businesses are numerous tourism industry representative bodies that use the resourcefulness and political connections of their members to influence tourism development (Leksakundilok, 2004). The Phang Nga Tourism Association (PNTA) plays an active role in helping to shape development through frequent meetings with the Phang Nga governor and occasional planning discussions with local TAO representatives.

4 THE IMPACTS OF THE 2004 TSUNAMI ON KHAO LAK

“Where is tourism? As soon as people started speaking, that was one of their first questions ... even within the first week ... Will the tourists ever come back to Khao Lak? What is going to happen to us?” (English trainer, personal communication, 9 February 2007).

Approaching from due west, the first tsunami waves hit the tourism destination of Khao Lak at approximately 10.30am, the largest of which reached a height of 10.6 metres (Warunpitikul and Tangwisutijit, 2005). The waves penetrated as far as 3.5 km inland resulting in severe coastal erosion and destroying much of the built and natural environment. In the space of a few hours 5295 of the 6369 rooms available in Phang Nga (90 per cent of room capacity) were destroyed, culminating in an estimated THB 20 billion (more than USD 500 million) in damages (TAT, 2005a, Katharangsiporn, 2005, TAT, 2005c) and the lives of both tourism community members and tourists were taken. Seventy per cent of the 8212 people that died in Thailand were from Phang Nga Province (ADPC, 2006, UN, 2006), 358 of whom were tourism staff8. The hotels and bungalows were fully booked for the Khao Lak tourism high season. Receiving no warning, the tourists and the industry staff working in the many resorts and bungalows that lined the beach had no chance to escape. The bulk of the economic impact was borne by individual businesses of all types and sizes (WTO, 2005a). The extent of physical damage to Khao Lak—particularly in Bang Niang and Laem Pakarang—coupled with the huge losses of life has left parts of the Khao Lak community struggling to recover three years after the tsunami9.

The Khao Lak destination community experienced both direct and indirect impacts as a result of the tsunami: businesses were destroyed, tourist flows dried up, jobs were lost, and the workforce needed to run newly-opened businesses was severely depleted. The beachside properties in Nang Thong and the whole area of Bang Niang and Laem Pakarang sustained severe damage with many properties being completely destroyed. Businesses that sustained physical damage faced challenges in securing financial support for rebuilding. Businesses in Nang Thong and Khao Lak Beach that escaped physical damage suffered a loss of income due to a lack of clientele, depriving them of their primary income source10. Consequently, thousands of workers were retrenched or had their income significantly reduced (UN, 2005: 58). Support business owners and workers such as masseuses and handicraft sellers lost their customers while thousands of people who lost their formal tourism economy work moved into the informal economy for survival (UN, 2005: 58). This disruption of work patterns and employment had greater consequences in the long-term. The loss of lives coupled with the relocation of qualified staff to unaffected destinations immediately after the event left the workforce seriously depleted, which greatly hampered business recovery efforts.

5 RECOVERY OF KHAO LAK

“Many of our friends could not find the money to rebuild. ‘Maybe they did not have the power—psychological strength—to do it [rebuild].’” (Foreign Small Resort Owner at Bang Niang Beach, personal communication, 29 January 2007)

Khao Lak is in the process of rebuilding but the recovery has been slower than in Patong and Phi Phi Don. The first year was the hardest as tourist numbers in Phang Nga dropped 71.63 per cent (to 821 263 tourists) from the previous year’s highs of 2 894 652 persons (TAT, 2008). Throughout 2005 business was buoyed by the large numbers of volunteers who needed food and a bed and by loyal repeat clients who wanted to support the

8 Interview No. 87 in Table 8
9 Interview No. 23 in Table 8
10 Interview Nos. 90 and 99 in Table 8
community by generating much-needed business. The rebuilding of individual businesses is being undertaken in stages mirroring the process that marked Khao Lak’s modest beginnings, regulated by the availability of funds and increasing tourist flows. But ownership of resorts of all sizes has changed as people grapple with trauma and monetary flow issues (TAT, 2006b). This is particularly the case in Bang Niang. An examination of changes in overall tourism flows to Phang Nga (figure 7), room capacity (figure 8) and average occupancy rates in Khao Lak (figure 9) provides insights into the speed and pattern of rebuilding. Only 800 rooms out of the 5312 rooms pre-tsunami were available for occupation by the beginning of the 2005/2006 high season (ILO, 2006) with the number steadily growing each year. While occupancy rates are climbing toward pre-tsunami levels, they are yet to fully recover despite there being 2078 fewer rooms physically available in Khao Lak as of April 2008.

The recovery of the various villages that make up Khao Lak has differed greatly. Nang Thong’s recovery has been more rapid than Bang Niang for two main reasons. First, Nang Thong was not as heavily affected by the tsunami. The waves fell 100 metres short of the main road where many of the shops and support businesses are located. Second, this is the oldest and most established village among those that make up Khao Lak. Accordingly, access to finances (savings, established credit histories, and multiple businesses) was stronger than in its fledgling neighbour of Bang Niang. But the disaster did not only bring destruction, it also opened up opportunities for business advancement and expansion. Greater accessibility for large and medium businesses to cheap credit has seen some Nang Thong accommodation providers expand their pre-tsunami business ventures. Access to financial capital and credit remains a constraint. Dive operators

Figure 7: Annual tourist flow growth rates for Phang Nga Province 1999-2007

Figure 8: Number of rooms in Khao Lak 2004-2008

Figure 9: Hotel occupancy rates in Khao Lak 2004-2007

11 Interview Nos. 19, 23, 71 and 97 in Table 8
12 Interview Nos. 36, 55, 76, 77, 80, 83 and 86 in Table 8
13 Interview Nos. 28, 50, 59, 65 and 70 in Table 8
14 Comparative figures for Khao Lak are unavailable. Accordingly, Phang Nga Province figures are used as a guide given that Khao Lak is the largest tourist destination in the province.

15 Interview Nos. 36 and 96 in Table 8
have regained much of their pre-tsunami business but other support businesses, such as tailors, are not faring as well due to their heavy reliance on strong high-end tourist flows\textsuperscript{16}.

The tsunami had a considerable impact upon Bang Niang. In the once green and popular destination landscape many buildings, old and new, remain empty. The many small family bungalow enterprises that once filled the inner roads of Bang Niang are struggling to rebuild due to problems in accessing financial credit\textsuperscript{17}. Others who survived the tsunami could not return due to the trauma that resulted from the event\textsuperscript{18}. Large pieces of land remain empty and barren with ‘for sale’ signs up as the recovery continues. Comparative observations of business activity made in January and September 2007 reveal that new businesses that had opened for the 2006/2007 high season have already closed, a testament to the village’s heightened vulnerability. Some business owners have moved their businesses and houses away from the low-lying coastal plain and these plots are slowly being bought up by larger investors for larger-scale development. This is changing the Bang Niang tourist landscape and many of the smaller business owners are afraid that Bang Niang will lose its low-key and localised appeal\textsuperscript{19}.

Laem Pakarang was the worst affected area of Khao Lak where the waves were up to 10.6 metres high and pushed as far as two km inland. The majority of the large resorts that lined Laem Pakarang’s beach are still under construction. Some sit dormant as owners contemplate the viability of a tourism revival\textsuperscript{20} while others, such as the Blue Village, might never be rebuilt due to the high death toll there (TAT, 2006b). However, some community members are optimistic about Khao Lak’s future\textsuperscript{21}. Risk and tourism downturns may pose a threat to the security of some businesses but the area as a whole is likely to fully recover as struggling businesses sell and new investors buy into the destination community\textsuperscript{22}. In the words of one German employee:

\begin{quote}
“Tourism will come back and this [is] a big, big relief. The tin mining ... has gone. What do we have? There is no big industry. So you rely on rubber tapping, fishing and that’s it? Tourism is the biggest [industry] ... This is the future for us." (Tourist Travel Agent Representative, personal communication, 2 February 2007)
\end{quote}

Tour operator charter flights and room allocations rose for the 2008/2009 Andaman Coast high season. Strong indications from the European tour operators suggest that significant business will be directed toward Khao Lak leading to a possible tourist flow increase of 20 per cent\textsuperscript{23}. Community members predict a return to pre-tsunami capacity and occupancy levels in the 2009/2010 high season\textsuperscript{24}.

The multiple factors that contributed to Khao Lak’s vulnerability to the tsunami (pre-tsunami conditions), the collective actions taken to rebuild the Khao Lak tourism community post-disaster and the outcomes of these actions that have shaped Khao Lak’s current state are presented in Part III.

\begin{flushleft}
16 Interview Nos. 79, 81, 82 and 86 in Table 8
17 Interview Nos. 17, 25, 28 and 50 in Table 8
18 Interview Nos. 17, 28 and 50 in Table 8
19 Interview Nos. 20, 28 and 59 in Table 8
20 Interview No. 79 in Table 8
21 Interview Nos. 21, 25, 50, 71 and 80 in Table 8
22 Interview Nos. 56 in Table 8
23 Interview No. 23 in Table 8
24 Interview Nos. 19, 71 and 55 in Table 8
\end{flushleft}
PART III DESTINATION VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF KHAO LAK

1 EXPOSURE

Exposure to the tsunami and destruction levels in Khao Lak were the outcomes of a combination of geophysical parameters, including ocean bathymetry, coastal morphology, and the absence of significant natural barriers, coupled with man-made factors, such as development patterns and characteristics and human alterations to the biophysical environment (UNEP, 2005). Khao Lak’s physical exposure to the tsunami was heightened by the shallowness of the offshore shelf, the flatness and openness of the onshore coastal plain, and building characteristics. Khao Lak’s flat and open coastal terrain is perfect for tourism development; the vast stretches of beaches are calm and the flat terrain easy to build on but this also left the community very exposed to the high waves spurred by a shallow foreshore. Furthermore, the building materials and positioning proved inappropriate for the open terrain. Having little protection from natural vegetation and shallow footings, most beachside buildings were destroyed. Wooden and brick structures fared the worst, with reinforced concrete structures proving more robust.

1.1 Biophysical characteristics of tsunami waves and impact patterns

The nature of the foreshore bathymetry and coastal terrain were key contributors to the evolution of the near-shore tsunami waves and the subsequent damage Khao Lak sustained (Siripong, 2006). The intensity and height of the tsunami waves that devastated Khao Lak along with the extensive reach of the water inland were influenced by the following five factors: the massive size of the generating event and its close proximity to Khao Lak; the shallowness of the offshore shelf; the shape of the coastline; and the low-lying nature of the coastal plain upon which Khao Lak is built (Chatenoux and Peduzzi, 2005, National Science Foundation, 2005a, Dalrymple et al., 2006).

The Great Sumatra-Andaman earthquake that generated the 2004 tsunami was an event of staggering geological proportions. With a magnitude of $M_w 9.3$, it ranks as the second largest earthquake in recorded history alongside the 1960$M_{w} 9.5$ earthquake in Chile and the $M_{w} 9.2$ Alaska earthquake of 1964 (Kawata et al., 2005, Ioualalen et al., 2007). It had the longest duration of faulting (at least 10 minutes), while the aftershocks presented the most vigorous earthquake swarm ever observed (National Science Foundation, 2005a, Norwegian Geotechnical Institute, 2006). The vertical uplift of the Indo-Australian tectonic plate and drop of the Burma plate caused a vertical difference of up to 8.5 metres in seafloor elevation that displaced an estimated 30 cubic km of water forming a tsunami wave that travelled outward from the near north-south alignment of the fault (British Geological Survey, 2005, Norwegian Geotechnical Institute, 2006). Figure 10 depicts the vertical modelling of the earthquake induced seabed movement along the India plate and Burma plate boundary (indicated by black dots). Most of the tsunami’s energy was directed in an east-north-easterly direction towards Northern Sumatra and Thailand’s Andaman Coast (Shuto, 2005). The Andaman Coast, located only 500 to 600 km from the source, received the full brunt of the tsunami and suffered huge losses. The tsunami travelled approximately 650 km east-north-east to reach Khao Lak’s shoreline approximately two hours after the earthquake (NGDC, 2009b). Numerical simulations suggest two main waves, which included a weaker pre-wave (Gregg et al., 2006, Ioualalen et al., 2007). Yet eyewitnesses experienced multiple waves, with the second and third waves being reported as larger than the first pre-wave (Gregg et al., 2006, Skelton et al., forthcoming). Such discrepancies could be attributable to difficulties in distinguishing between main and parasitic waves (Skelton et al., forthcoming).

Figure 12 shows the pattern and reach of inundation at Khao Lak. Maximum inundation penetration reached approximately 3.5 km at Laem Pakarang, 1.5 to 2 km at Bang Niang before tapering down to 500 metres to 1 km at Nang Thong. Figure 13 details the run-up heights (drawn from available data). Both vary along the length of Khao Lak’s coastline. Water marks left on buildings and roofs, as shown in figure 14, indicate
that flow depths reached as high as 7 to 8 metres in Khao Lak (Warnitchai, 2005). There are numerous reasons for the deep inundation distances and extreme run-up heights at Khao Lak. First, the bathymetry and sea depths off the coast of Khao Lak are very shallow (as shown in figure 15) causing high run-ups and deep inundation (Siripong, 2006). The shallowness of the foreshore shelf created a shoaling effect, which greatly increased the wave velocity (estimated between 6 to 8 metres per second) and height (Chatenoux and Peduzzi, 2005, Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005, Shuto, 2005). The waves broke far offshore and came ashore as a vertical wall of water. Second, the concentration of the tsunami waves toward Khao Lak was caused by convergence due to bathymetry-induced refraction (Shuto, 2005). Refraction caused by the protruding northern headland at Laem Pakarang and Laem Hin Chang to the south further amplified wave intensity on the surrounding beaches (Gubbels, 2005, Siripong, 2006, Skelton et al., forthcoming). The protruding headlands of Laem Pakarang and Laem Hin Chang are evident in figure 12 and figure 15. The combined effects of convergence and foreshore shallowness on tsunami wave heights are perfectly illustrated at Laem Pakarang where the foreshore is so shallow that the sea bottom is routinely exposed at low tide. Here wave run-ups reached 10.62 metres while eyewitness accounts suggest the convergence of tsunami waves from three directions (Siripong, 2006). The force of the waves severed the terminal of the cape’s spit and eroded the beachfront (beach erosion is marked in red in figure 12). Third, the waves were largely uninhibited by offshore islands, reefs, seagrass and onshore vegetation that have a propensity to reduce wave energy; a thin belt of native coconut and Casuarina trees did little to protect the coastal zone from the immense force of the tsunami (Chatenoux and Peduzzi, 2005, Shuto, 2005, Dalrymple et al., 2006, Siripong, 2006, Cochard et al., 2008). Fourth, the extreme height of the waves coincided with the timing of high tide, causing the tsunami to ride on top of the elevated tidal water level (Bell et al., 2005, Kawata et al., 2005, Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005).

Differences in inundation patterns and run-up heights were caused largely by the topography of Khao Lak (Siripong, 2006). A comparison of the wave penetration patterns between Sunset Beach, Nang Thong, Bang Niang and Laem Pakarang demonstrates the influence of the natural terrain on inundation patterns and run-up heights. Khao Lak is located along a long stretch of very low-lying coastal plain that extends up to four km inland in Khao Lak’s north to the foot of the bordering
escarpment. Comparisons between figure 12 and figure 13 indicate that run-ups and inundation levels were highest along the extremely flat terrain that extends from Laem Pakarang in the north down to Bang Niang Beach. These two areas sustained the heaviest damage in terms of property and loss of life. The southern end of Khao Lak comprising Nang Thong and Sunset Beach was better protected from advancing waves by the higher terrain. Eyewitness accounts and researcher observations confirm that resorts at Sunset Beach were only marginally affected by the waves given that most of the development is built on the rising hills of the southern escarpment dominated by Khao Lak Mountain. Nang Thong suffered immense damage along the beachfront where many of the larger and well-established resorts were located but the waves were prevented from reaching the village of Nang Thong located along the main highway (marked as a red line running from north to south along the coast in figure 12) by upward-sloping terrain. The comparison of satellite images of the topography of Khao Lak featured in figure 16 shows the impact the tsunami had on the coastal plain and the vegetation. Image A portrays the topography of Khao Lak’s coastline prior to the tsunami, which is covered by green vegetation. The extent and pattern of tsunami wave inundation is evident from the grey shading that is seen on Image B (taken on 31 December 2004) where the vegetation was stripped away by the tsunami. Image C highlights the low-lying areas that have maximum sea-level elevations of 10 metres in red.

1.2 Development type, development patterns, and the impact of the tsunami

Locations of human settlements along with the built infrastructure play a crucial role in determining the

Figure 12: Inundation levels along the shoreline of Khao Lak
Source: Department of Geology, Faculty of Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, 2005.

Figure 13: Run-up heights along Khao Lak’s coastline
Figure 14: Maximum flow depths in Khao Lak reached 7 to 8 metres

Figure 15: Bathymetry and topography of Khao Lak in metres along Khao Lak’s beachfront
Source: Pomonis et al. (2006).

Figure 16: Satellite image comparison of Khao Lak’s pre- and post-tsunami topography and inundation levels
vulnerability of communities (Birkmann, 2006), particularly for those engaged in and reliant upon tourism. Extreme events, such as the 2004 tsunami demonstrate that environmental degradation and poorly planned and inappropriate development increase community vulnerability to shocks (Sanandang, 2004, Miller et al., 2005). According to Wong (2000), inappropriate development in Southeast Asia is a direct outcome of a lack of understanding of coastal processes on the part of tourism developers, which in turn, facilitates vulnerability (Pelling, 2003, Wilhite et al., 1987, Wisner et al., 2004). Findings from Khao Lak support these claims.

Capitalising on the views and flat terrain, many resorts were constructed along the beach. However, the proximity of the resorts to the exposed beach coupled with the types of structures built heightened vulnerability to the tsunami. Prior to the tsunami, building regulations stipulated a 30 metre setback from the maximum sea-level line, but did not include detailed structural codes (Bell et al., 2005, Calgaro, 2005). Wave velocities ranging from 6 to 8 metres per second exerted immense hydrodynamic pressure of 20 to 30 kilopascals on buildings and obstacles that lay in the path of the incoming waves (Matsutomi et al., 2005, Warnitchai, 2005). To put this in perspective, this is a minimum of 15 times greater than the lateral wind loading applied to a structure is a non-cyclonic regions (Standards Association of Australia, 2002). Most of the resorts and buildings sustained heavy damage, with many being completely destroyed (Thanawood et al., 2006, Warnitchai, 2005). However, damage patterns varied considerably due to great variances in building materials, structure and foundation types, building positioning and orientation, and elevation (Bell et al., 2005, Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005, National Science Foundation, 2005b, Warnitchai, 2005). To increase building strength, Warnitchai (2005) recommends the limitation of wooden structures in coastal areas and the replacement of shallow spread footings with reinforced concrete deep pile foundations. An Indian Ocean Warning System has been set up (see Section 3.2.2) but the reconfiguration and redesign of development present a challenge to tourism communities and planners as they try to ensure development designs fulfil safety standards and tourist demands for water views. There is some evidence that structures have been rebuilt using more robust currents (Kawata et al., 2005, Warnitchai, 2005). Debris articles ranged from wood, cars, furniture, trees, metal to boats, including a Naval Patrol Ship that was washed 1.5 km inland at Bang Niang— it remains there to date. The great amount of debris carried along by the tsunami not only transmitted more force onto built structures, but also claimed many lives (Warnitchai, 2005). Reinforced concrete structures founded on deep piles proved to be the most structurally sound. However, most buildings in the Andaman Region are non-engineered and have shallow spread footings less than 1 metre below ground (Bell et al., 2005, Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005, Warnitchai, 2005). Severe scouring of the supporting sand underneath these shallow spread footings was very common, leading to widespread foundation failure (Warnitchai, 2005). The severe scouring was caused by highly turbulent and strong tsunami-induced currents (Warnitchai, 2005). Elevated buildings that allowed water to flow under the structure escaped detrimental damages as did buildings with solid walls that were perpendicular to the ocean (Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005, National Science Foundation, 2005b). Most beachfront properties in Khao Lak faced the beach. Entering the buildings through the large sea-facing windows, the force of the tsunami waves gutted the concrete structures but left the building structurally intact (Bell et al., 2005).

Eisner (2005) and Cochard et al. (2008) recommend a number of planning-related principles to reduce exposure to tsunamis. These include: the avoidance of new development along exposed sand spits and narrow and flat land strips; the redesign and reconfiguration of development along the coast that minimises future tsunami loss; the adoption of special precautions that protect critical infrastructure and property; and the introduction of evacuation plans and early warning systems. To increase building strength, Warnitchai (2005) recommends the limitation of wooden structures in coastal areas and the replacement of shallow spread footings with reinforced concrete deep pile foundations. An Indian Ocean Warning System has been set up (see Section 3.2.2) but the reconfiguration and redesign of development present a challenge to tourism communities and planners as they try to ensure development designs fulfil safety standards and tourist demands for water views. There is some evidence that structures have been rebuilt using more robust
materials and design\textsuperscript{25} but these are in the minority\textsuperscript{26}. Few businesses interviewed have changed the design of their buildings or materials used in the aftermath of the tsunami despite recommendations outlined in the post-tsunami Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan (refer to Section 3.2.1.4 for more detail).

\section*{2 SENSITIVITY}

Khao Lak’s sensitivity to the tsunami disaster was heightened by four factors directly related to the very nature of the place-based and seasonal product the community offers: (a) a high dependency on tourism as the primary livelihood option; (b) high seasonality levels; (c) a heavy reliance on the marketing strategies of international tour operators; and (d) the fragility of destination images to negative perceptions of risk. The destination landscape remains incomplete, which lessens its international appeal while ongoing construction noise is causing tourists to leave in frustration. Khao Lak’s destination brand was rapidly growing but was still heavily dependent on a few key markets, which lowers its capacity to attract a broad range of markets.

Compounding these destination-specific sensitivities are those factors relating to Khao Lak’s developmental history, limited hazard awareness, social exclusion and pre-existing weaknesses in governance structures and processes. Being a destination in its infancy, Khao Lak businesses did not have a strong financial base; financial reserves were low and credit histories (if they existed at all) not well established. After the tsunami, many businesses experienced difficulties in accessing financial capital. This has slowed the recovery process, stifled earning capacity and deepened financial sensitivities. A lack of hazard risk awareness attributed in part to the government’s suppression of hazard warnings left the community ill-prepared for risks, while low levels of insurance compounded their vulnerability. Pre-existing weaknesses in governance structures have: (i) hindered the implementation and enforcement of developmental regulations; (ii) corruption and nepotism facilitated the unequal distribution of resources pre- and post-tsunami; and (iii) limited local government engagement leaves the community with little active support and inadequate infrastructure. Social exclusion is a major cause of unequal access to resources for foreigners (most notably the Burmese) while low skill levels in

\textsuperscript{25} Interview No. 100 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{26} Interview Nos. 18, 89 and 101 in Table 8

\textbf{Figure 17: This house at Laem Pakarang exhibits collapsed masonry infill walls with RC frames intact}  
Source: Emma Calgaro.
tourism, hospitality and languages among the local populace inhibits the capacity of businesses to recover. However, Khao Lak’s sensitivity was also lessened by strong community and business characteristics.

Khao Lak’s capacity to recover from the shock of the tsunami was aided by the loyalty of its large repeat-client base who offered financial support through donations and, most importantly, through the return of their business. Many regular tourists brought friends and family with them on their return which not only boosted revenue levels, but gave people hope and resolve to stay and rebuild. Strong family networks also provided much-needed financial and moral support. Decisive actions taken by industry representative bodies and resourceful community members were instrumental in increasing access to financial capital for members and colleagues and securing marketing support, while the resourcefulness of business owners helped attract much-needed business. Some business owners used negative exposure to highlight their plight and attract new clients and business.

2.1 Tourism-specific sensitivities

High dependency on tourism in the face of limited livelihood options

“In this area, if you are not involved in tourism, you cannot earn much money.” (Resort Owner, personal communication 30 January 2007)

Livelihood diversification is recognised as a key strategy in reducing vulnerability and building resilience against a wide range of shocks (Moser et al., 2001, Turner et al., 2003). In Khao Lak, however, land resources are scarce and livelihood options are limited. Before the introduction of tourism, livelihoods were based on rubber, fruit and coconut plantations, shrimp farming and subsistence fishing27. Tourism development created a multitude of new opportunities for locals to start their own businesses and provided surrounding communities with new markets for local produce and thousands of new jobs28 (Scheper and Patel, 2006). Today, the greater Khao Lak community relies heavily on tourism for income31.

Khao Lak’s heavy dependence on tourism is due to two factors: few alternative options and no economic incentive to diversify. The rapid replacement of traditional agricultural livelihoods with more lucrative tourism-related income sources has dramatically reduced the range of livelihood options available to people in Khao Lak. With the introduction of tourism development along the narrow flat strip of Coastal land, there is little appropriate land left for plantations (fruit, rubber, palm oil). Prior to the tsunami there was no economic incentive to diversify when risk levels were considered to be low. Alternate income sources do not generate enough income to support the needs of the household, making tourism the most important livelihood source in the region32. Alternate livelihood incomes are supplementary, particularly in the low season when tourists numbers are down to 30 per cent33. In the words of one resort owner:

“Before tsunami, all business about the tourist. Very good money ... They not need to make more.”34

Those with a diversified tourism portfolio (particularly those with alternate destination locations) are more resilient to risk. Financial resources (earnings and collateral) from unaffected alternate business can be used to secure additional credit needed for rebuilding, paying staff and supplementing earnings if profits are temporarily low. However, the capacity to redistribute resources among multiple businesses (and their resilience) depends on the location of the second tourism business and the nature of the shock.

---

27 Interview Nos. 17, 20, 41, 69 and 83 in Table 8
28 Interview Nos. 20, 45 and 71 in Table 8
For example, if tourist flows are interrupted to Thailand in general, such advantages of diversification could be lost. Political unrest or health epidemics may affect a region or a whole country, as can natural disasters if media reports and government travel warnings in supply countries are overly cautious and misleading (see Section 2.1.4). Those households with substantial earnings from non-tourism activities are the most resilient to these types of stresses and shocks. Adapting to the heightened perception of risk, some foreign business owners have chosen to diversify their tourism portfolio by either building alternate businesses in Khao Lak or choosing to relocate one of their restaurants to another Thai destination\(^{35}\). Such adaptations increase chances of resilient futures.

**High seasonality**

“How can I survive on low season [business]? [The] town is like a ghost-town it’s so quiet.” (Former Restaurant Owner, personal communication, 25 January 2007)

Khao Lak’s vulnerability is compounded by the highly seasonal nature of this business. The strong market demand generated from Europe fills the resorts to full capacity for six months of the year (the high season running from October to March) providing the community

---

\(^{35}\) Interview Nos. 28 and 97 in Table 8
with earnings needed to sustain them through the low season\textsuperscript{36}. The low season generates very little business (approximately 20–30 per cent) due to very heavy rains in the monsoon season and its coincidence with summer in the northern hemisphere. The Eurocentric client base are attracted to sun, sea and sand getaways during the northern winter\textsuperscript{37}. Consequently, the majority of businesses (with the exception of larger accommodation providers) close their doors for the low season giving the destination a ‘ghost-town’ feeling\textsuperscript{38}. Those that remain open struggle further from limited marketing support from the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT). A high dependence on six months of business for yearly earnings necessitates higher product and service prices in Khao Lak\textsuperscript{39}. The timing of the tsunami demonstrated Khao Lak’s vulnerability to shocks during the high season. Occurring at the zenith of high season business, the event simultaneously destroyed the infrastructure, the community’s seasonal earnings, and their yearly income. Support businesses, such as grocers, internet and copy shops, and basic restaurants proved less vulnerable than pure tourism services as they service the needs of the local population year-round\textsuperscript{40}.

To lessen dependence on high season business, medium and larger accommodation providers are adapting their business strategies by diversifying their services and their market base\textsuperscript{41}. One of the oldest resort families in Nang Thong is exploring ways to diversify their markets to include Asian and domestic markets while maintaining established clientele. The domestic market, in particular, does not covet sunlight making them a viable option for the rainy low season\textsuperscript{42}. Larger resorts with conference facilities are diversifying their product to capture the conference market throughout the year\textsuperscript{43}. The building of conference facilities has increased markedly following the tsunami\textsuperscript{44}.

\textbf{Access to markets, destination positioning, and resilient clientele}

“Khao Lak can give something to the guests. Not the same [as] Phuket and Krabi. Most of the hotel have repeat guests ... They come to visit us again after the tsunami in 2005. Some of them stay in Phuket, drive the car for just looking ... So this is [the] symbol of Khao Lak [as a] destination.” (Assistant Resort Manager, personal communication, 5 February 2007)

A destination’s vulnerability is heavily influenced by its market base, business marketing strategies and the type of clientele they attract\textsuperscript{45}. Money is a key factor in facilitating a swift recovery (see Section 2.1.6). Even more important is gaining access to a constant flow of tourists to fill newly-built resorts. The absence of guests leaves newly-finished resorts with mounting debt, no turnover and hence more vulnerable. So the marketing presence of a destination holds the key to its capacity to cope, respond, and adapt to shocks. Khao Lak has a small but loyal market base. However, as a destination in the early stages of development, Khao Lak is devoid of a strong market presence such as the highly branded and popular neighbouring destinations of Patong and Phi Phi Don\textsuperscript{46}. Accordingly, Khao Lak’s market share is lower, as are demand and occupancy rates. When a shock or stressors occur there are fewer tourists to take the place of lost markets, particularly when the image is tainted by negativity—in this case death and destruction. Vulnerability to shocks is not only affected by events in destination countries. Stressors in Khao Lak’s key supply markets of Sweden and Germany, such as economic recessions (recorded in both countries as of November 2008), only compound business vulnerability. However, individual businesses do have the power to influence their own vulnerability levels based on their choice of marketing tools, the strength of their professional business networks (particularly with market suppliers) and their type of clients.

Prior to the tsunami, strong tourist demand for Khao Lak filled the resort to full capacity for six months. The marketing options used to attain these levels differ markedly among the main types of businesses as do business vulnerability levels:

\textsuperscript{36} Interview Nos. 17, 56 and 71 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{37} Interview Nos. 17, 20, 56, 69 and 71 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{38} Interview Nos. 32, 76 and 79 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{39} Interview No. 71 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{40} Interview No. 45 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{41} Interview Nos. 20 and 55 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{42} Interview No. 55 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{43} Interview No. 71 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{44} Interview Nos. 23 and 28 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{45} Interview No. 18 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{46} Interview No. 102 in Table 8
Guesthouses, and small bungalows and resort owners: Small accommodation providers rely on individual travellers sourced through guidebooks (e.g., Stefan Lösser and *Lonely Planet*), internet sites, walk-ins, repeat business and personal recommendations that in time create strong business profiles\(^{47}\). Contracts with travel agents are a rarity\(^{48}\). They also benefit indirectly from the international tour operator coverage of their larger counterparts which creates destination awareness and interest from those looking for cheaper alternatives\(^{49}\).

Medium-sized and large resort owners: The core client base for larger resorts are package tour guests sourced largely through European tour operator brochures\(^{50}\). The main operators include TUI AG, Trans Orient, and LTU (Germany), Fritidsresor and Apollo (Sweden), Star Tour (Denmark and Norway), Thomas Cook (Germany, Scandinavia and U.K.) and Thompson (U.K.). Supplementary business is sourced from internet bookings, repeat guests and word of mouth\(^{51}\). This group also uses large annual international tourism conventions, such as the Internationale Tourismus Börse (ITB) in Berlin, to promote their product to international tour operators\(^{52}\).

Supporting businesses: This group is highly dependent on the marketing success of accommodation providers\(^{53}\) to attract clientele. The exceptions are localised travel agents and tour operators who gain business through internet bookings and walk-ins. This is particularly the case for tailors who depend upon high-end clientele and resort referrals\(^{54}\). Support businesses are left with little control over tourist and consequent business flows.

In reaction to the tsunami, the majority of tour operators (TUI AG, Neckermann, Fritidsresor, Thomas Cook, Apollo) diverted business to alternate destinations for the remainder of the 2004/2005 season and did not resume promotions and supply until the 2006/2007 season\(^{55}\) (TAT, 2006b). The German operator, Trans Orient, proved the exception by returning business in 2005/2006\(^{56}\). Consequently, larger resorts and reliant support businesses that were open and ready to receive guests suffered from huge reductions in clientele, little access to markets and no control over tourism flows\(^{57}\). With limited tour operator support and inadequate marketing assistance from the TAT (see Section 3.2.1.4), community members used long-established European partnerships that facilitated Khao Lak’s pre-tsunami boom to access core markets, rebuild consumer confidence and attract guests back\(^{58}\). From a marketing perspective, smaller bungalow and resort owners were more resilient than their larger counterparts due to their direct access to clientele through internet sites and word of mouth\(^{59}\). Estimated occupancy rates for smaller accommodation providers were 65–100 per cent in the 2006/2007 high season compared to a range of 35–90 per cent for larger resorts, causing the latter to discount heavily to attract business\(^{60}\). For this reason, some larger resorts have also chosen to source clients through word of mouth and repeat clients so as to retain control over tourism flows\(^{61}\).

Marketing aside, one of the most defining factors in Khao Lak’s ongoing recovery has been the resilience and loyalty of their large repeat client-base typified by German and Swedish patrons and the close-knit diving community that has developed over the years\(^{62}\). Khao Lak’s focus on building close relationships with clients has created a strong repeat client base, ranging from 20 per cent for larger resorts to 80 per cent for some smaller properties\(^{63}\). Seen more as old friends and ‘family’ than clients, repeat guests have brought stability

---

\(^{47}\) Interview Nos. 36, 56 and 59 in Table 8  
\(^{48}\) Interview Nos. 56 and 59 in Table 8  
\(^{49}\) Interview No. 59 in Table 8  
\(^{50}\) Interview Nos. 17, 18, 20 and 23 in Table 8  
\(^{51}\) Interview Nos. 55 and 78 in Table 8  
\(^{52}\) Interview Nos. 18, 78 and 80 in Table 8  
\(^{53}\) Interview Nos. 76, 81 and 82 in Table 8  
\(^{54}\) Interview Nos. 79, 81 and 82 in Table 8  
\(^{55}\) Interview Nos. 17 and 71 in Table 8  
\(^{56}\) Interview No. 71 in Table 8  
\(^{57}\) Interview No. 23 in Table 8  
\(^{58}\) Interview Nos. 18, 20 and 28 in Table 8  
\(^{59}\) Interview Nos. 19 and 28 in Table 8  
\(^{60}\) Interview Nos. 18, 20, 28 and 78 in Table 8  
\(^{61}\) Interview No. 55 in Table 8  
\(^{62}\) Interview Nos. 19, 20, 70 and 86 in Table 8  
\(^{63}\) Interview Nos. 18, 20, 65 and 78 in Table 8
and growth to Khao Lak throughout its developmental history and this continues to boost Khao Lak’s recovery and resilience\textsuperscript{64}. Significant numbers of divers and their families returned as early as February 2005 to lend support, while some businesses reported stronger business returns after the disaster due to the sudden influx of repeat clients accompanied by their family and friends\textsuperscript{65}. Their firm presence reassured business owners and supplied much-needed capital\textsuperscript{66}. The high ratio of repeat clients also brings stability in times of shock; they help to overcome negative reports as friends are more likely to believe them over tour operators or media coverage\textsuperscript{67}. Furthermore, the disaster created a sense of camaraderie among businesses and guests that survived and returned\textsuperscript{68}. Access to these types of personalised relationships where guests become more like friends (social capital) has further strengthened the community’s resilience against external shocks.

**International exposure: Image-destroying or marketing opportunity?**

The fragility of destination images to negative perceptions of risk is recognised as a major contributing factor to the vulnerability of destination communities (Huan et al., 2004, Mansfeld, 1999, Richter and Waugh, 1986, Sönmez and Graefe, 1998). This proved true for Khao Lak in the short-term as the incessant negative images and stories of disaster-struck Khao Lak (some true and others not) re-branded it as a disaster zone causing tourist numbers to dwindle in 2005/2006\textsuperscript{69}. Negative and cautionary reports came from the media and supply country travel warnings, while other warnings originated from Phuket’s destination competitors and the Tourism Authority of Thailand\textsuperscript{70}. Constant reminders of the disaster, including markers showing the height of the waves and evacuation route maps, line the beachfront and the roads\textsuperscript{71}. Smaller Asian markets were deterred by culturally-laden ghost superstitions\textsuperscript{72}. However, while tourist numbers have yet to reach pre-tsunami levels due to the ongoing rebuilding process (particularly in Bang Niang), these same images and stories broadcast around the world have also had positive long-term impacts. The greater worldwide exposure opened up new markets that have the potential to generate greater long-term tourist flows\textsuperscript{73}. Following the tsunami, British, Finnish, Norwegian and American tourists have joined the traditionally dominant markets of Germany and Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria\textsuperscript{74}. Many of these new markets originate from young volunteers who encouraged family and friends to visit\textsuperscript{75}. This process multiplies as new guests bring more friends\textsuperscript{76}. Curiosity about the disaster and its legacy has also attracted new visitors who want to see the police boat and look at tsunami-damaged hotels along the beachfront that are yet to be removed\textsuperscript{77}.

Some savvy foreign businesses have used this additional exposure to their advantage by highlighting their plight in their home countries which, in turn, generated much interest in their business and Khao Lak. In the words of a German restaurant owner\textsuperscript{78}:

“No after the tsunami, I have never seen business like this, I have never had before. It was crazy this year [2006/2007 season]. OK in November [2006] was a German TV team came here and they sent a spot before Christmas, in the German TV. You can see this is all the European lands. Like Switzerland, Austria.”

Following this documentary film, the restaurant was fully booked all season creating more business than the owner could cater for. Using the media as a tool for gaining funding support and greater market share has also been employed by the founder of the Ecotourism Training Centre in Bang Niang (refer to Section 3.2.5) which has been covered by the BBC, the Discovery Channel, Yahoo and 80 print media outlets worldwide\textsuperscript{79}.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Interview Nos. 17, 28, 47, 78 and 97 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Interview Nos. 19, 20, 55, 70, 76 and 86 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{66} Interview Nos. 19, 20, 51, 78 and 97 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Interview No. 55 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{68} Interview No. 86 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{69} Interview No. 59 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{70} Interview Nos. 37, 71, 78, 80 and 86 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{71} Interview Nos. 28, 51, 69, 70 and 86 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{72} Interview Nos. 17, 20 and 71 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{73} Interview Nos. 20, 55, 56, 70 and 86 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{74} Interview Nos. 55, 56, 71 and 86 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Interview No. 55 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{76} Interview No. 55 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{77} Interview Nos. 28, 51, 69, 70 and 86 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{78} Interview No. 65 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Interview No. 22 in Table 8
\end{itemize}
Delays in rebuilding and incomplete landscapes keep tourists away but rents still rise

“Many tourists were here [pre-tsunami]. It's a nice area. But you can see around you now that it is not so nice. People do not want to come now when Khao Lak is unfinished ... many people stay short time. I’m losing business.” (Small Bungalow and Bakery Owner in Bang Niang, personal communication 26 January 2007)

Rebuilding delays and ongoing construction in both Bang Niang and Nang Thong has left the destination landscape looking incomplete, which negates a strong tourism recovery. Furthermore, the lengthy time period between the disaster event and Khao Lak’s recovery is compounding this emerging sensitivity. As noted in Section 5 of Part II, Bang Niang is littered with vacant lots, abandoned structures and ‘for sale’ signs while some of Laem Pakarang’s larger resorts lay dormant. Prior to the tsunami, Bang Niang was rivalling Nang Thong for most popular centre due to the myriad of trees that surrounded the many small bungalows and atmospheric restaurants that were scattered throughout the greenery. This is still missing causing it to feel very much like a ‘ghost town’ instead of the tropical getaway it once was. This is harming Khao Lak’s destination image and is lowering investor confidence causing a catch-22 situation: the landscape cannot recover without strong investment but investors are hesitant to invest in an uncertain business venture causing some to wait.

The reasons for this situation lie with both the private and public sector. Delays in rebuilding hamper income generation from incomplete tourism ventures and affect neighbouring properties. Ongoing noisy construction all over Khao Lak has turned tourists away. Some come for shorter periods of time; others leave earlier than planned. The rebuilding process is further slowed by governmental delays in the replacement of infrastructure in Bang Niang. Power was not supplied until August 2005, leaving business owners to rely on generators. The destination landscape remains incomplete, which lessens its international appeal while ongoing construction noise is causing tourists to leave in frustration. Khao Lak’s destination brand was rapidly growing but was still heavily dependent on a few key markets, which lowers its capacity to attract a broad range of markets.

Street lighting along the inner Bang Niang streets has still not been replaced, pavements remain incomplete and a lack of good drainage systems leads to flooding. Resort owners contend that bad infrastructure is creating an unfavourable tourism image and affecting business negatively. Their guests feel insecure walking down dark streets at night with incomplete pavements. The Khuk Khak TAO is responsible for infrastructure provisions in Bang Niang. However, there is a belief among resort owners that the TAO does not have the monetary resources or the political will to rectify the situation in tourism areas as this type of repair does not benefit them directly (see Section 2.5.1 for more detail on governance challenges).

Low tourist flows to Bang Niang have caused some new businesses to close, demonstrating the continuance of business vulnerability. However, this has not prevented rent rises imposed by landlords needing to finance their recovery and an increasing demand for land in prime locations in Bang Niang and Nang Thong. Rents for some properties have risen to such an extent that some tenants are forced to relocate to cheaper land plots and shop premises. Others have been successful in resisting rent increases so far but the threat remains.

A new destination in the early stages of development

Being in the early stages of development, Khao Lak’s tourism community proved more vulnerable to stresses and shocks than its more developed neighbours of Patong and Phi Phi Don. The stage of a destination’s development...
development influences not only the availability of financial resources, business stability and the strength of supporting industry bodies, but also determines the strength of a destination’s brand, market position and its consequent capacity to attract a broad range of markets. Khao Lak’s recovery following the disaster was hampered by problems in securing financial capital and attracting substantial market share. Khao Lak’s recent development as an international tourism destination meant that many businesses were relatively new with some being in the final stages of building when the tsunami occurred. Accordingly, business owners had limited access to savings, as they had invested most of their money in building their businesses (see Section 2.2). The correlation between development advancement, business stability, and access to financial capital is evident when making comparisons between the recovery capacity of businesses in the more established village of Nang Thong and its younger neighbour Bang Niang, which experienced a surge in tourism development in the early 2000s and was still growing at the time of the tsunami and is still struggling to rebuild due to financial challenges. In contrast, business recovery in Nang Thong is significantly more advanced. Here development is more established and business owners are more likely to have more than one business, such as rubber plantations (the main livelihood source prior to tourism), or multiple tourism businesses that have grown over the last two decades. The strengthening of business portfolios and the establishment of strong credit histories enabled quicker access to financial capital in the aftermath of the tsunami. Being home to many of the original inhabitants, Nang Thong also benefits from stronger family and social networks than Bang Niang which consists of newer inhabitants, many of whom have come into the area from other parts of Thailand and other countries, including Western European expatriates who came to Khao Lak as visitors and never left (see Section 2.6.2).

Access to finances depends upon a household’s capacity to respond, whereas access to market share is a destination-wide challenge that is in part outside the control of individual and collective destination efforts. As noted in Section 2.1.3, Khao Lak benefits from a loyal yet small market base and its infancy as a destination means that tourism flows are concentrated on a few key European markets making it more vulnerable to any stressor or shock that may change tourist patterns, including market trends and international operator preferences. Local industry association membership has boosted marketing reach and facilitated greater access to financial capital among some business sub-groups but smaller businesses and workers remain ill-represented in Khao Lak (see Section 2.6.1). This heightens their vulnerability and limits community cohesiveness.

2.2 Uneven access to financial capital

Access to economic capital proved the most important factor in determining people’s coping and recovery capabilities. The uneven access to financial resources is a main driver behind Khao Lak’s vulnerability and slow recovery (ILO, 2006). Unlike their counterparts in Patong, Khao Lak community members were most likely to be servicing new debts due to the early stage of development that the Khao Lak community was experiencing when the tsunami occurred. However, there are considerable differences in financial access capabilities between community members depending on business size, stage of business development, strength of social networks, and differences in nationality.

Thai businesses

Micro and small businesses

Khao Lak’s tourism boom persuaded many people living in the greater Takuapa District to invest all their accessible financial capital into lucrative tourism ventures. Like most business development in Thailand, tourism investors in Khao Lak started with small ventures sourcing capital from savings and family networks, land sales and profits from previous business ventures, and used all their profits to expand their businesses over time. Hence, those small business owners that had reinvested all their profits to expand and update their businesses were left with little means for recovery. This was particularly the case for Bang Niang businesses, some of which had opened only months before the tsunami or were still in the process of building. Financial institutions started to offer substantial loans to business applicants only as recently as 2004 in response to a perceived infallibility of Khao Lak’s tourism boom (Calgaro, 2005). Some small businesses were among those that secured loans to help finance their business ventures, but they were in the minority (24 per cent). Yet those with pre-existing loans were left with high repayment commitments but little

---

93 Interview 17, 18, 20, 76, 78 and 83 in Table 8
94 Interview 86 in Table 8
95 Interview 21, 39, 67 and 103 in Table 8
means to repay them\textsuperscript{96}. The majority, however, had no credit rating and, therefore, faced difficulties in securing financial credit for rebuilding (see Section 3.2.1.1 for details on post-tsunami financial options).

**Medium and large businesses**

Medium and larger resorts were most likely to have adequate access to financial capital due to strong credit ratings and profits accumulated over time\textsuperscript{97}. These businesses are generally more stable and established, confirming the strong correlation between access and entitlements to resources and the developmental stage of a destination. Like their smaller counterparts, larger businesses started from smaller beginnings and grew over time and space\textsuperscript{98}, often branching out and opening further tourism ventures\textsuperscript{99}. Loans were commonly used to expand business operations\textsuperscript{100}. Capital was also sourced from other business ventures (often belonging to the family unit) and were able to access capital from these ventures to rebuild\textsuperscript{101}. This is in contrast to smaller business owners in Khao Lak, many of which had no alternative income source or were new tourism entrepreneurs.

**Foreign businesses**

There are two types of foreign community members in Khao Lak: Europeans and South Asians (Nepalese and Burmese). Both have very different experiences with respect to access and entitlements to financial and social capital.

**Foreign small businesses**

Like their Thai counterparts, foreign small businesses started their businesses from the sale of assets and savings accumulated in their home countries. All profits were used to expand their businesses over time\textsuperscript{102}. This practice limited liquid capital available to be used in the recovery\textsuperscript{103}. Compounding this problem was the timing of the disaster. With the event taking place on 26 December, substantial monetary takings earned on Christmas (the busiest and most lucrative day of the year) were washed away by the water; owners had not had the time to deposit the money in the bank\textsuperscript{104}. Loans were uncommon with the exception of those businesses run by Thai-foreign couples. Some joint foreign-Thai businesses in Khao Lak had a positive credit rating and relationship with their bank, making it possible for them to access loans needed for the rebuilding\textsuperscript{105}. Having a Thai partner enables access to loans. Foreigners alone are not able to borrow money because they lack the land deeds used by the banks as collateral; foreigners are not able to own land\textsuperscript{106}. Furthermore, banks will not risk loaning money to foreigners because many have one-year visa restrictions and no residency; it is too easy for them to leave without paying the loans back\textsuperscript{107}. One advantage of not having loans was the lack of debt burden, leaving them in a strong financial position\textsuperscript{108}. Section 3.2.1.3 outlines the financial options available post-tsunami. But the pre-tsunami financial status of Western expatriates and those from Nepal and Burma differ markedly.

**Burmese and Nepalese business owners and workers**

Burmese workers make up a significant part of Khao Lak’s low-skilled tourism workforce. Prior to the tsunami, 10 000 Burmese worked as low-paid manual labourers building new beachfront hotels, while others worked in restaurants, tailor shops, and in resorts (Chit, 2005). The Burmese population are the most disadvantaged financially, socially and politically. They are routinely exploited by members of the police for personal financial gain (Robertson, 2007). This sustained extortion depleted their financial stock and left them very vulnerable to shocks and further abuse. This type of victimisation was exacerbated by the disaster. Lacking access to banks and other savings institutions because of their migration status, many Burmese kept significant amounts of money hidden in their houses. This money was lost to the tsunami waves leaving the Burmese with little means of survival (Robertson, 2007).

Nepalese support business owners and workers are respected in the Thai community and do not suffer the

\textsuperscript{96} Interview 20, 21, 31 and 76 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{97} Interview 18, 23, 25, 55 and 80 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{98} Interview 36, 55 and 77 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{99} Interview 18 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{100} Interview 18, 20, 25, 36, 55 and 78 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{101} Interview 18 and 25 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{102} Interview 86 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{103} Interview 65 and 86 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{104} Interview 17 and 65 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{105} Interview 50 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{106} Interview 28 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{107} Interview 106 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{108} Interview 56, 59 and 91 in Table 8
same discrimination as the Burmese. But they too face challenges. Burmese and Nepalese support businesses are struggling as they, like other support businesses, rely heavily on resorts to attract business to Khao Lak. They did not receive aid because their businesses are generally located along the main street in Nang Thong that was not damaged.

Low levels of insurance coverage and risk perception
Low insurance levels among Khao Lak businesses heightened their vulnerability to shocks and stressors. Yet the choice to take out insurance is culturally-loaded and depended on risk perceptions and surplus income. Insurance preferences fall into three categories: those with comprehensive coverage, those with basic insurance, and those with none. Prior to the tsunami, comprehensive insurance cover was high among medium and larger businesses with pre-existing loans because insurance is a prerequisite for securing bank credit\(^{109}\). Only 9 per cent of small businesses interviewed had comprehensive insurance. However, both small and larger businesses encountered difficulties in securing claim payouts\(^{110}\). For some, insurance payouts fell short of covering all costs\(^{111}\) and others only had basic insurance for fire and/or water damage (11 per cent) as the risk of a tsunami was unknown\(^{112}\). The majority of the micro and smaller businesses interviewed did not have any insurance, a common trait (Bell et al., 2005, WTO, 2005a). The reasons relate directly to access to finances, perception of risk and social norms. First, Khao Lak was perceived as safe; there was no prior history of tsunamis or storm surges and criminal activity is low. Second, insurance was seen as an unnecessary and high cost for micro and small businesses. Third, knowledge about appropriate insurance premiums was minimal. Finally, those that rent shop space find it difficult to obtain insurance for the content of their premises.

This pattern of insurance coverage and the rationale behind it remained largely unchanged after the tsunami. Only six of those that had basic or no insurance prior to the tsunami now have comprehensive insurance, a direct response and adaptation to the new perception of risk in the area. The large majority, however, have chosen not to take out insurance for five reasons. First, the high cost of insurance outweighs the perceived risk; the threat of another tsunami is considered highly unlikely\(^{113}\). Second, there is scepticism that insurance companies would honour comprehensive policies citing the ‘act of god’ exemption clause\(^{114}\). Third, knowledge about insurance among small businesses remains low. Fourth, small businesses renting their shop space face difficulties securing insurance policies for shop contents\(^{115}\). Finally, insurance is not an automatic response to risk in Thailand as it may be in the West due, in part, to high costs. Instead, some put money aside regularly to cover unforeseen damage or shocks\(^{116}\).

2.3 Linkages between access to information and disaster preparedness

“More could have been done but no one was prepared for it.” (Manager of Dive Operator; personal communication, 7 February 2007)

Perceptions of risk and disaster preparedness are directly related to access to information; lack of awareness of coastal hazards and vulnerabilities limit capacity to address hazard risk (US-IOTWS, 2007). Tourism businesses and industry organisations are often ill-prepared for disaster situations even in high risk areas because the potential impacts of disasters are deliberately played down for marketing purposes (Cassedy, 1991, Drabek, 1992, Drabek, 1995, Murphy and Bayley, 1989). This proved to be the case in Khao Lak. The community did not perceive the Andaman coastal zone to be unsafe or at risk to natural hazardous events and information pertaining to potential risks was scarce\(^{117}\). The fault for the scarcity of information about potential threats and the consequent heightened state of vulnerability along the Andaman Coast can be attributed in part to the central government.

In 1998, the director general of the Meteorological Department issued a warning to the government pertaining to the likely threat tsunamis posed to Thailand’s Andaman Coast (The Nation, 26 July 2005)

\(^{109}\) Interview 18, 23, 25, 50 and 77 in Table 8
\(^{110}\) Interview 19, 21, 24 and 26 in Table 8
\(^{111}\) Interview 18, 20 and 23 in Table 8
\(^{112}\) Interview 21, 25, 50, 52, 78 and 86 in Table 8

\(^{113}\) Interview 28, 29, 31, 32, 37, 46, 65, 86, 90 and 99 in Table 8
\(^{114}\) Interview 18 and 86 in Table 8
\(^{115}\) Interview 99 in Table 8
\(^{116}\) Interview 65 in Table 8
\(^{117}\) Interview 51 in Table 8
that subsequently featured in media reports broadcast in Phuket at the time\textsuperscript{118}. However, these claims were publicly refuted as the negative ramifications of the perceived risk upon tourism flows to Phuket and the surrounding area were considered too costly (ibid.). The same reason was cited for the failure of the Meteorological Department to issue a warning immediately on hearing of the tsunami threat early on the morning of 26 December 2004 (Symonds, 2005).

Limited access to information not only heightened sensitivities to risks before the tsunami; it also played a role in determining a household’s capacity to cope, respond and recover from the event. Community members knowledgeable about who to approach to receive emergency aid (see Section 3.1.2), financial capital for rebuilding (see Section 3.2.1.1), institutional support from industry representative bodies (see Section 2.6.1), and to secure basic human rights (see Section 2.6.3) were more successful in securing the resources needed for a speedy recovery. Those that did not, either missed out on aid and financial provisions or arrived too late to benefit. Awareness of information pertaining to financing options, insurance benefits and industry representative bodies and membership benefits remains low among micro and some smaller Thai businesses.

Since the event, three factors have better prepared Andaman Coast tourism destinations to coastal hazards and tsunamis: (a) the installation of the Tsunami Early Warning System (see Section 3.2.2); (b) the establishment of the National Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre (see Section 3.2.3); and (c) knowledge about tsunami and coastal hazards gained through personal experience. People now know what natural signs to look for pertaining to a future tsunami threat and have a better understanding of the procedures in accessing help\textsuperscript{119}, which increases their resilience to future shocks.

2.4 Staffing issues: Skills, shortages and benefits

Shortages of skilled staff

Greater access to skills and knowledge is imperative for enabling the individual pursuit of a range of livelihood strategies (DFID, 1999b). A strong stock of skilled labour also enhances business and, in this case, wider destination success. Together, these two components heighten opportunity, capacity and resilience to change. Khao Lak is lacking in both. Many local villagers are unable to participate in tourism-related activities due to a lack of appropriate skills and resorts are encountering difficulties in recruiting qualified staff due to high staff losses post-disaster. Shortages of skilled staff is a common problem in Khao Lak\textsuperscript{120}. Much of Khao Lak’s tourism workforce is from the greater Takuapa District and semi-skilled, having little formalised tourism or hospitality training with the exception of a minority that are university educated and, in turn, hold higher level and management positions\textsuperscript{121}. Supplementing local labour are workers from other parts of Thailand, Burma and Western Europe. Limited language skills in English and German among the local population inhibits access to higher paying tourism jobs in resorts, and with local tour operators and dive operators\textsuperscript{122}. Understandably, divers do not feel comfortable undertaking dive courses or dives with instructors with whom they cannot communicate well\textsuperscript{123}. Smaller and family-run businesses also have concerns regarding their lack of good language skills and the negative impact that language-induced misunderstandings has on accessing clients, customer service and repeat business\textsuperscript{124}. High seasonality also contributes to skilled staff shortages for small and medium businesses that have to compete with larger and less seasonal destinations, such as Phuket, for skilled-staff, with staff preferring constant work over seasonal positions\textsuperscript{125}.

To rectify the skill-shortage problem and promote staff loyalty, many of the medium and larger hotels invest in their staff by training them during the low season to ensure excellent service standards\textsuperscript{126}. This is advantageous for both employers and employees. Staff gain valuable skills training, which heightens good service and staff loyalty. Training is either job-specific (house-keeping, food and beverage, or front desk) or language-specific, such as English and German\textsuperscript{127}. But

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Interview 23 and 83 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Interviews 28, 43, 53 and 56 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Interview 18 and 71 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{121} Interview 17, 18, 36, 39, 80 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Interview 22, 25, 47, 64 and 71 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Interview 70 and 81 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{124} Interview 19, 94, C and G in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{125} Interview G in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Interview 18, 23, 36, 78 and 80 in Table 8
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Interview 18, 80 in Table 8
\end{itemize}
employer-led skills training also have drawbacks due to the high competition for skilled staff; employers provide staff with training only to have them leave to work in more prestigious hotels or businesses (in Khao Lak or other destinations) that offer higher salaries and opportunities for career advancement128. The central government has also taken steps to improve skills levels by introducing the Skills Development Act in January 2003. This legislated the compulsory in-house training of hotel staff working in hotels and resorts with more than 100 staff. The managers of each department undertake and lead these training sessions. The training plans of each hotel are sent to the Provincial Government to prove that they are complying with the requirements of this policy129. Increasing the level of expertise of staff in Thai destinations is beneficial for two reasons. First, better service leads to a better and more competitive product that can be offered to the international tourist market. This is financially beneficial for individual businesses and national tourism earnings. Second, a strong skill base increases the employability of the staff. Accordingly, staff have a better chance of acquiring work in alternate destinations in the event of place-specific shocks, such as the tsunami. This, in turn, increases the resilience of both staff and businesses. Further governmental training measures include collaborations between the Phang Nga Office of Labour and localised Vocational Training Centres where courses are designed specifically to match industry needs130. Industry associations can also apply for training support from the Ministry of Tourism and Sport131.

Following the tsunami, sourcing skilled staff proved more difficult. The loss of lives and disruptions in working patterns led to a loss of 50 per cent of Khao Lak’s workforce and a drastic depletion in skilled tourism industry workers132(WTO, 2005a). Workers from other parts of Thailand returned home due to trauma and after-shock fuelled fears, while others sought work in alternate destinations like Hua Hin133. Those that did stay faced three immediate problems: unemployment, reduced income and general socio-economic uncertainty and hardship (ILO, 2006). Consequently, many of those formerly employed in the formal sector temporarily pursued alternate informal economy activities for income while resorts were being rebuilt (ILO, 2006). But the reopening of resorts and increases in room capacity over time have not been matched by the availability of skilled and qualified staff. Market demand for labour is for 10 000 workers, while 9324 continue to be underemployed134. These shortages prompted a proliferation of NGO tourism skills programs (featured in Section 3.4.2). Industry collaborations with localised colleges are another longer-term option. Such proactive measures test the resourcefulness and engagement levels of industry representative bodies and determine their effectiveness in accessing the resources needed to create a skilled and committed workforce135.

Staff benefits
Workers insurance did provide some income for those that lost their jobs due to massive business losses and closures after the tsunami; however, amounts were minimal and entitlements uneven necessitating alternative arrangements until jobs were restored. Employees (excluding extended family members working in family businesses) are largely covered by workers insurance that pays 50 per cent of the original salary for six months and covers basic medical needs in the event of job losses136. Companies with more than two staff (except for bars and restaurants) are required by law to provide workers insurance for full-time staff137. Some hotels paid staff full salaries during the closure periods because social security payments were considered too low to support a good standard of living138. Other employers shared basic provisions and passed on donated money to their staff to guarantee their livelihood139. Additional financial assistance was made available through the Office of Labour’s ‘Social Fund for Tsunami Workers’, with 1555 workers out of 1600 receiving Fund contributions amounting to THB 8 million (USD 203 978) in total140. Few employees

128 Interview 17, 26, 74 and 78 in Table 8
129 Interview 103 in Table 8
130 Interview 87 in Table 8
131 Interview 102 in Table 8
132 Interview 87 in Table 8
133 Interview 20, 55, 77, 80, 87 and 89 in Table 8
134 Interview 87 in Table 8
135 Interview 102 in Table 8
136 Interview 25, 35, 55, 56, 78, 80 and 96 in Table 8
137 Interview 51, 78, 105 in Table 8
138 Interview 35, 80 in Table 8
139 Interview 55, 56 and 79 in Table 8
140 Interview 87 in Table 8
had substantial savings to rely upon in the event of job losses\textsuperscript{141} and union membership is non-existent\textsuperscript{142}. Consequently, employee savings levels have increased post-tsunami as a result of heightened awareness of risk and the need for preparedness strategies\textsuperscript{143}. Access to employee insurance is most problematic among self-employed workers, particularly masseurs (a highly transient workforce). Masseurs are employed on a short-term and seasonal basis by hotels and massage and spa establishments and likely to move between employers when better payment conditions arise\textsuperscript{144}. From the employer perspective, insurance provisions for short-term staff are very expensive given the cost (50 per cent of total contribution is supplied by the employer) and transitory nature of staff.

\section*{2.5 Pre-existing weaknesses in governance structures and processes}

The vulnerability of local populations can be intensified by poor governance and a lack of capacity (Jäger et al., 2007). Weaknesses in governance structures and processes are a major contributor to Khao Lak’s vulnerability. Despite the existence of well-developed tourism plans, implementation and enforcement is problematic due to a lack of capacity and expertise, budgetary constraints, and political engagement at the local levels. Corruption and an abuse of power by local elites further exacerbate policy and planning success leaving the community feeling frustrated and disillusioned with the sincerity and effectiveness of governance structures.

**Planning strategies, enforcement challenges and infrastructure standards**

Prior to the tsunami, there was a 3-year tourism development plan and complimentary structures in place to guide tourism development in Khao Lak in a way that was consistent with district and provincial development strategies\textsuperscript{145}. Planning regulations in Khao Lak stipulated a thirty metre set-back line for beach development and regulated building density and height. However, these regulations were rarely implemented and enforced resulting in planning violations\textsuperscript{146}. According to a TAT representative (personal communication 7 July 2005), Thailand is very good at designing tourism plans and policies but they are more theoretical ideas that impress on paper than operational strategies.

The reasons for this are three-fold. First, overlapping government department jurisdictions over the coastal zone and little coordination among departments produce unclear and conflicting coastal development policies including tourism\textsuperscript{147} (Phayakvichien, 2005). Constant rotation of provincial governors also hinders consistent policies and their implementation\textsuperscript{148}. Second, district and sub-district governmental bodies lack the financial, capital, expertise, real power and motivation needed to effectively implement and enforce plans, while Phang Nga provincial officials have limited capacity to oversee and monitor progress\textsuperscript{149} (ASIST-AP, 2004, Phayakvichien, 2005, Gilchriest et al., 2007a). There are no real ramifications for development violations and tourism projects are given a low priority at the local level because they require a high proportion of the TAO budgets\textsuperscript{150}. Therefore, while the decentralisation of tourism governance structures in 2003 signalled a positive step towards localised empowerment, it lacks logistical support at the provincial, district and sub-district levels, causing weakened structures that cannot fulfil their roles. Third, the TAO lacks a real interest in tourism-related planning and tourism infrastructure, and have little interest in interaction with the tourism community\textsuperscript{151}. TAO officials do not understand the tourism industry or its needs and have no solid tourism vision to direct sustainable development\textsuperscript{152}. There is little TAO consultation with the community on tourism planning and development issues despite the fact that: (i) community-government participation is a key component of the TAO directive\textsuperscript{153} (ASIST-AP, 2004, Gilchriest et al., 2007a); and (ii) the private sector has the background knowledge and skill-base to assist local

\begin{flushleft}
141 Interview 18 and 20 in Table 8
142 Interview 17 and 18 in Table 8
143 Interview 18 and 20 in Table 8
144 Discussion A in Table 10
145 Interview 34 and 53 in Table 8
146 Discussions A and B in Table 10
147 Interview 25 in Table 8; Discussion E in Table 10
148 Discussion B in Table 10
149 Interview 18, 25, 34, 53 and 55 in Table 8; Discussions A and B in Table 10
150 Interview 18 and 53 in Table 8
151 Interview 18, 25, 28, 35, 50 and 65 in Table 8
152 Interview 18 and 55 in Table 8
153 Interview 34 in Table 8; Discussion A in Table 10
\end{flushleft}
authorities with the formulation of tourism strategies that compliment a strong collective tourism vision\textsuperscript{154}. However, there are marked differences between the actions of the three TAOs that hold jurisdiction over the Khao Lak area. Bang Muang and Bang Sak TAOs are proactive and responsive to tourism business needs, while Khuk Khak (that holds jurisdiction over the majority of Khao Lak) is not, with the difference lying with TAO preferences and agendas\textsuperscript{155}.

With few resources for tourism, the TAOs focus on the provision of basic infrastructure (road systems and pavements, water and waste management, electricity supply, transportation), which they see as their main role and strength\textsuperscript{156}. Yet, as noted in Section 2.1.5, some basic infrastructure, such as street lighting, pavements, and adequate drainage, is still missing in parts of Khao Lak\textsuperscript{157}. While taxes and prices for electricity and water are high, the poor quality of infrastructural services is causing much frustration\textsuperscript{158}. Furthermore, there are rising concerns about the poor management of solid and wastewater disposal systems and the detrimental impact subsequent environmental degradation may have on tourism flows and livelihoods\textsuperscript{159}. Pre-tsunami, there was not enough development to place significant pressure on the natural environment; community members are now worried that the unmonitored rebuilding of post-tsunami development and future growth may place unsustainable pressure on fragile coastal ecosystems.

Not all businesses have adequate wastewater facilities and there is little monitoring or support from local authorities despite multiple attempts to have this resolved at the sub-district and district level\textsuperscript{160}. If nothing is done to curb the mismanagement of natural resources and waste, environmental degradation may become an emerging sensitivity. Irregular and high-priced transportation is another growing concern. Public transportation (mini-bus service) is limited to one route and only runs at irregular intervals for six hours a day.

Highly priced and unregulated taxis and illegal minibus services fill the demand instead\textsuperscript{161}.

**Corruption, local elites and access to localised power structures**

“In Thailand if you have, if you have money to pay, more important [than regulations]. You can do everything [despite] law ... depend on what they want to do.” (Resort Owner, personal communication, 24 January 2007)

“There will be dependencies, there will be bribes, there will be favours, there will be other things in the background that you have no clue about.” (Agency Representative, personal communication, 2 February 2007)

“[The TAO] representatives only think about their own back pocket ... See now we can have a chance to make a lot of black money ... they should be interested [in tourism]. Who is paying their salary? But the corrupt people don’t want to stop being corrupt because they have a good income from that.” (Resort Owner, personal communication, 31 January 2007)

Weaknesses in tourism policy and planning implementation and consequent low tourism development standards are compounded by corruption and a lack of transparency in governance processes. Money is routinely paid to have legal development proposals passed\textsuperscript{162}, while those with money and political connections are able to secure developmental approvals that contravene planning regulations\textsuperscript{163}. Building exceptions are also made for local elites that have personal connections to localised power bases (both the TAO and traditional village leaders) and broader power networks\textsuperscript{164}. Such connections also facilitate better access to land, roads, and financial capital. The power of the local elite is deeply embedded in the social structure and local community members will not challenge discrepancies due to fear of reprisal and marginalisation\textsuperscript{165}. These take various forms

\textsuperscript{154} Discussions A and B in Table 10
\textsuperscript{155} Discussion F in Table 10
\textsuperscript{156} Interview 25, 34 and 53 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{157} Discussions E and F in Table 10
\textsuperscript{158} Discussions A and C in Table 10
\textsuperscript{159} Discussions D and F in Table 10
\textsuperscript{160} Interview 96, 100, 101 in Table 8; Discussion D in Table 10
\textsuperscript{161} Interview 101 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{162} Interview 59 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{163} Interview 18, 25, 28, 50 and 65 in Table 8; Discussion B in Table 10
\textsuperscript{164} Interview 28, 33 and 83 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{165} Interview 18 and 25 in Table 8; Discussion A in Table 10
ranging from pressure to vacate prized land, property vandalism, loss of employment, and having difficulty in accessing workers who have been dissuaded by higher powers. Conflict is routinely avoided in Thai culture so as to facilitate harmony, the saving of face and uphold the status quo. Localised corruption practices have been reported to the Provincial Government and local Parliamentary Representatives but to no avail. The continuance of such practices has created mistrust and apathy among the community with regard to the government’s intentions, their agenda and their capacity to represent the best interests of the whole community instead of particular factions.

**Limited government accessibility and access to avenues of power**

The lack of government engagement in tourism affairs along with intransparent governance practices has caused an ever-growing divide between the destination community and local government bodies that are deemed inaccessible and self-serving. The Khao Lak community feel that they lack strong leadership at the local level to lead and support robust tourism development initiatives. The local authorities are disinterested in their needs and concerns and fail to act when approached for help and assistance, thereby denying them a voice, support and true representation. There are no local forums for airing grievances or solving conflicts and community issues. Frustrated by a history of limited government engagement, response and accessibility, community members have lost faith and trust in local government and are increasingly reluctant to seek governmental assistance. Small and medium business owners who are better educated and more aware of governance procedures are more likely to act and petition for resources. Western expatriates are most likely to approach upper levels of government to gain results, as are their larger Thai business counterparts who actively use multiple-scaled actions, established business networks and organisations to access the resources they need for advancement.

**2.6 Industry representation, access to social networks, and marginalisation**

With little governmental support, the private sector drives and shapes tourism advancements in Khao Lak using a combination of different avenues to access resources and assistance, including family and established social networks, and formal business networks.

*Industry representation and action*

The strength of tourism destinations and their capacity to respond to shocks is directly related to the strength and capacity of local authorities and tourism industry associations. Khao Lak’s resilience is bolstered by the strength of local representative groups and their independent organisation and adaptive capabilities. The Phang Nga Tourism Association (PNTA) and newly-formed Khao Lak Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Group were instrumental in petitioning for more funding to hasten the rebuilding process, influencing development plans, and accessing core markets in efforts to restore confidence and business. The use of multi-scaled actions by both parties in securing capital and support post-tsunami clearly demonstrates the collective capacity to cope and respond effectively to future shocks and hence heightens its vulnerability.

Responses to the inaccessibility of socio-political capital differ markedly among community sub-groups due to differences in knowledge, education levels and exposure to wider developmental processes. Micro business owners and workers are often intimidated by the TAO and local elites and have limited knowledge about developmental processes including who to approach for assistance and action options available. Cultural norms of avoiding conflict and confrontation also hinder action. Consequently, they rarely petition for better access to funding, rights and change. Small and medium business owners who are better educated and more aware of governance procedures are more likely to act and petition for resources. Western expatriates are most likely to approach upper levels of government to gain results, as are their larger Thai business counterparts who actively use multiple-scaled actions, established business networks and organisations to access the resources they need for advancement.

---

166 Interview 28, 33 and 46 in Table 8  
167 Interview 28 in Table 8  
168 Interview 18 and 59 in Table 8  
169 Discussions A and B in Table 10  
170 Discussion G in Table 10  
171 Interview 18, 29, 31 and 35 in Table 8; Discussions A, B and E in Table 10  
172 Interview 18 in Table 8  
173 Interview 28, 77, 56 and 59 in Table 8; Discussion A in Table 10  
174 Interview 28 in Table 8  
175 Interview 102 in Table 8
importance of collective action headed by visionary and resourceful leaders.

**Phang Nga Tourism Association: Localised industry support and representation**

The main role of the Phang Nga Tourism Association (PNTA) is to support and represent the needs of its members, lobby for collective business aspirations and actions, and raise destination profiles. The most important goals of the Association are:

- To attract strong marketing support from international operators servicing Khao Lak’s key supply markets; and

- Maintain a strong market niche that focuses on nature, tranquillity and high-quality tourism.

Other common issues include staff shortages and training needs (see Section 2.4).

The PNTA are resolute regarding the protection of Khao Lak’s destination image and product so as to avoid over-development and consequent product and environment degradation\(^{176}\). This is achieved through regular meetings with members, the Provincial Governor, and occasional consultations with TAO authorities. The strong professional relationship between the PNTA and Governor is also used as a forum to gain assistance with developmental concerns and challenges (ranging from building regulation enforcement challenges to the prohibition of beach hawkers and deck chairs) and ensure that industry needs are voiced and addressed in the public arena\(^ {177}\).

The PNTA’s access to multi-scaled governmental and industry networks proved instrumental in accessing the financial and political capital needed to advance Khao Lak’s post-tsunami recovery and demonstrate the advantages of Association membership and the collective power of industry stakeholders. Weekly meetings with the Phang Nga Provincial Governor were used to air grievances over delays and the uneven distribution of financial resources. The Association also used its close connections with the local parliamentary member (a former president of the PNTA) to petition for additional financial resources and influence post-tsunami planning strategies for Khao Lak at the national level\(^ {178}\). Founding PNTA members revived consumer interest and confidence through direct links with established European market partnerships that facilitated Khao Lak’s pre-tsunami boom. Marketing links and market support were strengthened further through a series of PNTA road-shows to key supply markets and joint industry and media familiarisation trips undertaken throughout 2005. However, the PNTA’s success always depends on the conviction of their leadership and members. PNTA-led recovery actions slowed over time as members turned their attention to the recovery of their own businesses, which has lessened their ability to harness ongoing support from government and industry bodies\(^ {179}\).

Low membership levels among micro and small business owners and workers is also a problem. Despite membership being open to all tourism stakeholders, membership is dominated by medium and larger businesses. Four reasons for this are:

- **Mismatch of interests and needs**: The PNTA is perceived to represent the interests of larger resorts and hotels, with main activities concentrating on international marketing aimed at European tour operators. Smaller enterprises, including support businesses and accommodation providers, have different marketing and financial needs and developmental concerns that are not reflected in the PNTA agenda\(^ {180}\). Unresolved actions have also eroded confidence and membership numbers\(^ {181}\).

- **Limited awareness of PNTA**: Micro and smaller operators are largely unaware of PNTA’s existence and find it difficult to access relevant information about the PNTA. Awareness of the PNTA sparked immediate interest among some smaller enterprises keen to be a part of industry networks.

- **Self-imposed exclusion**: Some micro businesses and sub-sectors feel they are not welcome in the PNTA due to their lower social standing and

\(^{176}\) Interview 18, 20 and 23 in Table 8

\(^{177}\) Interview 17 and 23 in Table 8

\(^{178}\) Interview 18 in Table 8

\(^{179}\) Interview 41 in Table 8

\(^{180}\) Interview 36 and 47 in Table 8; Discussion E in Table 10

\(^{181}\) Interview 36 in Table 8
limited knowledge about tourism development strategies\textsuperscript{182}. This self-imposed blockage prevents enquiry and participation in all formalised tourism networks and destination community discussions.

- **Self-sufficiency and time constraints:** The strong cultural norm of self-sufficiency in southern Thailand is hindering the formation of effective business networks. Businesses show a lack of interest in association membership and participation in wider tourism development discussions, preferring instead to operate in isolation\textsuperscript{183}. Time constraints also play a large role, with small businesses lacking additional staff to cover time spent at meetings despite being strongly in favour of group action. All time is spent running the business\textsuperscript{184}.

Low group membership among some industry sub-groups not only heightens their vulnerability, but also hinders community cohesiveness and lessens the community’s capacity to petition for change and action\textsuperscript{185}. This extends further than just the PNTA. Strong community networks are an important component of sustainability and resilience, a point that is gaining recognition among destination sub-groups, including travel agents, restaurant owners, and boat owners\textsuperscript{186}. But active and widespread engagement remains a challenge with responsibility of representation and action being projected onto others and not owned\textsuperscript{187}. There are few alternative industry groups in Khao Lak, with the exception of a loose diving collective that has strengthened in the aftermath of the tsunami\textsuperscript{188} and the newly formed Khao Lak Group for SMEs.

**Khao Lak Group for Small and Medium Enterprises**

Set up in direct response to the tsunami, the Khao Lak SME Group was successful in attracting political attention, immediate financial and marketing support for smaller enterprises that were floundering in the tsunami’s wake. Members included any SME in need ranging from medium-sized resorts to small family beachside restaurants that were totally destroyed\textsuperscript{189}. The Group was established to bring hope, stability and strength to many small businesses that lost everything\textsuperscript{190}. But its creation did more than this; it created SME unity and new landscapes of power and opportunity for small businesses and, in doing so, heightened their adaptive capacity and resilience.

The group actively sought political forums from which to voice their concerns regarding the formulation of the new building regulations. A Memorandum was presented directly to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in February 2005 outlining SME concerns regarding the rebuilding process\textsuperscript{191}. Financial donations and business sponsorships were sourced either directly from volunteers from key markets like Germany through two Khao Lak accommodation websites and distributed this equally among its members where possible\textsuperscript{192}. Like more traditional aid providers, aid provision was, in part, dictated by the explicit wishes of donors, such as assistance to a particular beach restaurant or the regeneration of vegetation along Bang Niang Beach\textsuperscript{193}. If donor requests were untenable, Group administrators lobbied donors for permission to divert money to other activities or businesses\textsuperscript{194}. Business sponsorships involved a foreign donor supplying finance capital for the rebuilding of smaller resorts in exchange for a guaranteed annual allocation of time in the resort over an agreed period of time\textsuperscript{195}. The supply of free accommodation was taken as payment in kind for the loan. Immediate post-tsunami marketing support was sought via two means: (a) the Group used accommodation websites to reach their target markets\textsuperscript{196}; and (b) updated information on recovery efforts to inform the travelling public was provided and room availability in smaller guesthouses, bungalows and resorts was advertised. Both actions helped to restore tourist confidence and stimulate much-needed

\textsuperscript{182} Discussion C in Table 10
\textsuperscript{183} Discussions B and G in Table 10
\textsuperscript{184} Discussions E and G in Table 10
\textsuperscript{185} Discussion B in Table 10
\textsuperscript{186} Interview 37, 50 and 59 in Table 8; Discussions C, D and G in Table 10
\textsuperscript{187} Discussion B in Table 10
\textsuperscript{188} Interview 70 and 81 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{189} Interview 29 and 33 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{190} Interview 20 and 28 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{191} Interview 20 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{192} Interview 17, 20, 28, 29 and 33 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{193} Interview 28 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{194} Interview 28 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{195} Interview 33 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{196} Interview 28 and 33 in Table 8
business for accommodation providers and support businesses not affected physically by the waves\textsuperscript{197}.

But the Group’s effectiveness and longevity were hampered by two factors. First, the group faced similar membership and operational difficulties as the PNTA, whereby individual credit problems caused active interest to wane once the immediate financial and marketing needs had been addressed. Other members left Khao Lak altogether due to insurmountable financial difficulties and post-disaster trauma\textsuperscript{198}. Second, participants left due to misunderstandings about aid distribution and disagreements about how Group resources should be used\textsuperscript{199}. The loose network still exists as does SME interest in collective group action but actions and active participation are limited.

\textbf{Strength of family and social networks}

The resilience of a household and community is heightened through access to strong social support networks; at the community level, the level of cohesion, equity, and the effectiveness of social networks in facilitating access to resources is crucial for recovery (Jäger et al., 2007, Miller et al., 2005). Such networks become particularly pertinent in a post-disaster setting where good relationships with one’s family, neighbours, and friends, can strongly encourage people in spite of their losses (Ito et al., 2005: 27). Access to finances and governance and power structures in Thailand are intertwined due to the close relationship between family and historically-embedded community leadership structures. Family and honouring reciprocal family obligations is of great importance in Asia (Irwin, 1996). This cultural norm explains the integral role family and social networks have played in Khao Lak’s post-tsunami recovery\textsuperscript{200}.

Family structures form the backbone of Thai society and these ties and support structures have provided support for tourism community members throughout the rebuilding process\textsuperscript{201}. Types of support include financial backing for business ventures and the recovery (see Section 3.2.1.2), child-minding by grandparents so that parents can work for the betterment of the whole family unit, and psychological support and strength needed to overcome trauma and rebuild\textsuperscript{202}. But such links can also foster nepotism and the misappropriation of funds to family and friends over intended recipients (see Section 3.1.2). The family unit also serves as the basis for the development and growth of business opportunities, with various family members contributing to the success of ventures owned and run by the family\textsuperscript{203}. This family-oriented business model dominates tourism businesses in Khao Lak, be they larger or smaller in nature\textsuperscript{204}. The determination to support children and the larger family unit has also driven some business owners to rebuild in the face of risk\textsuperscript{205}.

However, social networks outside the structure of the family network are generally weak. Thais do not naturally rely on outside support structures, be they community, government or NGO organisations\textsuperscript{206}. A strong tradition of social inclusion and exclusion based around family units leaves those without strong family ties in the area with few support options and highly vulnerable to unforeseen shocks\textsuperscript{207}. This is particularly the case in Bang Niang, where there are high numbers of Thais from other parts of the country and foreigners\textsuperscript{208}. Furthermore, such a preference for self-sufficiency outside the strong family unit hinders the formation of robust community networks and reduces support options. However, the shared disaster experience has altered community relationships. Camaraderie and community cohesiveness has increased among select factions (foreign expatriates, smaller businesses and dive operators), but the financial strain of rebuilding has isolated others\textsuperscript{209}.

---

\textsuperscript{197} Interview 76 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{198} Interview 28 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{199} Interview 59 in Table 8; Discussion E in Table 10
\textsuperscript{200} Interview 29, 55, 59, 77, 101 in Table 8; Discussion G in Table 10
\textsuperscript{201} Interview 17, 20, 28, 69, 77 and 79 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{202} Interview 50, 51 and 78 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{203} Interview 55, 67, 94, 95 and 96 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{204} Interview 18, 25, 35, 55, 69, 76, 78, 79 and 96 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{205} Interview 77 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{206} Discussion B in Table 10
\textsuperscript{207} Interview 31, 32, 40 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{208} Interview 28 in Table 8
\textsuperscript{209} Interview 20, 28, 29, 35, 36, 37, 69 and 81 in Table 8
Social exclusion of minorities

“We are paying money to the police because [laughing] that’s Constitution for us! Only high season that is … The whole people is money in high season.” (Burmese business owner, personal communication 6 February 2007)

Conflict and resultant migration can heighten vulnerability in receiving populations when migrants (legal or illegal) create new competition for resources or upset tenuous cultural, economic or political balances (Jäger et al., 2007). This is evident in Khao Lak with regard to Burmese and Nepalese migrants and a general concern in all three destinations where influxes of non-local Thais have moved to destination areas to benefit from unskilled jobs in resorts, restaurants, and in construction (Chit, 2005). The higher pay rates in Thailand enable Burmese workers to financially support their families at home (Robertson, 2007). However, their working and daily living conditions are difficult and subject to widespread discrimination and abuse. Prior to the tsunami, 31 353 migrants held temporary one-year ID cards (Tor/Ror 38/1) in Phang Nga which allowed them to stay in Thailand and to apply for work permits (costing USD 100). These work permits held by 22 668 (72 per cent) of these migrants entitled them to health insurance, medical assistance and protection under Thai Labour Laws (TAG, 2005). Despite having the correct documentation, Burmese migrants were subjected to paying monthly ‘security fees’ or bribes of THB 1500 (USD 38) taken directly or through their employer to avoid arrest (TAG, 2005, Robertson, 2007). The reasons behind the harassment are thought to be two-fold. First, there is a strong resentment against the Burmese in Thailand due to historical differences between the neighbouring countries dating back to Burma’s invasion of Thailand’s capital Ayutthaya in 1767 (Maw, 2005). Second, the feeling among many Thais is that these people take their jobs.

The migrants’ lack of personal security was exacerbated by restrictions, some illegally imposed by employers. Employers illegally withheld migrant documentation making the workers vulnerable to arrest and extortion by the police, salaries were withheld or paid only partially, and some migrants were forbidden to leave their workplaces (Robertson, 2007, TAG, 2005). A climate of impunity further legitimises the abuse of migrant workers in Phang Nga and Phuket facilitated through a intricate system of corruption (Robertson, 2007). Their marginalised positions prevent them from reporting employer and law enforcement abuses (Oberoi, 2005) begging the question ‘to whom?’ Migrants are banned by law (Labour Relations Act 1975, Section 101) from forming their own unions but registered workers are entitled to join Thai unions (TAG, 2005) and there were no NGO organisations to turn to. Their only other option is to leave their employer with the possibility of their employment documentation being instead of transferred to the new employer, leaving them undocumented, without healthcare access, and vulnerable to arrest (Robertson, 2007, TAG, 2005). Having no secure rights inhibited their access to humanitarian aid, financial support and local social networks. The worsening of this institutionalised and widespread discrimination following the disaster is discussed in Section 3.1.3. The only support outlets available to Burmese migrants are relatives and compatriots from their village or communities that are in Thailand. These networks aid in: (i) the initial travel across the border; (ii) finding work with sympathetic employers and securing better paid jobs; and (iii) steering migrants to supportive Thai-based community networks and informal structures of assistance when the need arises (Robertson, 2007). These networks became a critical source of assistance following the tsunami. They have no knowledge about or access to local tourism representative groups. Yet despite these hardships, Burmese choose to stay in Thailand as their earning potential and their capacity to support family members in Burma is much higher.

210 Interview 25 in Table 8
211 Interview 81 and 82 in Table 8
212 Interview 81, 82, 103, 104 in Table 8
213 Interview 103, 104, 105 in Table 8
214 Interview 81 and 82 in Table 8
215 Interview 81 in Table 8
216 Interview 81 in Table 8
217 Interview 81 and 82 in Table 8
218 Interview 81 in Table 8
3 RESPONSES AND SYSTEM ADAPTATION

“Resilient coastal communities take deliberate action to reduce risk from coastal hazards with the goal of avoiding disaster and accelerating recovery in the event of a disaster. They adapt to changes through experience and applying lessons learned.” (US-IOTWS, 2007: 34)

Disaster outcomes are not solely negative; they also create opportunities for political reorganisation, solidarity and activism, and the creation of new business relationships and social networks, all of which facilitate social transformation and have the propensity to increase resilience (Oliver-Smith, 1996, Pelling, 2003). As noted in Section 2, the tsunami prompted action and support from existing social networks and impelled a strong community consciousness that is fuelling widespread community interest in industry representative and community-based group participation that can assist in building community cohesion, improve greater access to socio-economic gains from tourism, and heighten destination community preparedness in the event of future shocks. These shifts have also been complimented by strong government, NGO and multi-scaled industry-led actions aimed at bolstering a confident tourism recovery and building resilience in the affected destination communities. These post-tsunami responses and adjustments and their contributions to building resilience form the focus of this section.

Short-term emergency aid and assistance provided by the Royal Thai Government (RTG) were followed by medium and longer-term adjustments and adaptation responses that were instigated through two initiatives: the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan (ATRP) and the Andaman Sub-Regional Development Plan (SRDP).

Key strategies include: ongoing national marketing support to attract tourists back, the redrafting of tourism development plans, the development of Thailand’s Tsunami Early Warning System, the instigation of a National Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre, the provision of credit to facilitate tourism business recovery, and multiple endeavours to promote good governance. The World Tourism Organisation (WTO) coordinated industry-led actions focussed on marketing, financial assistance, skills training and risk management, while NGO activity in Khao Lak concentrated on financial assistance, bolstering support for minority groups, boosting skill levels, offering leadership training, and providing support for alternative livelihood programmes.

However, the successful implementation of planning initiatives and the provision of aid and longer-term support has been hindered by numerous obstacles that are compounding pre-existing sensitivities, creating new sensitivities, and heightening destination vulnerability levels. First, pre-existing weaknesses in governance structures and processes outlined in Section 2.5 have not been addressed and continue to undermine the implementation of new planning and development strategies aimed at building resilience in the affected destination communities. Second, corruption, nepotism and rules of social inclusion that are strong in Thailand have also resulted in the uneven distribution of emergency aid. Third, NGO support to Khao Lak’s tourism community has been marred by skewed preferences for support directed toward the ‘poor’ and minority groups over tourism businesses that are seen as rich and even unscrupulous. Fourth, complex credit application processes limited the effectiveness of post-tsunami financing schemes, particularly among foreign business operators. Those that did receive additional aid were presented with a double-edged sword: access to much needed credit has enabled young businesses to rebuild and regain their livelihoods but has left them with even higher debt levels, which increases their sensitivity to business competition, economic downturns and future shocks. Finally, Burmese workers still lack access to basic support networks, have few rights despite supporting national mandates, and are subject to stringent work-permit conditions and related abuse.

3.1 Short-term coping responses

Emergency aid and assistance

The RTG led and executed an effective immediate post-disaster emergency and short-term recovery response (Scheper and Patel, 2006, UN, 2005). Measures undertaken included: a massive forensic operation; provisions for basic needs such as food water and medical attention; and the construction of temporary and permanent housing, and the repatriation of foreign tourists (UN, 2005). The Thai military forces played a key role in the initial search and rescue efforts and assisted in the building of temporary and permanent housing in affected areas. The forensics operation was a collaborative effort involving the Thai and Australian Police, the Ministry of Health, the Department for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM), and 500 Thai and international experts from 30 countries (Scheper and Patel, 2006). Governmental efforts were supported by technical assistance provided by 77
NGO, bilateral and UN organisations in the immediate aftermath of the disaster (Scheper and Patel, 2006).

Assistance for foreign tourists was swift. The Immigration Bureau helped close to 5000 foreigners to return to their home countries and assisted thousands of tourists who had lost their belongings and passports (UN, 2005). Visa extensions were waived and financial assistance was offered by the Thai Government for return airfares, accommodation, food and transport; USD 243 was given to every tourist for basic provisions. Tourist medical expenses were covered by the Ministry of Health while the Immigration Bureau established centres at airport arrival halls to aid family friends that were arriving to check on the injured, missing and the dead (UN, 2005).

International tour operators, such as Swedish Star Tours and Fritidsresor, provided immediate support by using their charter planes to evacuate people irrespective of whether they had travelled with them previously or whether they were Swedish or not. They also flew doctors and medical staff from Scandinavia to Thailand219. However, the immediate assistance on the day of the disaster came from Khao Lak community members, particularly the dive community that worked together to help the injured and to coordinate meeting points for evacuation in the temples or ‘Wats’220. Psychological and social support for Thai nationals was overseen by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Human Security. Post-traumatic stress Disorder (PTSD) proved an ongoing challenge in Phang Nga with 33.6 per cent of people still experiencing PTSD one year after the event (Bangkok Post, 2005) and high stress levels becoming evident throughout the interview process for this report221. Trauma support was available in Khao Lak for 18 months after the tsunami event but the effectiveness of the service was limited by the frequent absence of staff, inadequate counselling services, and limited knowledge about the service among some factions of the community222. Ongoing experiences of stress and depression are hampering some people’s ability to rebuild their lives and their livelihoods and are increasing their vulnerability to future stresses223.

Emergency financial relief and the alleviation of unemployment

The Ministry of the Interior provided immediate emergency payments of THB 2000 (USD 49) for every victim. All Thai registered businesses were entitled to an additional THB 20 000 (USD 487) payment to assist them with immediate recovery needs (UN, 2005). Unregistered businesses received no benefits224. The Ministry of Labour also offered unemployment benefits equaling the minimum wage of THB 175 (USD 4) per day to employees who had lost their job for a period of 30 days (UN, 2005). This benefit excluded those who were not directly affected by the tsunami (WTO, 2005a). A further THB 40 000 (USD 1000) was provided for the loss of family members and assets (FES and MAC, 2005). Government support, however, was poorly coordinated and monitored at the district and sub-district levels (Scheper and Patel, 2006) causing aid distribution anomalies, heightened mistrust in local governing bodies, anger and frustration.

The distribution of emergency payments was placed under the jurisdiction of local village leaders. While some community members did benefit from emergency payments (34 per cent of those interviewed), funds were disproportionately distributed to local elites, friends and relatives225. Complaints about the corruption of village leaders and the misappropriation of funds to non-affected parties emulate the experiences of community members in Phuket and Krabi (Scheper and Patel, 2006) and wider aid distribution challenges in developing countries (Pelling, 2003). Others received no aid due to a lack of knowledge about procedure, the complexity of the process, and who to approach226. The uneven distribution of financial capital has strengthened the financial position of the ruling elite while marginalising others in the process. There is no governmental monitoring mechanism to deter the misappropriation of resources227.

219 Interview 86 in Table 8
220 Interview 86 in Table 8
221 Interview 31 and 32 in Table 8; Discussions A and D in Table 10
222 Interview 28 in Table 8; Discussion A in Table 10
223 Interview 31 and 32 in Table 8
224 Interview 51, 100 in Table 8
225 Interview 26, 29, 31, 32, 37, 43, 46, 51, 61, 76, 83 and 86 in Table 8
226 Interview 36, 37, 40 in Table 8
227 Interview 44 in Table 8
Losses in business were not factored into aid distribution decisions causing aid to be aimed primarily those who sustained losses in property and assets. Accordingly, those businesses in Nang Thong and Khao Lak Beach that escaped physical damage but lost business revenue were given no emergency aid.

Uneven aid distribution and mistreatment based on prejudiced perceptions

“For vulnerability to be decreased, we as a community need to be treated equally, we were not treated equally. We should be treated equally, not based on if you were born here, local or a tourist business … Enough is enough! The government needs to have a list acknowledging that people deserve the same help.” (Foreign Small Bungalow Owner, personal communication, 21 January 2007)

“Normal people, the government give them about 200 baht for this, they give them a house [and] house equipment … many, many provision and many people give them money. But not for business ... For business no.” (Thai Medium Resort Owner, personal communication 24 January 2007)

“But we are not rich! How are we to survive?” (Thai Medium Resort Owner, personal communication, 25 January 2007)

While aid reached various sectors of the community, those dependant on tourism were largely overlooked causing anger, frustration, disillusionment, and hopelessness (WTO, 2005a). Feelings of hopelessness impaired the capacity of some to take the necessary steps to rebuild their lives, which increases their vulnerability over time and space. The perception of who ‘needs’ aid and assistance and who does not proved to be a powerful driver of unequal aid distribution in Khao Lak. There is a perception among some aid workers, researchers, and government bodies that those deriving their livelihoods from tourism are wealthy and privileged and, therefore, do not require outside assistance in the event of a shock. This perception is compounded by two related beliefs. Tourism businesses are seen as ruining localised livelihoods, polluting the environment and excluding locals from the financial benefits of tourism development.

Prime Minister Thaksin advised the community in January 2005 to approach their TAO for assistance. However, the TAO offered little assistance, treating the tourism community like ‘slum dwellers’ and leaving them with little direct government support. One badly affected business owner was denied assistance from the TVC and had property stolen from her because it was mistaken for TVC-funded supplies. A former TVC volunteer confirmed strong biases that favoured ‘local communities’—those that derive their livelihoods from more traditional sources, such as fishing or subsistence farming—over those involved in tourism-related activities. There was also a marked difference between the immediate financial assistance provided to Thais and foreigners. The Minister for Natural Resources and Environment and the Minister of the Interior confirmed that all affected victims were entitled to aid assistance. However, financial assistance was only provided for Thai nationals at the local level. Few Western foreigners received financial or logistical assistance from the local Thai authorities and were treated with scorn when they followed government requests to report their losses. They were told by officials that they are foreign and, therefore, were redirected to their home governments for assistance. The plight of the Burmese workers was much worse.

Registered Burmese workers were entitled to humanitarian assistance from the Thai Government but
assistance was refused due to discrimination at the local level (ALTSEAN Burma, 2005; Oberoi, 2005; Schepers
and Patel, 2006). Instead, both registered and illegal workers were subjected to abuse and inequity (Hedman,
reports about Burmese looting intensified anti-migrant sentiment among factions of Thai society culminating
in the arrest, extortion against, and deportation of both documented and undocumented workers; 2000 workers
were deported in the first three weeks following the tsunami239(Chit, 2005; Hulme, 2005; Maw, 2005;
TAG, 2005; Robertson, 2007). The Burmese junta also refused assistance to its citizens (Robertson, 2007).
Fear of deportation and abuse curtailed efforts to search for relatives and prompted the payments of bribes to
local authorities240 (Robertson, 2007). The problem was compounded by a lack of sufficient knowledge
about human rights and information on where to source reliable assistance (Robertson, 2007). The collapse of
the tourism industry caused some employers to abandon their migrant workers, making it difficult for them to
replace work permits lost in the disaster (Oberoi, 2005). For others, the death of their employer made it impossible
for them to prove their legal working status, leaving them vulnerable to deportation, while some found it
difficult to break work contracts due to the increased demand for cheap manual labour for rebuilding efforts
(Chit, 2005, ALTSEAN Burma, 2005).

3.2 Longer-term adjustments and adaptation responses
Strong national response facilitated through the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan
Following the 2004 tsunami, the Thai government introduced the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan (ATRP). A product of multiple stakeholder input, the ATRP aims at stimulating a rapid and sustainable tourism recovery in the ten tsunami-affected Andaman Coast sub-districts (spanning six provinces) through three key strategies (TAT, 2005b): (a) the formulation and implementation of an integrated tourism development strategy; (b) the facilitation of a strong private sector recovery by offering financial support; and (c) the launch of multiple marketing drives. While the ATRP offers strong guidelines for the affected communities, their successful implementation is proving difficult to
achieve due to deficiencies in governance structures and conflicting interests operating at various scales of
social organisation.

Government-led financial assistance
The first component of the ATRP involved substantial government-led financial assistance to promote a strong
recovery for businesses of all sizes that were directly and indirectly affected by the tsunami through the
creation of two programmes: The Tsunami Recovery Fund supported by the Venture Capital Fund (VCF); and
soft loans underwritten by the Bank of Thailand. While these measures have assisted the recovery of
many businesses, stringent conditions, application complexities, and bureaucratic obstacles hindered their
effectiveness. Furthermore, increased access to credit also has a downside: the decrease of business financial
reserves following the tsunami, coupled with increasing debt levels borne out of a need to take on new loans
(some of which come on top of pre-existing loans used to start businesses in Khao Lak), have compounded the
financial instability of many businesses in a destination that is yet to recover its pre-tsunami occupancy rates and
tourist flows. Together, these factors greatly increase financial vulnerability to any type of stress, including
future shocks, economic downturns that may negatively affect tourist flows or changing consumer preferences.
The impact of this can already been seen in Khao Lak, where some businesses have been forced to close due to
financial ruin (refer back to Section 2.1.5).

A. Tsunami Recovery Fund for larger businesses: The RTG used its Venture Capital Fund (created in 2003)
to provide venture capital to medium-sized businesses through the provision of loans with a 1 per cent
interest rate for the first seven years, before reverting to the national Minimum Loan Rate (MLR)241 for the
remaining lifetime of the loan. Offices were set up in Patong, Khao Lak, Ao Nang, and Ranong to enable
rapid access to these funds. Applications under this scheme were simple; businesses were only required to
present a business plan242. This plan was very popular and proved an effective financial instrument for assisting
medium-sized businesses243 (WTO, 2005a), so much so that claims surpassed the capital made available in
the first few months of its inception leading to claim

239 Interview 81 in Table 8
240 Interview 81 in Table 8
241 Interview 18 in Table 8
242 Interview 18 in Table 8
243 Interview 18 and 79 in Table 8
Ministry of Industry figures show that by the end of 2005, 61 per cent (THB 2.8 billion or USD 72.7 million) of financial capital granted to small and medium businesses was sourced through this fund. It has joined 114 ventures (50 per cent in Phuket alone) with these medium-sized hotel projects consuming 78 per cent of all funding made available by the end of 2005 (WTO, 2005a).

B. Soft Loan Provisions under the ‘Lending to Entrepreneurs Affected by the Tsunami in Six Provinces’ Programme: With the endorsement of the RTG, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) extended a line of credit to both state and private banks at an annual interest rate of 0.01 per cent to underwrite soft loans for businesses (WTO, 2005a). The BOT financial outlay of THB 4.8 billion for the programme was supplemented by an additional THB 1.2 billion to make up a total credit line of THB 6 billion (Bank of Thailand, 2005; Bank of Thailand, 2006). The main lending funds included: (i) the Tsunami SME Fund and the Thai French Joint Credit Project that catered for small business interests; and (ii) soft loans through the commercial banking system open to all. The funds were available for reconstruction, re-financing existing loans, re-stocking and working capital (WTO, 2005a).

- Soft loans for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs): The SME Bank’s Tsunami Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Fund aimed at assisting the recovery of smaller businesses by offering short-term loans for up to THB 1 million with the support of the BOT. Credit limits for new clients were THB 500 000 (USD 12 749) and the collateral needed was real estate deeds and a guarantor. An additional THB 500 000 was made available for existing clients with real estate collateral culminating in a maximum of THB 1 million. Existing clients with no real estate collateral required the backing of a guarantor and were limited to credit allowances of THB 500 000. All loan applicants also needed to show proof of a steady source of income. Lenders were to pay back the loan with 2 per cent interest (per annum) within a maximum repayment period of three years. During this period, a SME Bank member sits on the board of the business and oversees decisions. Loan applications were accepted up until 28 February 2006.

The Government Savings Bank (GSB) made funds available for micro and small businesses under its Thai and French Joint Credit Project run in collaboration with the French Government. A maximum of THB 300 000 (USD 7649) was available for a lending period of three years at 2 per cent interest per annum, before reverting to the national MLR for a further five-year period. An additional advantage was that repayments were postponed for the first year. Applications were accepted up until June 2008. If real estate deeds were unavailable as collateral, a guarantor was required. The BOT has provided the GSB with a total of THB 410 million to fund this project (Government Savings Bank, 2005, Government Savings Bank, 2006).

However, the effectiveness of these schemes in assisting recovery was lessened by the following factors:

- Awareness of these lending options was low among micro businesses thereby excluding them from a funding opportunity; 247

- The SME Fund loan application process was complicated, difficult to understand, and very slow causing recovery time delays. This not only resulted in applications being denied, but also prevented people (particularly micro businesses) from applying. Complicating the application process further for some stakeholders were application anomalies and non-transparent processes; 250

- The loan conditions and repayment schedule proved too strict making this option both difficult and unpopular among SMEs. Many small businesses were unable to secure funding because they lacked the required documentation and collateral, such as business registration papers, proof of former assets, business plans and, most importantly, land 251

244 Interview 18 in Table 8
245 Interview 28, 55 and 56 in Table 8
246 Interview 60 in Table 8
247 Interview 37, 41, 45, 52, 90 and 99 in Table 8
248 Discussion D in Table 10
249 Interview 41, 42, 44, 90 and 99 in Table 8; Discussion B and E in Table 10
250 Interview 52, 59 and 71 in Table 8
251 Interview 28, 47, 71 and 76 in Table 8
Prior to the tsunami, small businesses were not required to register unless business earnings exceeded THB 300,000 per annum. The need for land deeds also prevented businesses with pre-existing loans with other banks, those who rent their premises, and foreign business owners from securing loans. The additional SME Fund condition of surrendering part control of their business strategies to the SME Bank was a strong deterrent for some; the credit limit was considered too low to make a real recovery contribution for some SME lenders, and lastly, some small businesses are experiencing difficulties in servicing these debts.

Increased debt and the hardship of paying back pre-existing and new loans are contributing to the vulnerability of many small businesses. Of those interviewed, three businesses secured loans from the SME Bank and one received a GSB loan.

**Favourable commercial loan conditions:** Medium and larger Thai businesses with a credit history or a strong business history benefited greatly from the changes in commercial loan conditions initiated under the soft loan programme, whereby interest rates were set at 2% per cent for a period of three years with additional payments suspended for two years. Loans were supplemented with savings and profits from family business portfolios. That said, those businesses with pre-existing loans coupled with doubts regarding Khao Lak’s future financial viability caused loan access and repayment problems. Smaller businesses did report some success with the securing of loans, but many faced the same challenges that limited access to SME and GSB bank loans: lack of a proven credit history, incomplete business records and limited access to suitable guarantors (ILO, 2006). Having built their business up slowly over time negated the need for micro and small businesses to apply for credit prior to the tsunami. Furthermore, soft loans were available for a very short period of time only, thereby limiting their reach (ILO, 2006). The only other credit option was to seek credit under normal loan conditions charging 8% per cent interest, a rate that was too much for some small businesses. Repayment conditions have made it difficult for smaller businesses to save enough to cover the interest costs given that parts of Khao Lak such as Bang Niang Beach still suffer from lower tourist numbers.

**Alternate financial capital sources in the face of loan inaccessibility for Thai businesses**

Failing to secure (enough) credit, micro and small businesses relied upon savings, pre-existing social networks, NGOs and the kindness of donors to secure financial capital. Many small businesses accessed money from friends and family, with some being able to gain financial support from social networks abroad including newly formed friendships as a result of the disaster. Obtaining small loans from pawning personal effects was used as a temporary measure to overcome money shortages while informal sources of capital were sought for larger amounts (illegal loans from private

---

252 Interview 18, 20, 23, 28, 44, 45, 47 and 99 in Table 8; Discussion B in Table 10
253 Interview 20, 28 and 56 in Table 8
254 Interview 17, 26, 31, 45 and 65 in Table 8
255 Interview 28, 55 and 56 in Table 8
256 Interview 21 and 76 in Table 8
257 Discussions A, C and D in Table 10
258 Interview 21, 46 and 48 in Table 8
259 Interview 45 in Table 8
260 Interview 23, 55, 56, 78 and 96 in Table 8
261 Interview 25, 55 and 77 in Table 8
262 Interview 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 28, 31, 36 and 83 in Table 8
263 Interview 43, 50, 52, 89, 100 in Table 8
264 Interview 23, 67 and 99 in Table 8
265 Interview 67 in Table 8
266 Interview 47 in Table 8; Discussions A, F and G in Table 10
267 Interview 69 and 79 in Table 8
268 Interview 21, 26, 28, 29, 42, 44, 46, 47, 51 and 79 in Table 8
269 Interview 21, 37, 46 and 67 in Table 8
270 Interview 21 and 67 in Table 8
271 Interview 51 in Table 8
Destinations Vulnerability Assessment for Khao Lak, Thailand

creditors) at an interest rate of 20 per cent (accrued on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis) when there were few other options272. Another innovative way of accessing capital was through the establishment of business sponsorships that were set up through the Khao Lak Group for SMEs (refer back to Section 2.6.1.2), whereby foreign donors helped fund the rebuilding of small resorts in exchange for annual time-share options at the resort taken as payment in kind until the debt was repaid. Under such arrangements both parties tended to benefit273.

Some smaller enterprises were able to access small loans from NGOs, such as the Raks Thai Foundation (a Member of CARE International), and local grassroots organisations274. One micro business worker received an interest free loan of THB 40 000 maximum (USD 1020) from a women’s foundation. The programme’s aim was to enhance livelihood diversification in order to reduce dependency on tourism in the area275. Donations were another source of financial capital276, with some receiving financial donations from long-standing clients277. Others received donations collected via websites (refer back to Section 2.6.1.2), such as www.diveaid.com that was set up by members of the Khao Lak dive community to collect money for businesses and workers278. However, there were also drawbacks to such donations as some were conditional. For example, a Christian Organisation might offer financial aid in exchange for participation in Christian activities or religious conversion279. On the other hand, there were also instances in which the generosity of donors was abused by some who lied about their situation and intentions in order to receive more money280. This created mistrust and animosity among community members and negatively affected social relations. Yet despite all forms of assistance and generosity, some factions of the community (both foreign and Thai) are still struggling financially and taking one day at a time281.

Home government assistance to foreign business owners and workers

Western business owners received a mixed response when appealing to their home governments for assistance. The Italian government provided financial support with favourable conditions282. The German government provided loans through the Thai German Embassy to three German business owners for a two-year period283. Two other German business owners had the option but refused due to the strict and short-term repayment conditions284. The Dutch government offered no support285, nor did the Swiss government286. On approaching the Danish Embassy, one Danish business owner was refused aid based on the premise that the Thai government was helping tsunami victims did not need financial assistance287 despite the fact that Thai financial aid was only available to Thais. This left foreign business owners with few government-led refinancing options. Consequently, foreign business owners relied on savings288 (which in some cases were substantial289), donations from family, friends and old customers290; and loans from family and friends291. Those with savings used these to rebuild slowly. Those with insufficient financial capital returned home to work, returning months later when sufficient funds had been saved292. Others have sold off assets in their home countries to help finance the recovery of their business in Thailand293. Assistance to Burmese citizens was refused both by the Burmese junta and the Thai government (Robertson, 2007). Nepalese community members also received little help from their home country government. To survive, they

272 Interview 46, 90 in Table 8; Discussion A in Table 10
273 Interview 17 in Table 8
274 Interview 32, 40 and 44 in Table 8
275 Interview 40 in Table 8
276 Interview 28 and 71 in Table 8
277 Interview 28, 29 and 51 in Table 8
278 Interview 86 in Table 8
279 Interview 29 in Table 8
280 Interview 51 in Table 8

281 Interview 17, 32, 35, 51 and 56 in Table 8
282 Interview 17 in Table 8
283 Interview 28, 35 and 59 in Table 8
284 Interview 17 and 65 in Table 8
285 Interview 56 in Table 8
286 Interview 17 and 28 in Table 8
287 Interview 59 in Table 8
288 Interview 56 and 65 in Table 8
289 Interview 56 in Table 8
290 Interview 65 in Table 8
291 Interview 35, 56 and 86 in Table 8
292 Interview 28, 35, 50 and 59 in Table 8
293 Interview 59 in Table 8
have borrowed from friends to cover shop rental and taxes\(^{294}\). One Nepalese tailor benefited from subsidies provided by a sister tailor shop in Patong that received more business than the Khao Lak branch\(^{295}\). Businesses run jointly by foreign-Thai couples were able to get access to loans either from Thailand or from banks in the foreigner’s home country\(^{296}\).

**Formulation of a new tourism planning strategy for the Andaman Coast**

The post-tsunami tourism planning strategy aimed to build resilience against future shocks through the introduction of strict coastal zoning regulations and an integrated evacuation road system that facilitates a quick escape in the event of another tsunami. The new zoning laws and building codes include a 30-metre coastal development setback, multiple graded density zones, and structural codes (see Appendix 5). These changes are applicable to any structures built after 1 May 2005, leaving pre-existing buildings exempt. Structural changes have been made to some buildings\(^{297}\) but these are not uniform for two reasons. First, some regulations, such as the provision of an escape platform on the top of higher structures, was seen as aesthetically unsuitable for resort development that could affect the marketability of resorts\(^{298}\). Second, the government lacks the financial and human resources required to enforce these strategies at the local level resulting in planning violations\(^{299}\) (Civil Engineer at Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning Phuket, personal communication, 12 July 2005). The successful implementation of these plans is further hampered by an overlap of department jurisdictions, corruption and a change in government\(^{300}\).

The initial plan for an emergency road evacuation system was cancelled due to local opposition and bureaucratic complications. Local stakeholders opposed the new road plans fearing that changes to the beachfront would negatively alter Khao Lak’s beachfront appeal and lower tourist numbers. Furthermore, the central government were unable to finance the repossessing of prime development land needed for the widening of the road system\(^{301}\) (Khao Lak Tsunami Recovery Plan [TRP] Project Manager, personal communication, 4 July 2005).

A Khuk Khak TAO representative confirmed that post-tsunami development patterns and regulations have not changed\(^{302}\). Plans continue to follow the 3-year plan model. Since the inception of the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan, the TAO and the Phang Nga Tourism Association have formulated a new 3-year tourism development plan that complies with the provincial tourism strategy. So far it has not been implemented because of insufficient staff capacities and a lack of expertise in tourism-associated affairs\(^{303}\). No obvious steps have been taken to address these pre-existing governance issues (Khao Lak TRP Project Manager, personal communication, 4 July 2005). Such weaknesses in governance and the failure to implement much-needed regulations and plans waste collective resources, increase exposure levels and detract from sustainability goals\(^{304}\). Furthermore, the absence of active government engagement is negatively affecting development standards, trust in governance processes, and tourism investor confidence\(^{305}\).

The failure to implement capacity building strategies is a common blockage to building resilience in communities (Jäger et al., 2007). Solutions to these problems are never straightforward, but improved funding, investment in human capacity and skills, and the development of effective and transparent monitoring and evaluation process of existing strategies contribute greatly to alleviating such challenges (Jäger et al., 2007). However, these governance changes are time-consuming and difficult to implement. In the meantime, business owners need to rebuild because they depend on tourism for their livelihoods\(^{306}\). Therefore, a balance

\(^{294}\) Interview 81 and 82 in Table 8  
\(^{295}\) Interview 82 in Table 8  
\(^{296}\) Interview 50 and 59 in Table 8  
\(^{297}\) Interview 77, 100 in Table 8  
\(^{298}\) Interview 20 and 55 in Table 8  
\(^{299}\) Interview 67, 83 and 85 in Table 8; Discussion A in Table 10  
\(^{300}\) Interview 25, 50 in Table 8  
\(^{301}\) Interview 17, 18, 28 and 76 in Table 8  
\(^{302}\) Interview 34 in Table 8  
\(^{303}\) Interview 34 in Table 8  
\(^{304}\) Discussion B in Table 10  
\(^{305}\) Discussion B in Table 10  
\(^{306}\) Interview 89 in Table 8
is needed between change and speed, presenting a challenge for the authorities and the community\textsuperscript{307}.

**National tourism marketing strategies neglect Khao Lak**

Restoring consumer confidence and tourism flows to pre-tsunami levels is one of the biggest challenges facing Khao Lak. The marketing strategy outlined in the ATRP addresses this need. The TAT was responsible for restoring consumer confidence on behalf of all the affected destinations by hosting familiarisation trips to the affected areas, running aggressive promotional campaigns, and offering discount packages (TAT, 2005b); these strategies did not include Khao Lak and focussed on its more famous neighbouring destination of Phuket. A TAT representative interviewed in 2005 stated that Khao Lak was not considered a priority due to the belief that it could not recover from the sustained damage (personal communication, 7 July 2005). Furthermore, the TAT have no direct presence in Phang Nga where tourism market share is still small compared to Phuket and Krabi Provinces\textsuperscript{308}. Such preferences have resulted in the uneven distribution of marketing support among the affected communities. Recovery was also stimulated in Phuket, Krabi and alternate Thai destinations not affected by the tsunami, which marginalised Khao Lak even further.

The TAT has increased their marketing support of Khao Lak since 2007 by working in conjunction with local operators and hotels to help promote the area. An example of this was a joint TAT and industry promotional workshop undertaken with Meier Weltreisen, the biggest tour operator in Germany selling packages to Thailand. The 200 participants from German-speaking nations saw first-hand that Khao Lak is ready to welcome back visitors from Germany and Austria (TAT, 2007a). However, the Khao Lak community remains sceptical of the TAT’s agendas that the community believes do not, for the most part, include them.

**Introduction of a Tsunami Early Warning System for Thailand**

The introduction of the Indian Ocean Early Warning System in 2005 was heralded by both the government and tsunami-affected communities as a crucial tool for increasing preparedness against future shocks. The system would not only safeguard them, but would help to reassure tourists and hasten recovery. The Department for Disaster Mitigation and Prevention (DDMP) and the Ministry of Interior have overseen the development and installation of an early warning system in the six affected provinces. The system consists of a total of 79 warning towers (finished by 26 June 2006) and complimentary disaster preparedness training in risk reduction strategies and evacuation plan management for district officials. Despite the technology being available in July 2005, Khao Lak’s warning system was not completed until December 2005. No explanation was given for the delays. However, the reasoning is believed to be linked to governmental preferences; Khao Lak was not seen as a priority area for the installation of the system (ILO, 2006). As of 26 June 2006, a total of 79 warning towers had been installed in the six Thai provinces bordering the Andaman Sea. Eighteen have been installed in Phang Nga (TAT, 2006a) and the warnings are broadcast over the loudspeakers in five languages\textsuperscript{309}. Warning alerts are also sent via radio, televisions and a free SMS service to which people can subscribe\textsuperscript{310}. In December 2006, Thailand’s first tsunami detection buoy was installed and is now functioning. Under the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Thailand’s National Disaster Warning Centre (NDWC) and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Washington will assist Thailand and other countries bordering the Indian Ocean with the installation of a Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) system, a tsunami detection and early warning system, by providing the region with two deep ocean buoys developed by NOAA (TAT, 2006a).

The presence of the Early Warning System caused community members to feel safer\textsuperscript{311}. But there are concerns regarding the effectiveness of the system. First, the warning sirens and announcements cannot be heard in some areas, including the north end of Bang Niang Beach\textsuperscript{312}. Second, key parts from some warning towers have been stolen rendering them useless\textsuperscript{313}. Third, previous tests have not worked properly causing

\textsuperscript{307} Interview 55, 102 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{308} Interview 18 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{309} Interview 23 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{310} Interview 20 and 71 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{311} Interview 17, 20, 21, 23, 71, 90 in Table 8

\textsuperscript{312} Interview 50 in Table 8; Discussion A in Table 10

\textsuperscript{313} Interview 56 in Table 8; Discussions A and F in Table 10
some to lose faith in its effectiveness\textsuperscript{314}. Fourth, warning procedure and disaster preparedness training has been limited and training dates unknown\textsuperscript{315}, signage is irregular, marked evacuation distances unclear and evacuation roads are blocked by development or trees\textsuperscript{316}. This mistrust in the System was demonstrated in September 2007 following an earthquake off the Sumatran Coast. News of the threat and the issuance of tsunami warnings in neighbouring countries came via international news channels causing many locals to run to high ground for safety (Montague, 2007). No news or reassurance was issued from the NDWC, causing much uncertainty and fear. Without adequate public awareness and knowledge of disaster preparedness procedures, early warning technology is useless. Furthermore, a reliance on a faulty early warning system (including procedures) creates an emerging sensitivity to future shocks. In the face of these technical problems, the real warning system may take the form of social network communication now that the community is aware of the natural signs\textsuperscript{317}.

**Launch of National Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre**

Responding to the long term challenges and uncertainties of highly competitive global tourism trends, the Ministry of Tourism and Sports launched the Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre in March 2007. This government initiative at the national level is a good example of adjustment and adaptation responses that have the propensity to improve industry preparedness and help destination communities prepare for and cope with future shocks and stressors.

Placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT), the Intelligence Unit intends to provide timely and accurate market intelligence and competitive analyses to TAT offices worldwide and representatives of the Thai travel and tourism industry for strategic planning, tourism marketing and promotions, and public relations purposes (TAT, 2007b). The role of the Tourism Intelligence Unit is to monitor emerging trends, including changes in the behaviour and lifestyles of travellers, and to conduct impact assessment studies to gauge the impact of such changes on the Thai tourism industry. The Unit also uses modelling to forecast trends, detect irregularities and identify potential issues by monitoring and analysing key tourism performance indicators and organisational performance indices.

The Crisis Management Centre was established to enhance the collective ability of the TAT, tourism agencies and organisations to respond to shocks and events that threaten tourism flows to Thailand. The Centre is designed to facilitate the planning and execution of rapid and orchestrated responses to sensitive situation with decisions being based on accurate information. The Centre will also endeavour to be the interface between volunteer, emergency and relief organisation through the provision of hotlines, and the broadcast of real-time on-site situation updates, announcements and reports. Having a fully-equipped press centre, the Centre is intended to be a focal point for media and where press briefing will take place (TAT, 2007b).

**Sustainable tourism redevelopment under the Sub-regional Development Plan (SRDP)**

Following the tsunami, the Fiscal Policy Office of the Ministry of Finance requested assistance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in preparing a Sub-regional Development Plan (SRDP) for the three most affected provinces: Phang Nga, Phuket and Krabi. While the Andaman Tourism Recovery Plan focuses on reactionary redevelopment (coastal zoning and building code requirements) and preparedness strategies linked directly to the disaster, the SRDP is a proactive and strategic blueprint aimed at maximising long-term sustainability in the Andaman region over the next 15 years. Specifically, the SRDP (Gilchriest et al., 2007b: 3):

- Creates a common planning framework for shaping and directing the various recovery aid programmes and plans by government, international donors, and NGOs, toward common and mutually beneficial goals that avoid duplication and diseconomies of scale;

- Introduces a common long-term vision for the Andaman Coast that encourages contributions and engagement from government, civil society, the community and the private sector; and
• Reduces risk among investors and other stakeholders by establishing a transparent, consistent and practical planning system that identifies the most appropriate type, form and distribution of development that matches needs with sustainable resource use.

The fulfilment of these aims transforms adversity into opportunity, with the SRDP becoming the catalyst for good governance, robust and integrative planning, and greater regional synergy (Gilchriest et al., 2007b).

The SRDP covers short- (to 2010), medium- (2011-2015) and long-term (2016-2020) plans that incorporate six key elements that shape regional sustainability: economic and tourism development targets, social and community development, environmental management and preservation, robust infrastructure provisions, and risk management. Twenty-three projects have been identified as priority action points. Table 4 briefly outlines the 12 recommended projects that affect Khao Lak directly or indirectly. But being in the proposal stages, there are no guarantees that the SRDP strategies can or will be adopted, prompting the authors to flag common operationalisation challenges that have hindered plan implementation in the past. These include: lack of institutional support and coordination among agencies at the national, provincial, and local level; financial constraints; and a lack of local actor (including the private sector) and governmental engagement and long-term commitment (Gilchriest et al., 2007a).

Improving environmental and natural resource management

Adger et al. (2005) and Crossland (2002) stress the need to complement socio-political measures with strategies that enhance the capacity of ecosystems to regenerate and adapt to hazardous conditions, particularly in sensitive coastal zones where more than 50 per cent of the world’s population live. To reduce the physical exposure of the degraded environment and open terrain by buffering the built environment against future coastal hazards, the Department of Marine and Coastal Resources (DMCR) coordinated the replanting of native trees and grasses along the severely eroded beachfront of Laem Pakarang, as well as Tai Muang Beach and Koh Koh Khao. The initial plans were to plant vegetation along the entire stretch of Khao Lak beaches. Nang Thong Beach and Bang Niang Beach were excluded from the project because the beachfront land is privatised and the community blocked government measures to acquire beachfront land due to fears that the land designated for trees would be used for alternate purposes. This is another example of the tourism community’s distrust of the government. Casuarina and Pandanaceae trees were planted because their root systems help to prevent erosion and they create a natural barrier against storm surges and tsunamis (Calgaro, 2005). Business owners supplemented government efforts by replanting vegetation on their private land. The tsunami heightened the community’s awareness of the importance of environmental conservation. These measures, along with increasing environmental responsibility, build biophysical resilience. The conservation of the ecological resource base also underpins the sustainability of tourism development.

3.3 The Phuket Action Plan: A multinational tourism response

Given the unprecedented impact of the tsunami on the tourism industry, the World Tourism Organisation (WTO) launched a multi-scaled and collaborative response called the Phuket Action Plan (PAP). The main aims of the Action Plan are to: provide assistance to unemployed tourism workers; aid the recovery of small and medium tourism-related businesses; restore consumer confidence and visitor flows; and introduce strategies that focus on disaster risk reduction and strengthening tourism sustainability (UN, 2005, WTO, 2005a). The plan was seen as an ideal opportunity to foster cooperation and coordination among the affected countries, to share knowledge and ideas, to develop regional tourism clusters and to facilitate the sustainable redevelopment of tourism activities that avoided ‘past mistakes’ (Rice, 2005:10-11). Partners included in the formation and execution of the PAP included Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), VISA, Netherlands Development Organisation.

318 Interview 58 in Table 8
319 Interview 28 in Table 8
320 Interview 58 in Table 8
321 Interview 28 in Table 8
322 Interview 58 in Table 8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector and sub-sector focus</th>
<th>Project (P)</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban and regional planning</td>
<td>P1: Establishment of new plan-making framework for the Andaman sub-region</td>
<td>Rectify current planning and jurisdiction inconsistencies between government departments and levels by strengthening the administrative planning system that controls the expansion of development in Krabi, Phang Nga and Phuket tourist destinations (including those on Phuket’s west coast), and urban expansion in Phuket Town. Determine institutional support needs for the following four planning components: comprehensive and proactive plan formulation and governance; plan formulation structure for the Andaman sub-region; refining of the zoning process and system; and public awareness and participation in the planning process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental management and infrastructure</td>
<td>P3: Restructuring of Khao Lak Town Centre</td>
<td>Prepare a feasibility study for the diversion of the National Highway Route 4 that runs directly through Khao Lak and the conversion of the existing road into a tourism boulevard and rambla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental management and infrastructure</td>
<td>P7: Implementation of new centralised wastewater treatment plants in Khao Lak</td>
<td>Promote sustainable tourism development and ensure the preservation of Khao Lak’s environment through the provision of a centralised and municipally controlled wastewater treatment plant. Introduce an ‘eco-tax’ on accommodation to be paid in part by tourists to help fund the installation and maintenance of the proposed plants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental management and infrastructure</td>
<td>P8: Environmental conservation promotional program</td>
<td>Promote environmental conservation through the: Establishment of coastal conservation best practices for residents, developers and tourists to be disseminated in Thai and English via multiple media channels and brochures available at airports, hotels, PAO and TAOs; Implementation of a ‘Greencall’ public environmental monitoring program to facilitate public reporting to appropriate authorities on pollution problems; Expansion of the Department of Coastal and Marine Resources’ (DCMR Phang Nga Regional Office) marine and coastal resources awareness display programme that includes the formation of Coast Care Conservation Clubs in schools and youth clubs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P9: Orientation training for environmental management</td>
<td>Increase skills and capacity levels within provincial, district and local government bodies responsible for SDRP implementation through the provision of 2 types of training: Training of key personnel at the provincial and local level in environmental planning and application of the SRDP. This includes instruction on evaluating potential environmental impacts of development, sub-regional plan formulation, and assessment of carrying capacity and mitigation measures over time. ‘Training the trainer’ programmes to build capacity at the local level and strengthen environmental best practices.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Table 4 continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector and sub-sector focus</th>
<th>Project (P)</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Marketing and Certification</td>
<td>P11: Establishment of Andaman Tourism Marketing and Promotion Board (ATMPB)</td>
<td>Set up an Andaman Tourism Marketing and Promotion Board that: Creates a cohesive Andaman image that can competitively compete for market share in the national and international tourism domain; Facilitates widespread marketing exposure of smaller enterprises that lack the capital and/or expertise to implement a robust marketing strategy that reaches key national and international markets; Maximises social and economic contributions that tourism makes for all stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P12: Web portal and e-commerce facility</td>
<td>Establish a unified web portal and e-commerce facility that combines research, client relation management (tourists and operators), e-commerce (booking of accommodation and services) and disseminates data and information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P13: Establishment of joint branding for the Andaman Coast</td>
<td>Develop joint branding for the Andaman that effectively promotes the rich diversity of available activities to key markets; and Generate a unique personality or ‘feel’ for Andaman destinations that creates a unique selling point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P14: Andaman Coast Certification Program for Tourism (ACT)</td>
<td>Establish an Andaman certification program that incorporates eco-labelling to promote the adoption of sustainable tourism products and services, help suppliers raise their service standards, and create a powerful marketing tool to attract tourists to the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P16: Establishment of the University of the Andaman Coast</td>
<td>Increase skill levels and research capacity of the Andaman Coast populace through the foundation of the University of the Andaman Coast. The proposed University would focus on social sciences (particularly tourism-related courses), science and technology and health sciences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and Social Development</td>
<td>P19: Strengthening community mechanisms for participation in socio-economic development in the region</td>
<td>Increase wider access to the economic benefits of tourism in villages in close proximity to tourism centres (incl. Khao Lak) by: Increasing skills and knowledge of local leaders, enabling them to create innovative mechanisms for ensuring village participation; Augmenting the effectiveness of community development efforts by fortifying organisational capabilities of governance and community development organisations; Establishing effective structures to ensure active and sustained participation of community-based organisations (CBOs) and vulnerable groups in local governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P 20: Strengthening multi-sector partnerships for livelihood development in villages</td>
<td>Secure stable tourism-oriented livelihoods for community enterprises and promoting local business competitiveness by: Establishing strong and mutually beneficial partnerships between village communities, CBOs, NGOs, industry and government actors that will facilitate the development of shared plans and activities and greater community cohesion; Providing training and coaching interventions for CBOs SMEs and cooperatives on business planning and management, product development, network building, enterprise evaluation, communication and social management, and capital generation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gilchriest et al. (2007a)
Box 4: Phuket Action Plan Strategies

Marketing and communication strategies: Consumer and travel trade confidence in Thailand’s affected destinations was boosted by two actions. First, the WTO set up a centralised tsunami recovery website that provided accurate and live recovery updates. Second, a series of familiarisation trips were run for the international press and the major tour operators from the major generating countries (U.K., Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Russia, China, Korea) to provide an accurate picture of the damage sustained and recovery progressions.

Community relief: The WTO undertook a study to ascertain the recovery progress of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in order to inform appropriate financial assistance strategies.

Professional skills training: Responding to the need for skilled workers in the affected areas, the WTO and supporting partners offered training for new tourism employees, courses for the retraining of tourism employees while they waited for their old jobs back, and management training courses.

Risk and crisis management: The PAP initiated two projects aimed at reducing risk in the tourism sector. The Global Advanced Technology Emergency Information Network for the Tourism Sector is an emerging multi-scaled initiative designed to mitigate risk and facilitate effective multilateral tourism responses to hazards. It aims to fill existing gaps between communication and information exchange and the multiple actions undertaken by the tourism industry, governments, international organisations, NGOs and the media (WTO, 2005a). Coordination is being directed by the World Economic Forum in cooperation with the private sector. The second initiative aimed at increasing awareness and coping capacity through the provision of risk awareness and management training at the local level. The WTO, in partnership with The University of Hawaii and the Asian Centre for Tourism Planning and Poverty Reduction Faculty of Social Administration (ACTPPR) ran the ‘Future Leaders of Andaman Sea’ workshop for 50 youth from Phang Nga and Krabi Provinces. The workshop was organised with the support and involvement of various governmental organisations at the national and local level. The workshop not only provided the young community members with the knowledge and skills to become future leaders in disaster risk reduction, but facilitated the creation of new networks between participants and their respective communities (WTO, 2005b, WTO, 2005a). Working with multiple governmental partnerships simultaneously strengthens local knowledge, engagement and networks between multinational bodies, national and local governmental authorities and local community members. Increased knowledge of appropriate avenues for information gathering and action may prove beneficial in the event of future shocks.

(SNV), and private sector companies. Strategies that proved beneficial for Thailand and Khao Lak are summarised in Box 4.

3.4 NGO assistance for Khao Lak

Numerous NGOs participated in both short and long-term measures ranging from the clean-up of debris to boat and house building, child support programmes, assistance for the elderly, and HIV prevention (4Kali.org, 2007, ILO, 2006, TVC, 2007). Those volunteers and aid organisations involved in reconstruction and immediate recovery activities pulled out of the area soon after the completion of short-term restoration work (Kongrut, 2007). However, some NGOs saw the need for long-term capacity building measures, such as ongoing financial support, skills and leadership training, and support for emerging alternate livelihoods and livelihood diversification. These ventures were assisted by an influx of private donations in the first year but these have dwindled leaving some organisations struggling to keep operating. The TVC closed in 2008 (Tsunami Volunteer Centre, 2008). Yet accessibility to these programmes is reduced for some sub-groups by four factors: knowledge of the programmes, time constraints, costs (which for the most part are set purposely low), and a mismatch of existing language capacities and appropriate courses.

323 Interview 17, 28, 71 and 97 in Table 8
324 Interview 30 and 66 in Table 8
Financial aid and management training
Two organisations offered financial aid and support to small businesses. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) in partnership with the Credit Union League of Thailand (CULT) provided technical assistance to help micro and small businesses get access to financial services and small loans. They provided information sessions on the advantages of cooperative savings and how to establish and register credit union savings groups. A number of credit saving groups were formed and/or strengthened through the project. Created to help rebuild tsunami-affected communities, the 4Kali.org Foundation is supporting small business development by offering small grants and micro-credit loans to individuals wanting to establish businesses which are not entirely dependent on the tourism industry. Projects range from mobile food carts, laundry businesses, local restaurants, barber shops and massage parlours. However, the bulk of NGO assistance focussed on increasing skills and community leadership.

Provision of skills and leadership training and promoting livelihood diversification
Social investment in skills and leadership training builds resilience by creating pathways to sustainable employment opportunities, facilitating localised leadership, and promoting self-organisation capabilities. The type of programmes offered fall into two categories and are summarised in Table 5 and Table 6:

- Short-term programmes designed to support livelihood diversification among former tourism workers while encouraging community members to remain in the region; and
- Longer-term programmes that offered sustained support to both tourism workers wanting to improve skill levels and employment prospects and those looking for an opportunity and means to enter the tourism industry and benefit from future tourism growth.

The provision of skills and leadership programmes benefited the community in four ways. First, at the most basic level the training gave people something positive to focus on in the immediate aftermath. Newly-formed centres, like Step Ahead and the Saori Weaving Centre, became refuges for people who had lost everything. Similar experiences were shared spurring hope and resolve to retrain and rebuild325. Second, it provided the newly unemployed with a reason to stay in the region, thereby circumventing further staff shortages. The tsunami disaster left Khao Lak with a depleted skilled workforce, with many of the surviving workers leaving to escape the memories and pursue employment in alternate destinations. Third, the skills training in tourism and hospitality enabled greater local participation in and financial benefit from the tourism sector while creating a skilled workforce for business owners. Finally, the programmes helped to diversify livelihood options. Acquiring new and transferable skills (in business planning and administration, money management, leadership, computing and English) builds individual resilience against future shocks.

NGO initiatives for Burmese workers
Conditions for an estimated 2500 Burmese migrants have improved considerably since the tsunami (TAG, 2005). Increased post-tsunami media attention on the plight of the Burmese workers attracted support from various NGOs that has given both legal and illegal Burmese workers a much needed voice against routine discrimination and exploitation. Assistance was largely provided by the Tsunami Action Group for Migrants (TAG), a group formed from local NGOs led by Human Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIB), Grassroots HRE, and MAP Foundation. Initial TAG activities focussed on providing direct emergency relief to 4792 migrants before shifting to more long-term empowerment activities, including326 (Hakoda, 2005, TAG, 2005):

- Ensuring the re-documentation of migrants with ID cards (Tor/Ror 38/1), work permits, and birth certificates for new-borns;
- Providing temporary financial assistance to construction employees that were waiting for employers to begin rebuilding;
- Securing the legal status and livelihoods of migrants (including salary rates and employment conditions) through constant advocacy with government authorities, UN bodies and journalists;

325 Interview 93 in Table 8
326 Interview 81 in Table 8
- Assistance with reclaiming money from the police327;
- Improving migrant access to information, education, health and legal services; and
- Supporting the strengthening of migrant communities and their capacity to cope with trauma, exercise their rights as a group and self-organise.

The timely re-issuing of temporary visas and work permits was vital given the high post-tsunami demand for cheap construction labour in Khao Lak; but the cost of work permits and the removal of income sources reduced the number of registered workers to 17,165 in Phang Nga when employers needed 36,000 (TAG, 2005). Unregistered workers remain extremely vulnerable to discrimination, exploitation, arrest and deportation. The Federation of Trade Unions Burma (FTUB) offered two information and training sessions in Phang Nga aimed at building capacity and facilitating cohesion among Burmese workers that were affected by the tsunami. The outcomes of the initiative were three-fold: (i) migrant workers gained a better understanding of the role of trade unions, workers’ rights and assistance services; (ii) trade union membership was increased; and (iii) collaboration between Thai and Burmese trade unions was enhanced. Other NGOs that offered financial and medical assistance included the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and Médecins Sans Frontières.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Projects (P) and Goals</th>
<th>Actions and outcomes benefiting Khao Lak’s destination community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Thailand Business Partnership and International Business Leaders Forum | P1: IT Skills Program by KPMG To assist businesses, workers and the newly unemployed to recover | Conducted student IT skill classes in the Ban Sak School, Phang Nga Province and provided computers, internet access and teacher support
Improved the students’ IT and online learning skills.
This pilot project spread to many schools throughout the tsunami hit areas. |
| | P2: Career Transitioning Training by Manpower Incorporated To help former tourism workers who had lost their jobs and workplaces develop new career paths and promote livelihood diversification | Undertook skills assessments followed by training in appropriate alternative livelihoods
Former bell boys, cleaners and gardeners were offered alternative careers training including landscaping golf courses, tailoring, and massage. |

327 Interview 81 in Table 8
## Destination Vulnerability Assessment for Khao Lak, Thailand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Projects (P) and Goals</th>
<th>Actions and outcomes benefiting Khao Lak’s destination community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Labour Organisation (ILO) with UNDP and Ministry of Labour (executed in partnership with local partners in Khao Lak)</td>
<td>Umbrella Project: Post-tsunami Livelihood Recovery Project in the Tourism Sector in Phuket and Phang Nga To assist those affected workers and employers to increase their employability and ability to generate income Support specific organisations servicing them to meet these needs To encourage employees to stay in destination sites so as to circumvent further staff shortages</td>
<td>Technical assistance to the growing informal economy Technical assistance to help micro and small businesses get access to financial services and small loans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P1: Job assistance and skills training by Phuket Federation of Hotels and Labour Services (PFHLS) | Provided information to workers, assisted with job searches, and offered skills training and marketing assistance to Labour Club members (300 retrenched industry workers). Training programmes included: The art of batik and the making of artificial flowers Micro and small business entrepreneurship Savings management by the Credit Union League of Thailand (CULT) |

P2: Hospitality and tourism service training by the Phang Nga Tourism Association | Provision of hospitality and tourism service training to raise the skill base of retrenched workers and interested community members The training was complimented by recruitment drives aimed at matching employers with employees (43% of trainees secured jobs) A new website promoting Khao Lak and offering a reservation service was also created |

P3: Product development assistance by ThaiCraft | Provision of technical assistance with product design and quality, skills development, and marketing and product distribution for three community-based groups in the greater Khao Lak area: The Saori Weaving Group that produces woven products for sale (wristbands, handbags, wallets, mobile phone holders) The Tsunami Doll Group selling sand-filled dolls created through a project run by the Tsunami Volunteer Centre Tsunami survivors that produced crafts for the Tsunami Craft Centre |

P4: Phang Nga Labour Bureau’s Get Ahead Entrepreneurship Training Sessions | The training of trainers programme focussed on creating skilled leaders within government and community organisations and among micro-entrepreneurs. Training was undertaken in Phuket and Bangkok with worker and employer representatives from Phang Nga and Phuket An information and training workshop was also held for 250 affected workers, providing occupational guidance and training, information on employee financial aid schemes, social security and workers compensation advice, and language training |

Sources: (ILO, 2006, IBLF, 2006); ILO, 2006
Table 6: Long-term NGO activities designed to increase skills levels and aid livelihood diversification in Khao Lak

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Projects (P) and Goals</th>
<th>Actions and outcomes benefiting Khao Lak’s destination community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Tsunami Volunteer Centre   | **P**: English training and disaster preparedness programmes  
TVC’s overall aim is to assist in the long-term restoration of tsunami-affected communities through empowerment                                                                 | English training was offered to hotel staff  
The TVC has introduced their disaster awareness and preparedness programmes into the hotels and resorts |
| 4Kali.org                  | P1: Establishment of a community centre  
4Kali concentrates on ‘helping people help themselves’                                                                                                                                                             | The establishment of a community centre south of Khao Lak is planned to teach diving, English and other livelihood skills that the community can use to help sustain a livelihood in the future |
| Step Ahead                 | **P**: Micro-enterprise Development and Training Centre  
Aims to support the recovery of the tourism industry in Khao Lak by improving the skill base for the local population                                                                                                                                                  | The main courses offered include: English, hospitality and computer skills  
Special interest classes in Italian cooking and German language lessons are also held periodically when there are volunteers available to run the classes |
| Ecotourism Training Centre | Their mission is to:  
provide career training to young adults affected by the tsunami disaster  
create a positive force in rebuilding the local community                                                                                     | It focuses on training young people to become leaders and catalysts for change in their own communities, which builds local capacity for the future  
The 9-month intensive training include diving, English through the avenues of ecotourism, environmental awareness, business education and computing, enabling graduates to seek professional employment as certified PADI diving instructors and dive masters  
Students are also included in community service projects |
| Tsunami Craft Centre       | The main aim of the Centre is to create opportunities and post-tsunami stability through the development of small business networks that have a promising future for producing high-quality, fair trade handicrafts                                                                 | It supports the economic recovery of tsunami survivors who began making handicrafts in the aftermath of the disaster as a means of income generation  
It provides producers with a centrally-located shop to sell their products, as well as various support services to aid in their development  
Producer groups arose from more than 13 temporary housing camps and villages, including: Saori Weaving Centre, Pruteow Batik, Pak Triam Tie Dye, Nam Khem Tie Dye, Baan Pui Batik, Khuk Khak Baskets, Tsunami Dolls, Bak Jok natural paper producers, Ban Talea Nok soap, Kho Surin Mokken wood-carved boats, and Bang Khaya Batik |
| Saori Weaving Centre       | The Centre was created to help weavers ease their minds and release any trauma and sorrow through craft                                                                                                                                                        | Initially, the centre only used the freestyle weaving as therapy to treat the victims  
After two years, the Centre began to attract local villagers looking for alternate job opportunities as unemployment rates in the area remain high |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Projects (P) and Goals</th>
<th>Actions and outcomes benefiting Khao Lak’s destination community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Kenan Institute Asia  | **P1**: Tsunami Recovery Action Initiative Program (TRAI)  
To build capacity in entrepreneurship, hotel management, tourism-related occupations and education and support sustainable tourism and livelihoods. | TRAI assists the recovery of small businesses and communities, builds capacities in sustainable tourism to improve livelihoods, and helped establish a long-tail fishing boat repair centre and pier. |
|                       | **P2**: Future collaborative projects                                                    | The Kenan Institute is involved in a collaborative project with the WTO to promote sustainable tourism in the Khao Lak area and devising a Provincial Strategy Plan for ecotourism and natural resource management, in partnership with the Provincial Governor and Lum Lu National Park. |
| Buddhist Fellowship   | **P**: English Teaching  
To build skill levels of local community members to facilitate their future participation and financially benefit from tourism growth in the Khao Lak area | Conducted free English classes in Khuk Khak for the benefit of adults in the local community. |

"‘Positive Power’ plus ‘knowledge’ plus ‘respect of the community’s right to receive support’ plus ‘adherence to rules and regulations’ is the key ... to solving problems in Khao Lak.” (Focus Group Discussion with Thai Resort Owners, personal communication, 10 September 2007)

Autonomy, adaptability, diversity, interdependence, collaboration, good governance, social learning and corresponding action are considered as the foundations of resilience (Godschalk, 2003, US-IOTWS, 2007). This Destination Vulnerability Assessment (DVA) of Khao Lak has shown that this tourism destination community has some strong characteristics that form the foundations of its resilience and that have helped it to recover and adapt in the face of disaster and adversity. In this assessment, the following factors have been shown to strengthen Khao Lak’s resilience to shocks:

- The destination’s niche nature-getaway branding that distinguishes Khao Lak’s tourism product within Thailand’s competitive tourism market, which is rigorously upheld by committed and visionary tourism actors;
- A resilient and loyal repeat client base that returned to support the destination community by providing income, hope and new business;
- Strong family networks that provided much-needed financial and moral support;
- Industry representative bodies and resourceful leaders in the community that spur positive action, community direction, and help build community cohesion;
- An ever-growing willingness among a broad spectrum of community actors to actively participate in community-based and industry representative groups that help shape destination development and create a platform for social leaning and collective action; and
- Resourcefulness of business owners that turn adversity into new opportunities for business growth and destination development.

However, there are ongoing weaknesses and emerging sensitivities that leave Khao Lak vulnerable and, therefore, require attention, improvement and strengthening. The key challenges are:

- Limited savings and diminished financial reserves coupled with compounding debt from both pre-existing loans used to build new businesses and additional loans needed to rebuild;
- Insurance levels remain low;
- Strong reliance on seasonal tourism-related employment and business returns in a destination that has yet to recover from the tsunami causing further business losses and financial instability;
- Access to financial capital still remains a challenge due to stringent bank lending restrictions and few alternative credit structures;
- Heavy reliance on marketing strategies and preferences of international tour operators;
- Marketing support from the TAT is improving but still remains low;
- Despite the increase of NGO-led skills training post-tsunami, skill shortages remain an ongoing problem for both business and villagers who are excluded from the benefits of tourism;
- Social exclusion of Thais from other parts of Thailand along with foreigner sub-groups leave these factions with few localised support options in times of stress, with the Burmese being the worst affected;
- Knowledge on risk management and disaster preparedness is still lacking despite the installation of the Early Warning System;
- A lack of capacity in local levels of government along with financial constraints, departmental overlap, weak political will, and corruption continue to hinder the implementation of tourism development.
plans designed to build destination resilience. This is a waste of resources and compounds already weak relations between government and tourism actors;

- Nepotism and corruption continue to reinforce the uneven distribution of resources and enable planning violations;

- Inadequate provisions of basic infrastructure, such as street lighting and wastewater management facilities, is deterring tourists and heightens the threat of environment degradation if not addressed soon; and

- A lack of political engagement between local governance bodies and community members leaves the populace with little support and no platform for discussing and resolving community challenges and needs.

In light of these strengths and weaknesses, we propose nine action points that aim to reduce current vulnerabilities and capitalise on existing strengths in order to build long-term resilience in the Khao Lak tourism community against future stressors and shocks.

1 ESTABLISHING GOVERNANCE PROCESSES STRUCTURES TO ENABLE PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERACTION AND ENGAGEMENT

Strong leadership, a legal framework, and effective institutions provide the enabling governance, socioeconomic, and cultural conditions required for building resilience in coastal communities (US-IOTWS, 2007). Accordingly, mutually accountable partnerships between governmental authorities, destination communities and tourism representative groups need to be developed and strengthened (Scheper and Patel, 2006) to alleviate heightened levels of exclusion, mistrust and frustration and enable meaningful and informed participation in decision-making processes and future tourism development. The Khao Lak community strongly calls for closer interaction between the private and public sectors in the design and implementation of robust development plans that are sustainable and in line with the collective Khao Lak tourism vision. Shared visions for the destination community include: improvement in service standards and products across various sub-sectors, and maintain and fortify Khao Lak’s niche destination market and image (a tropical getaway with no water sports, nor beach hawkers and beach umbrellas). The community recognises that strong governmental leadership and vision is a key factor in ensuring the success of mutually beneficial development in destination communities. The private sector cannot accomplish this in isolation without effective governmental management and monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, the development of closer relationships with local TAO and Takuapa District authorities will give the community a much needed platform for addressing grievances, discussing community challenges and creating opportunities for collective action, change and transformation.

2 IMPROVING EQUITY, INCLUSION AND DOWNWARD ACCOUNTABILITY

Systematic mechanisms of downward accountability and transparency are not in place culminating in planning violations and misappropriation of resources (Scheper and Patel, 2006). Therefore, there is a need to create strong multi-scaled government mechanisms that:

- Monitor long-term tourism development and increase the consistency of tourism plan implementation;

- Oversee and enforce development regulations that are consistent with strategic long-term tourism sustainability goals; and

- Chart the capacity and effectiveness of local government.

Such mechanisms will improve transparency and trust between the private and public sector (particularly at the TAO sub-district level) and heighten accountability among industry and governmental actors. For this to be successful, greater governmental engagement and support is required from higher levels of government, including the Phang Nga Provincial Governor and local parliamentary representatives, to oversee and

1 Discussions A and B in Table 10
2 Discussions B and E in Table 10
strengthen local governance and support long-term tourism development visions, strategies and standards.

3 BUILDING CAPACITY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Strategies aimed at facilitating transparent resource distribution and monitoring cannot be achieved without building capacity at the local level where financial resources, skill levels, and human capacity are limited (ASIST-AP, 2004). There is a need to improve the knowledge-base and tourism expertise within sub-district and district governmental offices to enable a deeper understanding of tourism needs and facilitate effective engagement with the Khao Lak destination community on developmental priorities and complimentary strategies. Deeper engagement and involvement on both sides also promotes governance responsibility and accountability.

4 STRENGTHENING BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS AND INCREASING MEMBERSHIP OF MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISES

Strengthened public-private linkages need to be complimented by stronger and more inclusive community networks and tourism representative bodies headed by strong, active and visionary leaders that foster social and corporate responsibility and action. The advantages of industry representation are three-fold:

- Representative group membership provides a forum for knowledge sharing among like businesses and developing common goals and overcoming challenges, thereby precluding conflict and damaging competition;

- Industry representative bodies create platforms for proactive participation in development processes and form a collective voice needed to effectively petition government departments and other industry actors for desired change and advancement; and

- The collective knowledge and expertise of members along with their combined connections to business networks, social contacts and political forums become a common resource for mobilising multi-scaled actions and securing favourable results.

The PNTA is a well-established representative group but membership is dominated by medium and larger accommodation providers; the needs of smaller micro enterprises are overlooked. Representation of SME sub-group interests should be bolstered (WTO, 2005a). Given the different interests and characteristics of Khao Lak’s business sub-groups (dive operators, travel agents, long-tail boat operators, and masseurs, to name a few), the formation of sub-group representative bodies that are closely linked or incorporated into the PNTA would promote sub-group and wider destination unity and strength. Multiple industry group representation and interaction promotes knowledge transfer and the creation of a common Khao Lak vision and development plan that generates livelihood opportunities and benefits for all community members without compromising the character of Khao Lak’s tourism product and the environment. Active representative bodies can also boost destination marketing exposure. But for this to be successful, membership participation needs to be proactive instead of passive with the responsibility falling on all members to create a common and strong voice.

5 IMPROVING THE SKILL BASE NEEDED FOR PARTICIPATION IN TOURISM LIVELIHOODS

Language skill levels are low among less educated community members and hospitality skills poor. Improvements in both through regular training would enable greater local participation in tourism related livelihoods and access to greater financial benefits. Despite the existence of English training undertaken by numerous organisations, awareness of such programmes is low among some sub-groups. Hence, access to information about available resources also needs to be addressed. One avenue for this is through the formation of sub-group representative bodies as advocated in point 4. Accessibility is also a challenge for some sub-groups due to time constraints, costs (which for the most part are

3 Discussions B and E in Table 10
4 Discussions C, D and G in Table 10
5 Discussion B in Table 10
6 Interview 22, 64, 71, 100 in Table 8
set purposely low), and a mismatch of existing language capacities and appropriate courses. Accessibility could be improved through the formulation of sub-group specific training and language programmes that cater to common education levels and sub-group availability. Alternative livelihood training may also be needed to increase long-term livelihood security in a climate of constant change.

6 CREATING MORE ACCESSIBLE FUNDING SOURCES FOR MICRO AND SMALL BUSINESSES (THAI AND FOREIGN)

Accessing enough capital to keep businesses afloat during the long-term recovery phase is an ongoing concern. Accordingly, there is a need for the provision of financial credit options. Financial measures introduced by the government were commendable but stringent lending conditions left smaller enterprises without access to sufficient funds. Foreign business owners also faced financial challenges; emergency aid was limited to Thais and low interest loans were inaccessible without land deeds for collateral. Considering that both foreigners and Thais contribute to the wealth of the country through taxation and registration fees it is reasonable for them all to benefit from financial accessibility. Community members want financial solutions with flexible terms and repayment options.

7 STREAMLINING BUSINESS REGISTRATION PROCEDURES AND IMPROVING ACCESS TO WORKER INSURANCE

Low business registration levels among micro and small businesses became problematic following the tsunami, leaving unregistered business owners with no way to prove loss of assets needed to gain compensation for business-related losses and access to loans. Confusing and conflicting sub-district and district registration procedures often deterred small businesses from registering. Streamlining these procedures, making them more elastic and having one contact point would facilitate higher registration levels. Access to worker insurance is also problematic among self-employed workers. Greater access to information on alternative schemes and options would heighten coverage and resilience to job losses.

8 PROVIDING DISASTER AND RISK PREPAREDNESS TRAINING AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Calls for better and widely accessible risk and disaster preparedness training at the local level are common among Khao Lak’s destination community with knowledge being recognised as the key to risk preparedness and resilience (US-IOTWS, 2007). Increased awareness and preparedness also instills community and investment confidence in livelihood resilience. The timing would need to be in the low season so that it does not clash with high season business operations. A localised centre for disaster management has also been suggested, giving people a focal point for information, training and assistance in the event of a shock or hazard. The TVC are currently developing a disaster preparedness program which could be extended to become the localised centre if appropriate support from governmental authorities is given.

9 IMPROVING INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Environmental conservation in Khao Lak is a priority given the high dependence on tourism. With environmental degradation and environmental sensitivity becoming emerging community concerns, there are strong calls to improve basic infrastructural provisions and more vigorous monitoring systems at the local level of government. Pressing infrastructure needs comprise:

- An integrated wastewater system for Khao Lak, including appropriate drainage for water run-off;

---

7 Discussions A and C in Table 10
8 Interview 35 in Table 8
9 Interview 46, 103 in Table 8; Discussions A and C in Table 10
10 Discussions A and C in Table 10
11 Discussion E in Table 10
12 Discussion A in Table 10
13 Interview 42 in Table 8
14 Discussions A, B and D in Table 10
15 Discussions B and D in Table 10
• Improvements in solid waste disposal systems, including an increase in public bins, for solid waste disposal and the introduction of recycling facilities; and
• Replacement of street lighting that was destroyed by the tsunami and the provision of pavements.

To complement the introduction of better waste management facilities there is a need to increase environmental awareness and monitoring capacities particularly concerning the negative consequences of water and waste mismanagement on tourism and quality of life. Greater community cohesion mentioned in points 1 and 4 will also aid the establishment of a collective environmental and destination consciousness.

16 Discussions B and D in Table 10
REFERENCES


Kitzinger, J. (1994) The methodology of focus groups: the importance of interaction between research participants, Sociology of Health, 16, 103-121.


TAT (2005b) Fact Sheet - Andaman Recovery Plan, Tourism Authority of Thailand, Bangkok.

TAT (2005c) Fact Sheet - Impact of Tsunami on Thai Tourism, Tourism Authority of Thailand, Bangkok.

TAT (2006a) Situation updates: Tsunami early warning system - Thailand’s first tsunami detection buoy installed and functioning, Tourism Authority of Thailand Situation Updates, Tourism Authority of Thailand, Bangkok.

TAT (2006b) Swedish tour operator returns to Khao Lak, News Room: TAT News, Tourism Authority of Thailand, Bangkok.

TAT (2007a) TAT hosts workshop in Khao Lak for Meier Weltreisen, Tourism Authority of Thailand News Room, Tourism Authority of Thailand, Bangkok.
TAT (2007b) Tourism Intelligence Unit and Crisis Management Centre launched, Tourism Authority of Thailand News Room, Tourism Authority of Thailand, Bangkok.


APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

1 Overview and rationale of use
The aim of interviews is not to be representative but to gain insights into the complexities of social phenomena through the subjective eyes of social actors that form part of the social tapestry (Valentine, 1997, Winchester, 2005). Valuing the subjectivity of data collection, interviews reveal how individuals make sense of their social world and act within it (May, 2001). The advantages of using open-ended interviews to explore destination vulnerability in multiple communities are twofold. First, they promote a two-way dialogue between the researcher and participant, whereby information is exchanged, reflected upon and preconceptions on both sides verified and/or challenged (Dunn, 2005). Second, open-ended interviews create opportunities for participants to voice what is most relevant and important to them (Dunn, 2005), while providing a structure for comparability (May, 2001) between stakeholder groups and across destination sites.

2 Objectives
The main objectives of the open-ended interviews are to:

• Establish a developmental process of tourism in Khao Lak pre-tsunami and document post-tsunami changes;
• Ascertain institutional responses to the tsunami in Khao Lak;
• Identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions that influence vulnerability levels in Khao Lak; and
• Investigate the interconnected nature of identified socio-political and environmental factors and the way they are constructed across a range of scales.

3 Sampling design and deployment
The sampling strategy reflected the need to produce a degree of replication between groups in each destination and across multiple sites (Punch, 2005). The participants interviewed reflect the spectrum of stakeholders that influence and contribute to tourism development in the case study sites, as well as those playing a role in the recovery. The groups represented in the sample are listed in Table 7. A minimum of three from the identified groups was set based on expected reasonable coverage of experiences within and across the destination sites (Quinn Patton, 1990). Participants were chosen using:

• Hotel listings provided by the TAT and Phang Nga Tourism Association which indicate the size of hotels in terms of rooms and the contact details.
• Tourism stakeholder listings provided by NGOs that had undertaken tsunami-related work in the destination areas.
• Snowballing techniques, including personal referrals and introductions. These were very effective in securing new stakeholder interviews in each community and creating a rapport. This sampling technique allowed the team to remain flexible in the ‘field’ and follow unexpected avenues of enquiry (Brockington and Sullivan, 2003).
• Random sampling, based on tourism maps and street observations, was the most common sourcing method. This technique limited the problem of focusing on homogeneous groups and shared opinions possibly held among friends and colleagues (May, 2001).

Stakeholders were contacted via phone, email and in person. The number of interviews was determined by financial and time constraints. A total of 101 interviews were conducted by a team of three (authors) over a total of five weeks—two weeks in Bangkok with NGOs participating in the recovery process and a further three weeks in Khao Lak. Each interview was carried out in a location suggested by the interviewee and lasted between 45 to 90 minutes. The familiarity of the interviewee’s surroundings both added to their comfort levels and awarded them some control over the interview process. Interviews were taped unless participants expressed discomfort with recordings. In these instances, responses were written. The taping of the interviews facilitated a more natural flow to the conversation and captured detail. Due to the sensitive nature of some of the disclosed information, the
identities of the participants will be kept confidential by using pseudonyms.

The interview design remained dynamic throughout the research process. Questions derived from the literature and document analysis were reviewed and reworded throughout the fieldwork process as new information came to light making some pre-determined questions obsolete. A list of the questions and issues raised with the participants is listed in List 1. Stakeholder grouping also changed in the field to reflect the make-up of businesses in each site. Two summary documents were kept and updated throughout the research process, providing an overview of what information had been gathered and what information needs remained outstanding:

- A list of the participant groups in each destination site, target numbers and actual numbers obtained was created to keep an ongoing tally that was updated throughout the duration of the fieldwork (Table 7).

- A summary of all interview participants in Bangkok and Khao Lak was kept, creating a centralised record of who was interviewed, when and the main issues raised (Table 8).

### Table 7. Khao Lak Stakeholder Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder Type</th>
<th>Specifics</th>
<th>Khao Lak (BN* &amp; NT*)</th>
<th>Done</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodations (Resort / Hotel /</td>
<td>Small (T)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guesthouse / Bungalow)</td>
<td>Small (F)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium / Large (F)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium / Large (T)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel / accommodation Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tour operators</td>
<td>Diving</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Travel agent / operators</td>
<td>N/A^a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guides</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souvenir and gift shops</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Shop</td>
<td>Incl. Grocery, drug store, photo.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Spa and Massage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tailors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Book stores</td>
<td>N/A^b</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beach Services:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Umbrellas, kayaks, beach vendors- Tourist Boats</td>
<td>N/A^a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (internet, laundry, taxis)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants, Cafés and bars</td>
<td>Owners (T)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owners (F)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>N/A^i</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Organisations</td>
<td>Khao Lak SME Group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phang Nga Tourism Association</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SME Bank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Step Ahead Foundation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4Kali.org</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tsunami Volunteer Centre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tsunami Craft Centre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ecotourism Education Centre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN-WTO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder Type</td>
<td>Specifics</td>
<td>Khao Lak (BN&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; &amp; NT&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenan Institute Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist Fellowship</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Andaman Tsunami Relief</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Researchers in the field and freelance English trainer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government departments and representatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAO Khuk Khak</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAO Bang Muang</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAO Bang Nam Khem and Community Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Headman of Nang Thing Village</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khao Lak National Park</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Marine and Coastal Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phang Nga Provincial Office</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan and Budget Division</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Administration Organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phang Nga Office of Tourism and Sport</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Skill Development Centre Dept. of Labour)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Bang Niang
- Nang Thong
- Small hotels and bungalows were defined as those with less than 25 rooms.
- Medium hotels and resorts were defined as those with 25-100 rooms.
- Large hotels were defined as those with more than 100 rooms.
- There are few large foreign resorts operating in Khao Lak.
- Community members advised that few guides had remained in Khao Lak. Those still working as guides also ran travel agents/operator businesses, thereby undertaking a joint role.
- There were no independent book stores in Khao Lak.
- The Phang Nga Tourism Association does not allow beach vendors to operate on the beach stating that this type of service is not what the Khao Lak market is looking for.
- Most of the restaurants, cafés and bars are smaller ventures run and staffed by families.
List 1: Open-ended interview questions and issues

Focus:
- How is tourism in KL, Patong and Phi Phi scaled (in terms of power base and institutions)?
- What factors cause vulnerability and what societal structures perpetuate vulnerability?
- Has the tsunami event triggered any changes in these structures of power?
- How do the communities rank these factors?
- To what extent do these communities self-organise and scale their actions to further their own agendas and goals (consolidation, enlisting help from NGOs, local tourism representative groups)?
- Have the communities learnt to adapt to shocks?
- What are the community’s needs now and what measures would help build resilient tourism livelihoods?

Exposure of Khao Lak / Patong / Phi Phi to natural hazards:

Target stakeholders:
TAT, local tourism representative groups, and local tourism community stakeholders, where applicable.

- Which area sustained the most damage along the Andaman coast—can you show me on a map?
- What in your opinion led to the massive destruction of the tsunami on the built environment (force of the wave, lack of mangrove forests, lack of vegetation, inappropriate buildings)?
- From an environmental perspective, what physical factors left the destinations so vulnerable?
- What damage was sustained by the natural coastal zone and how long-lasting are the effects?
- Were there any coastal defence mechanisms in place (natural or man-made) to stop the force of the tsunami or even storm surges?
- Are any defence mechanisms such as seas walls or the regeneration of mangroves and natural vegetation planned to help protect this area from storm surges or other natural hazards for the future? If so, what are they? If not, what not?
- What was the condition of the natural environment before tourism development started in the area (nature of coastal natural defence systems, namely mangrove forests, reefs, sand dunes)?
- Was this altered by tourism development?
- If so, in what way (removal of vegetation, reshaping of the natural landscape to make it suitable for building)?
- What policies are in place to protect the coastal environment in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?
- I read that Thailand has key conservation legislation in place: In 1992, the Thai government adopted a Coral Reef Strategy in order to improve the management of coral reefs bordering Thai coastline; and the Constitution of 1997 that enshrines the rights of local communities in conserving natural resources.
- Are you aware of this strategy?
- If so, who is responsible for implementing and managing this policy?
- Do regional co operations with ASEAN for example assist in the protection of coastal resources in Phang Nga/Patong/Phi Phi (supranational)?
- If so, do these policies affect tourism development?
- Are there any obstacles to the successful implementation and management of existing coastal management policy?
- If so, what are they (lack of knowledge, manpower/capacity at local/regional level)?
What is being done to rectify these weaknesses?

- How are these policies managed and which governmental departments are responsible for managing the coastal zone areas?
- Have these policies changed post-tsunami?
  - If so, how have they changed?
- Who is responsible for enforcing these policies pre and post-tsunami?
  - Are they enforced effectively?
  - Are there any barriers to the enforcement of these policies?
  - If so, what are they?
- What are the benefits from these new rezoning laws (safety, coastal protection, etc.) from an environmental perspective?
- Have any businesses violated the set-back lines or other environmental or building standards pre-and post-tsunami?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - Have any steps been taken to rectify the violation of these building regulations including the set-backs?
  - If not, why not?

Destination characteristics:

Target stakeholders:

TAT, key tourism community stakeholders, tourism representative bodies.

- How large is the tourism community in each destination site?
- What percentage of the local population is involved in this industry?
- How are each of the destinations defined in terms of:
  - Geographical space/area
  - Destination image and main attractions
- When and how did tourism start in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?
- Who are the main markets (high/low season) for each destination and why?
  - Country: International vs. domestic?
  - Independent travel (tour operators vs. individuals), group travel?
  - Have these markets changed post-tsunami and why?
- How are the main markets sourced?
  - Guide books, travel websites, tour operators (domestic vs. large international)
  - Who controls access to these sources?
  - Has this changed post-tsunami?
  - Did these market sources hinder or help access to key markets post-tsunami?
- What type of tourism development is most prevalent in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi and why (skill bases, access to financial resources, training possibilities, development approval)?
  - How many small/medium/large resorts and businesses are there?
  - Formal vs. informal workers and businesses and why?
  - What constitutes an informal business vs. formal (registration with government, size)?
  - Are most tourism-related businesses foreign-owned or local enterprises (directly linked to type of development)?
What types of support businesses exist in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?

Are most tourism-related businesses foreign-owned or local enterprises (directly linked to type of development)?

Is the staff of these enterprises predominantly local or brought in from other areas of Thailand and/or from overseas?

Has the composition of ownership and workforce changed post-tsunami?

Were there problems with staffing resorts/tourism support facilities post-tsunami?

Did staff leave the resorts and why?

How did businesses overcome this problem?

Has the composition of ownership and workforce changed post-tsunami?

Were there problems with staffing resorts/tourism support facilities post-tsunami?

Did staff leave the resorts and why?

How did businesses overcome this problem?

Main actors in shaping destination development:

Private sector

Target stakeholders:

National and local tourism representative bodies, key local stakeholders.

Who are the main actors in shaping tourism development in each destination site? (associations, key business investors)

Why?

Are there any tourism representative bodies operating in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?

Tourism associations, tourism support groups, unions?

What are their roles?

Who do they represent?

Are all groups (including, the informal sector and Burmese minorities) represented?

Across what scales do they operate (local/provincial/central)?

Have these groups influenced development and job conditions in each destination pre-tsunami?

If so, how have their actions impacted the community?

Have these representative groups helped the tourism recovery (rebuilding of businesses and restoration of jobs) in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?

If so, what types of actions have been taken?

Did these groups act alone or did they work in collaboration with other partners (who)?

What were the main aims of the actions/strategies?

And who was involved in the implementation of these strategies?

How were these measures carried out?

At what scale(s) were they carried out / who were the main target groups/departments and why?

Have tourism groups formed any other collaboration to help push their agenda post-tsunami?

Have the destination communities changed their business/working habits in order prepare themselves for future shocks?

Development type and patterns, strengthening local networks or international/domestic marketing links, more savings, insurance?

Have they used local networks to rebuild their livelihoods?

If so, how have these networks helped?

Are there any local elite/influence groups in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?

If so, who are they and how did they gain power in the community?

How do they influence tourism development and operations in each destination?
Development process of tourism destinations:

**Target stakeholders:**
Tourism community stakeholders, local tourism representative bodies, and some for local TAOs.

**Livelihood profiles and diversification**
- What type of business do you have (owners) or work in (workers)?
  - For owners: Do you have another business or is this the only one? If so, what other businesses do you have? How do you divide your time between each of your businesses (high/low season, day/night)? Which business provides you with your main income source? If not, why have you chosen to focus on tourism for your income?
  - For workers: Do you have another job in addition to this job? If so, what is it and how is your time divided between these jobs (high/low season, day/night)? If not, does your tourism job provide you with enough income for the whole year?
- Why do you work/have you invested in tourism?
  - Lucrative business venture, easy to start?
- Do the earnings from tourism stay in the destination community or do they benefit outside interests?
- Are there any negative impacts from tourism development in each destination area?
  - If so, what are they? (environmental, social, natural resource access)
- Is livelihood diversification a viable option for destination community members?
  - If so, what are the alternate options?
  - If not, why not (limited personal skills, limited access to fertile land, financial limitations, time)?

**Economic resources:**
- Where did you get the finances to begin your business pre-tsunami?
  - Savings, family assistance, micro-credit, bank loans (commercial banks or other)?
  - Did you have savings or assets to use, live off and rebuild with following the tsunami?
  - Did you have insurance?
    - If so, have the companies paid up following the tsunami?
    - Have more businesses invested in insurance post-tsunami?
      - If yes why do you think that is?
      - If not why not?
    - What were the main funding sources for rebuilding your business post-tsunami?
      - Savings?
      - Commercial bank loans?
      - Did funds from second businesses help to fund the rebuilding of tourism businesses?
      - Family and friends (social networks)?

**Legal regulations:**
- Is it easy to set up a tourism-related business?
  - Do businesses have to register their business interest?
    - If so, who must register?
    - Are there any reasons for businesses not to register (taxes, size)?
    - Is this enforced?
    - If not, why?
  - Have the regulations to set up a business changed post-tsunami, and if so how?
- Are you saving more of your income now after the tsunami or have your savings levels remained the same?

- What other types of financial services are available to the tourism businesses and workers and what services do they provide?

  □ Have new micro-credit schemes been created post-tsunami to help the recovery?

- To help businesses recover after the tsunami, as part of the Andaman Recovery plan, the national government offered support in the form of tax relief measures, and the establishment of special funds for the restoration of tourism businesses: The SME Fund and the Tsunami Recovery Fund.

  □ Are you aware of this?

  □ If yes, what do you understand of the special funds?

  □ Did you benefit from either the SME Bank loans or the Tsunami Recovery Fund?

- Did you benefit from commercial bank soft loans (with low interest rates) after the tsunami?

- Are employees and employers entitled to social security payments if they lose their income?

  □ If so, what are the conditions of the payments?

  □ Who controls their distribution and how often are they distributed?

**Physical/natural resources:**

- Do you own the land and/or building where your business is located?

  □ If you own the land and building, did you buy it of was it owned by the family?

  □ If you rent, do you have a contract and how long is the contract for?

- Are there any land ownership disputes over the coastal zone?

□ If so, what actions have been taken (social, political, environmental) to alleviate these problems and at what level (national, regional, local)?

- Are any groups excluded from accessing land?

  □ If so, who are they and why?

**Skills base:**

- What skills and training/education opportunities are available for the locals to draw upon to set up tourism-related businesses?

  □ Is access to education and skills and resources equal among community members? If not, what determines/blocks access?

  □ Are there any training programs to enhance the skill base of tourism workers post-tsunami?

  □ (ILO) Phang Nga Tourism Business Association held training for retrenched workers to provide more skilled labour post-tsunami.

  □ (IBLF) Manpower retrained former KL tourism staff (bell boys, cleaners, gardeners) in landscaping golf courses, tailoring and massage.

  □ Who has access to these programs and have these programs create new localised opportunities for livelihood diversification?

**Effect of tsunami on people’s livelihoods:**

**Target stakeholders:**

Local government representatives, local stakeholders, local tourism representative bodies, tourism stakeholders.

- How much have the communities lost in terms of business revenue (numbers or percentage)?

- How much damage in terms of money and/or infrastructure was done to your business/workplace?
For employers: How long did it take for you to reopen your business? What were business levels like in 2005, 2006 and now in 2007?

For employees: Were you working for your current employer at the time of the tsunami? If you did, did you keep your job following the tsunami? If you did, did you receive your full salary during the rebuilding and 2005 low season? If you didn’t, what did you do for employment or income? Did you have any support from family, friends or other social networks? Were you covered by staff insurance at the time of the tsunami and did you receive your payments? If not, why not? When did you return to work? If you are a new employee, where were you working before the tsunami and why did you change jobs?

Who were the most vulnerable community members to losing everything and why?

Employers, employees, casual workers, Burmese workers many of which were working in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi illegally.

- How long did it take to restore basics infrastructure (roads, sanitation, water supplies, communication systems, housing, and energy supplies)?
- Were there any changes in quality and amount of infrastructure post-tsunami?
- Were the changes appropriate? Why or why not?

Other shocks
- Have other events such as political unrest in southern provinces, military coup, travel trends, SARS, terrorist attacks in other countries or economic down-turns affected tourism flows to Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?
- If so, what were the effects in terms of tourist flows, loss of business revenue/loss of jobs?
- Now after the tsunami, do you think that risks from events or natural hazards have increased or do you still feel the same about risk levels to your business?

If so, what precautions are you taking to safeguard your business/job?

Savings, insurance, diversifying your livelihood options?

What did you (business owners/workers) do to survive financially when numbers are down (social security, family support)?

Tourism governance structures: Policy, planning and implementation:

Target stakeholders:
National tourism government departments, regional and local government authorities where applicable, national and local tourism representative bodies.

Policy and planning: National and regional level

Interviewers’ notes relating to governance and power:
- Ascertain governance processes and the way in which resource allocation decisions are made (nationally, regionally, locally).
- Ascertain power relations and structures of inequality – driven by preferences (social, political, economic).
- Who is actively involved in the governance of tourism (local government, NGOs, private sector, traditional structures, support groups)?
- Are you aware of the Tourism Development Plan (TDP) 2007-2009?
- If so, can you tell me what the main development goals of the latest Tourism Development Plan 2007-2009 are?
- Are there any differences between pre and post-tsunami TDP?
- If so, what are the differences and why did it change (b/c of tsunami event or another reason)?
Are Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi included in the Tourism Development Plan 2007-2009?

Who is involved in the formulation of the TDP?

- What level (national, regional, and local) are these goals decided upon?
- Do any stakeholders dominate the plan formulation process?

Were there any (other) planning and development strategies for Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi pre-tsunami?

- If so, what were the plansstrategies?

Were local representatives involved in the planning and decision-making process pre-tsunami?

- If so, who participated and how did they participate?
- Do these chosen representatives represent the whole community or just a specific interest group—and who are they?
- If not, why not?

Has local representative involvement in planning and decision-making changed post-tsunami?

- If so, how?

Has the formulation process changed pre-and post-tsunami?

- If so, what are the differences?
- If not, why not?

The former TAT Governor mentioned in an article published in ‘The Nation’ newspaper in 2005 that there have been problems with the decentralisation process: the skills/knowledge from the TAT was not transferred over to the Ministry, nor to the CEO Provincial Governors.

- In your opinion, have there been any problems with the transfer of responsibility from the TAT to the Ministry?
- If so, what is being done to help the situation?

Implementation and enforcement: National, regional and local level

Target stakeholders:
National tourism government departments, regional and local government authorities where applicable, national and local tourism representative bodies.

- In reality, how does the TDP shape tourism development in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?

- Is it effective and how is the success monitored?
- If not, who/what are the main blockages to successful implementation (lack of coordination, lack of capacity, skills and budget)?
- What measures are being taken to solve these problems and at what are the scale(s) of response?
- Who is responsible for implementing the development strategies pre-tsunami (for tourism) in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?

- How are the policies and plans implemented?
- And at what scale does this happen (national → regional → local)?
- Have implementation responsibilities changed post-tsunami?

- Why or why not?

- Are there any problems with enforcing the plans?

- If so, what are the blockages and at what scale to they occur?
- What actions have been taken to solve these problems?

- What are the implications for stakeholders who ignore development regulations?
Do lower levels of government (Provincial/District/Tambon) receive adequate support (skills/knowledge/supervision/monitoring power) from the central government in order to successfully implement and monitor plans?

☐ Has support for local authorities increased/improved since the tsunami?

☐ If so, why or why not?

**Policy and planning: Post-tsunami**

- Has the composition of business ownership and types of workers changed post-tsunami – can you show me on a map?

- Have development patterns changed post-tsunami?

  ☐ If so, how and which strategies have influenced these changes? (Compliance with set-backs, structure changes in building)?

- Are you aware of the Andaman Recovery Plan (if not, explain it to them – many times they don’t know the name but know of the changes)?

- Has the Andaman Recovery Plan been fully implemented in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?

  ☐ If so, which parts have been successful and why?

  ☐ If not, what are the barriers to the implementation of this plan (other plans, lack of political will, no leadership, recommendations do not match community goals or needs)?

  ☐ What steps have been taken to overcome these barriers?

  ☐ If there are other plans, what are these plans and how are they different from pre-tsunami plans?

  ☐ for Phi Phi this will include DASTA Plans - ask the participants if they aware of this plan

  ☐ Is the implementation of these new plans successful?

  ☐ If not, what are the barriers to the implementation of this plan (lack of political will, no leadership, recommendations do not match community goals or needs)?

- What are the implications on the rights of the hoteliers etc who already have dwellings in the set-back zones?

- Are there any other measures (environmental plans, coastal buffer zones, tourism development strategies) being undertaken to build resilience in Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi, both in terms of strengthening the natural and built environment?

**Patong specific: For TAT and government officials**

- The government has announced that Patong and other areas are to be rebuilt in line with strict principles of sustainable development and will be used as a model for future development in Thai coastal tourism. TAT has been entrusted with overseeing the development of the Patong Seaboard Redevelopment Master Plan which is designed to bring ‘system and order’ to the Patong beachfront. The model city planned for Patong will have a bicycle lane, good public transportation, sufficient parking areas and all other necessary tourist amenities. Everything would be properly zoned.

  ☐ Why was Patong beach chosen for the first site? Was it heavily destroyed by the tsunami? Or did the tsunami provide an opportunity for redeveloping a badly developed/unsustainable/environmentally degraded tourism attraction?

  ☐ Has this master plan for Patong Beach been started?

  ☐ Who will be responsible for choosing future sites earmarked for redevelopment under the plan? And who will be responsible for implementing and enforcing the plan?

  ☐ How does the Patong Master Plan fit in with the wider Andaman Recovery Plan?
### Development and marketing of Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi post-tsunami

**Target stakeholders:**
TAT, local tourism representative groups, and local tourism community stakeholders, where applicable.

- How many of the resorts have been rebuilt in each destination, percentages and numbers of businesses?
- Have tourism flows been affected by the terrorist attacks in southern Thailand or the military coup? If so how
- What collaborations have the Thai government made to strengthen tourism development in the region pre-tsunami?
- What links have the TAT made with other tourism bodies to strengthen the marketing campaign to get people back to this area?

□ And what has been the outcome of this marketing campaign for each destination Khao Lak/Patong/Phi Phi?

- Has the TAT linked up with PATA to entice people back to the region?
- What measures were taken by industry representative groups to get people back (promotions-through what means and conducted at what level, national government campaigns or sourcing from regional markets instead of international)?

□ Who has the power/the role and reach to get people back?

### Recovery plans and initiatives:

**Target stakeholders:**
NGOs, Private Sector Groups.

- What are the main aims and objectives of the recovery strategy/program?

- Was the community given an opportunity to help design the program?
- Who are the main partners?
- How were these partners chosen?
- What is/was the time frame for the project and why?

□ Monetary constraints, interest, new disaster (short-term vs long term goals)?

- Is project designed for disaster relief/immediate coping strategies/long-term resilience building strategies?
- Who is funding the project?
- Which group/area does it target?
- What is the organisation’s history with their chosen area?

- Why did they choose this area or community (agenda behind initiative)?
- How has the destinations characteristics changed pre → post-tsunami?
- How were the needs of the target community/area assessed?

- How does this project aid capacity building in the community/area?
- At what scale(s) is the project implemented and what is the process of implementation?

□ Is the community involved with the implementation of the program?

□ If so, how do they participate?

- How is the success of the project monitored and who is responsible for this?

- Are there any blockages to implementation procedures?
If so, what are these and at what scales do they occur?

What measures have been undertaken to overcome these blockages and at what scale?

If none have been taken, why not?

Is this project interlinked with other projects?

Sub Regional Development Plan for Andaman Region, Andaman Recovery Plan?

If so, how is this interlinkage managed?

How do organisations relate/communicate with each other/avoid duplication?

Can the tourism communities rely on ongoing assistance once the project finishes?

What provisions have been made for long-term capacity building and support?

Who will take over the responsibility of the programs implementation on completion?

Who are the chosen parties and why were they chosen?

Have/will these chosen parties be trained?

How will the success of the program be monitored and by who?

If no provisions have been made, what will the ramifications be for the community?

---

**Table 8: Open-ended Interview Participants in Khao Lak, Thailand, January-February 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Institution/Participant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BANGKOK</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.01.07 (E1&amp;S2) Chumchon Thai Foundation (CTF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.01.07 (E&amp;S) Thai Fund Foundation (TFF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.01.07 (E,S,K) RECOFTC Kasesart University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.01.07 (E,S,K) RECOFTC Kasesart University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.01.07 (E,K) ACTPPR Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.01.07 (E,S,K) Senior Researcher Thailand Institute of Scientific &amp; Technological Research (TISTR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.01.07 (E,S,K) Thai Professor Institute of Environmental Research Chulalongkorn University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>15.01.07 (E,S,K) IUCN Asia Regional Office, Bangkok Projects Coordinator Thailand Programme IUCN Thailand Programme Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.01.07 (E) WWF Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.01.07 (E,S,K) International Labour Organisation (ILO) Senior Specialist Employers Activities for East Asia ILO Tsunami Response Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>17.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>18.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>18.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>18.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>20.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>21.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>22.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>22.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>22.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>23.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>23.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>23.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>23.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>24.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>24.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>24.01.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 28| 21.01.07 & 25.01.07 (E) | Foreign Bungalow Owner  
Founder of Khao Lak SME Group  
(builds upon pilot study interview 30.08.05) | Bang Niang Beach |
| 29| 25.01.07 (K) | Thai Restaurant Owner  
Bang Niang | |
| 30| 25.01.07 (E) | Programme Coordinator  
4Kali.org  
Thailand Headquarters  
Bang Niang | |
| 31| 25.01.07 (K) | Thai Noodle Restaurant Owner  
Bang Niang | |
| 32| 25.01.07 (K) | Thai ex-owner of restaurant  
Bang Niang | |
| 33| 25.01.07 (E&K) | Thai Medium Resort Co-owner  
Bang Niang | |
| 34| 26.01.07 (S&K) | TAO Representative  
TAO Khuk Khak | |
| 35| 26.01.07 (E) | Foreign Bungalow & Café Owner  
Bang Niang | |
| 36| 26.01.07 (K) | Thai Medium Bungalows Owner  
Nang Thong | |
| 37| 26.01.07 (K) | Thai Tour Agency  
Nang Thong | |
| 38| 26.02.07 (S) | Khao Lak National Park Representative | |
| 39| 26.01.07 (S) | Thai Travel Agent  
Nang Thong | |
| 40| 26.01.07 (S) | Three Massage Workers  
Nang Thong Beach | |
| 41| 26.01.07 (S) | Thai Travel Agent  
Nang Thong | |
| 42| 27.01.07 (K) | Thai Owned Bungalow & Internet Service  
Bang Niang | |
| 43| 27.01.07 (S) | Thai Tourist Boat Operators  
Bang Niang | |
| 44| 28.01.07 (K) | Laundry Service Owner  
Bang Niang | |
| 45| 28.01.07 (K) | Grocery Store Owner  
Bang Niang | |
| 46| 28.01.07 (K) | Thai Restaurant Owner  
Bang Niang | |
| 47| 28.01.07 (S) | Thai Tour Operator  
Nang Thong | |
| 48| 28.01.07 (E,S,K) | Program and Project Coordinator  
Buddhist Fellowship  
Singapore | |
| 49| 29.01.07 (E&K) | Phang Nga Tourism Association Representative  
Bang Niang | |
| 50| 29.01.07 (E) | Foreign/Thai Small Guesthouse Owners  
Bang Niang | |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Role and Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>29.01.07 (E)</td>
<td>Tourist Information and Tour Booking Service Bang Niang Beach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>29.01.07 (K)</td>
<td>Photo Shop Owner Bang Niang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>29.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>TAO Representative Bang Muang TAO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>29.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>TAO Representative TAO and Nam Khem Community Leader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>30.01.07 (E)</td>
<td>Manager Large Thai Resort Nang Thong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>30.01.07 (E)</td>
<td>Foreign Small Resort Owner Bang Niang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>30.01.07 (K)</td>
<td>Director North Andaman Tsunami Relief Training Resource &amp; Education Centre Kuraburi Phang Nga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Head of Mangrove Station 17, Kuraburi (DMCR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Head of Mangrove Station 19, Thai Muang (DMCR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Lam Ken sub-district, Tai Muang district,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Foreign/Thai Small Resort Owner Bang Niang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Phang Nga Business Centre Manager SME Bank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Muang district, Phang Nga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Head of Strategic Planning Division Phang Nga Provincial Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Plan and Budget Division Representative Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Head of Disaster Relief Division Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Phang Nga Province</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Managing Director Ecotourism Training Centre Bang Niang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Foreign Restaurant Owner Bang Niang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Tsunami Craft Centre Manager Bang Niang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Thai Co-owner of Small Resort Bang Niang Beach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Director Kenan Institute Asia Environment &amp; Sustainable Development Division Baan Kaolak, Lamkaen, Thaimuang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Thai Restaurant &amp; Small Bungalow Owner Nang Thong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>30.01.07 (S)</td>
<td>Manager Diving Operator Nang Thong Village</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>02.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>Tourist Representative</td>
<td>Thai Travel Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>02.02.07 (K)</td>
<td>Souvenir Shop Owner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>02.02.07 (K)</td>
<td>Souvenir Shop Owner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>02.02.07 (K)</td>
<td>Thai Massage Parlour Owner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>02.02.07 (K)</td>
<td>Tour information-taxi service-laundry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>04.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>Thai Restaurant &amp; Small Guesthouse Owner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>04.02.07 (E&amp;K)</td>
<td>Thai Medium Resort Owner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>05.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>Executive Assistant Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>05.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>06.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>General Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>06.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>06.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>06.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>Foreign Travel Agent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>06.02.07 (K)</td>
<td>Urban Planning Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>07.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>Tsunami Volunteer Centre Representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>07.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>Foreign Diving Operator Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>07.02.07 (K)</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>07.02.07 (K)</td>
<td>Representative for Department of Skill Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>07.02.07 (S)</td>
<td>Thai Restaurant Owner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>07.02.07 (S)</td>
<td>Thai Massage Parlour Owner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>08.02.07 (E)</td>
<td>Foreign Café Owner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>08.02.07(E)</td>
<td>Assistant to Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>08.02.07</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>Step Ahead Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>08.02.07</td>
<td>(K)</td>
<td>Thai Tour Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>08.02.07</td>
<td>(K)</td>
<td>Thai Souvenirs and Décor Shop Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>08.02.07</td>
<td>(S)</td>
<td>Village Headman &amp; Thai Medium Resort Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>09.02.07</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>English Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>09.02.07</td>
<td>(K)</td>
<td>Assist. Director. Of Office of Tourism and Sport Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>09.02.07</td>
<td>(S)</td>
<td>Laundry Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>09.02.07</td>
<td>(S)</td>
<td>Small Thai Resort Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>10.02.07</td>
<td>(S)</td>
<td>Assistant Headman &amp; Taxi Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>12.02.07</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>15.02.07</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>General Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>16.02.07</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>Tailor employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tailor Shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>17.02.07</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>23.02.07</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>Bar Owner and Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>26.02.07</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>Foreign Bar Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Research Team:
Emma Calgaro, Macquarie University/Stockholm Environment Institute
Sapon Naruchaikusol, Stockholm Environment Institute-Asia
Kanannya Pongponrat, Stockholm Environment Institute-Asia
APPENDIX 2: CASE HISTORY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

Overview and rationale of use
Case histories of people, places and events collectively disclose what happened, how, why and what it was like from a personal perspective (George and Stratford, 2005: 107). Largely unconstrained by pre-determined issues, these testimonials allow participants to speak for themselves and create their own texts (Brockington and Sullivan, 2003) whilst allowing the researcher to track and understand the evolution of social processes through time and space (George and Stratford, 2005).

Objectives
The main objectives of undertaking case histories in the assessment of destination vulnerability are to:

• Establish developmental process of tourism in Khao Lak pre-tsunami and document post-tsunami changes;

• Ascertain institutional responses to the tsunami in Khao Lak;

• Identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions that influence vulnerability levels in Khao Lak; and

• Investigate the interconnected nature of identified socio-political and environmental factors and the way they are constructed across a range of scales.

Sampling design and deployment
The 10 case histories were collected with key informants and random stakeholders who embraced the opportunity to talk in length about their personal experiences. A summary of all the case histories undertaken is presented in Table 9. Evolving out of the foundational work obtained through the open-ended interview process, case histories provided more in-depth detail about the participant’s personal histories, their choices and motivations for choosing tourism as a livelihood source and the progression of their business/working interests and opportunities over space and time. These testimonies also provided detailed insights into the way in which destination community members responded to, cope with and adapted following the disaster. Select oral histories conducted with founding members of each destination community also provided insights into how destinations as imagined spaces evolve over space and time and the multiple agendas that shaped each destination. Together these collective and personal accounts of livelihood choices and destination evolution provided a tapestry of ideas, aspirations, goals, opportunities and limitations that form the contextual conditions from which vulnerability evolves.

In keeping with the sampling process used for the open-ended interviews, participants were chosen using:

• Tourism stakeholder listings provided by NGOs that had undertaken tsunami-related work in the destination areas.

• Snowballing techniques including personal referrals and introductions. These were very effective in securing new stakeholder interviews in each community and creating a rapport.

• Random sampling based on tourism maps and street observations.

Stakeholders were contacted via phone, e-mail and in person. The case histories were undertaken throughout the 3-week period in January and February 2007 by the three team members (authors). Each case history was carried out in a location suggested by the interviewee and lasted between 60 and 120 minutes. Case histories were taped unless participants expressed discomfort with recordings. In these instances, responses were written. The taping of the interviews facilitated a more natural flow to the conversation and captured detail. Due to the sensitive nature of some of the disclosed information, the identities of the participants will be kept confidential using pseudonyms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22.01.07</td>
<td>General Manager and Owner Thai Large Resort Nang Thong Former President of Phang Nga Hotels Association</td>
<td>Participant provided information on: the financing of the recovery, construction aspects, of the recovery effort, political problems with rebuilding in a sustainable manner (no will and corruption payments), limitations to collaborations with provincial and local government authorities and marketing strategies and collaborations with TAT. He said that he has not been so active in the Phang Nga Tourism Association in the last two years because he has had too much to worry about with rebuilding. He also commented that the Phang Nga Tourism Association has not been so strong or active in petitioning for a strong recovery in the last year due to a lack of strong leadership. This just goes to show that organisations are only as strong or motivated as their leaders. Unfortunately the Association may have lost some power and effect through inactivity over the last two years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.01.07</td>
<td>Thai Small Guest-house Owner Thai Food Restaurant and Guest House</td>
<td>Participant talked about her experiences with rebuilding her business. She did not register her business. Unclear why. She says its easy to start a business but she is currently struggling to keep her business open. Her English boyfriend sends money back from England to help her survive but she actually lies about the amount she needs. She asks for more and uses this money to pay off credit card debt. She is afraid of him finding out how much she owes because she thinks that he will insist that she sell the business because it is costing them too much.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.01.07</td>
<td>Foreign Bungalow Owner Bang Niang Beach</td>
<td>Provided detailed information on the politics of the recovery along with changes in type of development that could impair repeat tourist flows, problems of enforcing regulations, and getting access to funds to rebuild for small resorts and businesses particularly in Bang Niang. Local elites get away with violating the new building regulations. Similarly, the power of the local elites is so ingrained in the system that the locals will not do anything against the wishes of the local elite. The informal governance system is not fair, still very corrupt and self-serving. Participant explained the predicament of each of the resorts and businesses in Bang Niang. Also discussed the current needs of the community and the Thai habit of not following advice given by a foreigner due to them not wanting to lose face—a stumbling block for successful business practices as sometimes Thais misunderstand what the western market wants. It also shows mistrust within the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.01.07</td>
<td>Thai ex-owner of restaurant Bang Niang</td>
<td>She used to have bungalow in Bang Sak, then she sold the bungalow to open restaurant called “Paradise” in Bang Niang instead. No insurance for this restaurant plus she got a loan from bank to open this. After the tsunami, she received only THB 20 000 from the government and that was all she got for assistance. She did not know how to receive assistance or any organisation to help her. Until now, she still cannot set up occupation again. Her husband works as tour guide; income is unreliable. People start to think she has a mental sickness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.01.07</td>
<td>Tourist Information and Tour Booking Service Bang Niang Beach</td>
<td>Before the tsunami, she had her own business in Nang Thong but now she works for a resort. She gave information about: corruption and inequality of assistance in the area, difference between high and low seasons, rebuilding her business after the tsunami, and amazing support from repeat clients which are largely German.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.01.07</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Large Thai Resort, Nang Thong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.02.07</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
<td>Ecotourism Training Centre, Bang Niang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.02.07</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td>Nang Thong Village</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
07.02.07 Diving Operator Manager Nang Thong Village

The participant is the manager of this dive company—very nice and interesting person. He was here at the time of the tsunami and gave an account of that day and the immediate help that was received or not in this case—not all details of the stories were written down. For more detail, go to last quarter of tape. The owner of the dive shop is Swedish but has a Thai wife. The participant said the business has built back slowly due to the owner receiving no help from the Thai or Swedish government despite the fact that the original shop was totally destroyed along with the dive equipment and boat (all of which is very expensive to replace). It was located down next to the Happy Lagoon Restaurant and Bungalows across from Nang Thong Beach. He gave info on the strong client base (that was made even stronger as a result of the tsunami event), the slow recovery process, the lack of financial aid, price rises in KL to cover recovery costs, impact of negative press in 2005 but positive effect on long-term tourist flows (most westerners know where KL is now), the cooperation between the dive community members to help support each other during the 2005/2006 season and funding initiatives started by himself to help fund the community (www.diveaid.com). He also talked about the nature of KL in contrast to Phuket and who controls this.

09.02.07 English Trainer Khao Lak

Very interesting but very sad. Participant was here just after the tsunami and stayed to help. She provided info on: KL characteristics pre and post tsunami, occupancy rates in some of the resorts, unequal distribution of funds and the lack of government support for tourism businesses in KL, impact of tsunami on the community and various stories of the survival and immediate impact on locals and English training in KL.
APPENDIX 3: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION DESIGN AND RESULTS

Overview and rationale of use
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) are a valuable tool for the exploration of group norms and the socio-political dynamics that shape human interactions and outcomes (May, 2001) through brainstorming. The tapestry of processes and practices that make up the social world and the richness of relationships between people and places come to the fore (Cameron, 2005: 119). In doing so, focus group discussions promote the formulation of simultaneous insights and understanding for both researchers and participants during the research process (Goss and Leinbach, 1996: 116-117). This transforms knowledge through social learning, promotes empowerment among the ‘researched’, heightens participant participation throughout the research process and creates opportunities for social transformation (Cameron, 2005).

The use of this method in understanding destination vulnerability is advantageous for three reasons. First, the encouraged interaction between group members provides an opportunity for participants to explore different points of view, reconsider their own views and understands, and formulate new opinions (Cameron, 2005). For Kitzinger (1994: 113), ‘participants do not just agree with each other. They also misunderstand one another, question one another, try to persuade each other of the justice of their own point of view and sometimes they vehemently disagree’. The process of social learning is important for building unity and common understandings within and across community groups and sub-groups, a process that is an integral component of successful resilience building strategies. Second, this dynamic and energetic interaction between participants proves instrumental in highlighting the power discourses that shape thoughts and actions within the community at what level these occur. Identifying these underlying drivers of social patterns and change and the scale at which they occur provides information on appropriate entry points for transformative action. Third, the creation of small community forums provides the researcher with an opportunity to report back on initial findings ascertained from other data (in this case secondary documents, open-ended interviews and case histories), verify results and gain answers to outstanding queries. In doing so, this gives the participants an opportunity to directly influence the output.

Objectives
The objectives of the FGDs are four-fold:

- Identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions that influence vulnerability levels in Khao Lak;
- Investigate the interconnected nature of identified socio-political and environmental vulnerability factors and the way they are constructed across a range of scales;
- To gain feedback and validation of preliminary findings from the open-ended interviews and case histories; and
- Identify current community needs and explore community-led solutions to building capacity and resilience in their community.

Sampling design and deployment
The stakeholder groups included in the FGDs were chosen from the private sector stakeholder groups used in the interview sampling design (see Table 7 in Appendix 1). They represent dominant stakeholder groups and existing informal stakeholder collectives. The intended target groups were adjusted once in the field due to the availability of participants. Availability of participants did prove problematic for some stakeholder groups (small foreign and Thai hotels/bungalows, restaurant participants, and dive shops) due to the timing of FGDs. The FGDs were undertaken in September 2007, which falls into the low season for Khao Lak when many small businesses are closed. Furthermore, some small Thai hotel/bungalow owners cancelled and rescheduled on numerous occasions due to unforeseen problems that needed urgent attention.

Participants were chosen from the interview participant list presented in Table 8 (Appendix 1) personal referrals and snowballing techniques. The average size of each group was between 3-7 participants to facilitate a good in-depth discussion where all participants have ample chance to voice and discuss issues. One exception to this was the Massage group where there was much interest. A summary of the FGDs undertaken in Khao Lak is listed in Table 10.
The duration of the FGDs was approximately 1.5 hours. The FGDs were facilitated by four team members consisting of three SEI researchers and one local assistant:

- Kannapa Pongponrat
  Stockholm Environment Institute-Asia
- Sopon Naruchaikusol
  Stockholm Environment Institute-Asia
- Emma Calgaro
  Macquarie University/Stockholm Environment Institute
- Ratchaneekorn Thongthip Khuk
  Khak Community Knowledge Management Centre (Local Assistant in Khao Lak)

### Methods

**Situation Assessment: Problems and Possible Solutions Identification and Prioritising (Ranking and Scoring)**

**Objective**

- To gain feedback and validation of preliminary findings from the open-ended interviews and case histories;
- To identify the pre- and post-tsunami conditions that influence vulnerability levels in Khao Lak;
- To ascertain current community problems and needs and explore community-led solutions to building capacity and resilience in their community; and
- To prioritise current problems and possible solutions.

**Issues and Questions**

- Do the participants agree with the problems found from the stakeholder interviews?
- What are the current, 2007, and/or additional problems faced by tourism stakeholders?
- How are these problems ranked in terms of importance to community members?
- What are the possible solutions and actions that help to overcome these problems?
- How are these solutions ranked in terms of support and feasibility amongst stakeholders?
- Significant issues to be considered:
  - Social aspects: social network, community strengthening, awareness on assistance, perception on risk
  - Economic aspects: financial support, capital investment, marketing
  - Institutional aspects: plans and policies to support local community, capacity building program
  - Environmental aspects: natural resources planning and management for tourism development

### Table 10: Focus Discussion Participant Groups and schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Date (dd.mm.yy)</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khao Lak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Massage</td>
<td>09.09.07</td>
<td>15.15-17.05</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Thai-owned medium and large hotels/resorts</td>
<td>10.09.07</td>
<td>10.15-11.50</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Tourist Boats</td>
<td>10.09.07</td>
<td>15.05-16.20</td>
<td>4 – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Thai-owned Restaurants</td>
<td>11.09.07</td>
<td>10.50-12.20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Thai-owned small resorts/guesthouses</td>
<td>12.09.07</td>
<td>10.10-11.50</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Foreign-owned small businesses</td>
<td>14.09.07</td>
<td>14.30-15.50</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G Tour Agencies</td>
<td>16.09.07</td>
<td>09.50-11.30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Issues of trauma

Organisation

- The facilitator presents the preliminary findings from the interviews and case histories to the participants verbally before writing them up on a board/sheet of paper.

- The facilitator asks participants to discuss (agree/not agree) the presented issues.

- Participants discuss the issues amongst themselves and clarify or add any outstanding issues not already raised.

- Participants prioritise problems by scoring each identified problem using a scale of one to 50 points. This process starts with each participant writing their main problems on soft cards provided by the facilitator, and then awards a score to each problem. This is followed by a wider discussion among group members to finalise collective opinions and problem prioritisation.

- This process is repeated to ascertain possible solutions. This process starts with each participant writing possible solutions on soft cards provided by the facilitator and then awards a score to each solution using a scale of one to 50 points. This is followed by a wider discussion among group members to finalise collective solutions and prioritisation.

Timing

- The facilitator presents the preliminary findings and issues deduced from the interviews and case histories (5 minutes)

- The facilitator introduces the tool to participants (5 minutes)

- Participants work individually to identify their main problems and rank those problems (5 minutes)

- Participants work together to identify common problems and collectively rank them (10 minutes)

- Participants work individually to identify solutions to the common problems and rank them (10 minutes)

- Participants work together to identify common solutions and agree on solution rankings (10 minutes)

- Total time allocation = 45 minutes.

- Total time allocation = 45 minutes.
**Rich Picture**

**Objective**
- To understand the contributing causes and effects for a particular problem identified in section 4.1;
- To investigate the root causes and competing stakeholder agendas that drive this issue and the way it is constructed across a range of scales.

**Questions**
- What are causes and effects of main problem identified in the Situation Analysis?
- Which social actors are involved in this issue and what role do they play in its formulation and continuance?

**Organisation**
- Participants discuss the causes and effects of the chosen issue identified in section 4.2.
- Participants draw a rich picture of identified causes and effects of particular problem on a common board or sheet of paper.

**Timing**
- Facilitator introduces the tool to participants (10 minutes)
- Participants help to draw rich picture with facilitator guidance (25 minutes)
- Total time = 35 minutes

**Visioning on Resilience Building Strategy**

**Objective**
To develop a shared 5-year community vision of desired developmental outcomes and resilience building initiatives designed to reduce their vulnerability and increase the sustainability of their chosen tourism-related livelihoods. This will help them to think creatively about future tourism-orientated goals and sustainability goals and provide a common platform for developing a strategy that will provide support to the tourism community in attaining these goals.

**Issues and Questions**
- What visions do the participants have in terms of future developmental outcomes and resilience building strategies for the next 5 years?
- What factors and steps facilitate the attainment of these visions?
- How does the community execute these steps and at what scale?

**Framework:**

![Diagram of the problem and its causes and effects]
• What is the most feasible action plan for attaining the collective Khao Lak 5-year vision and reducing vulnerability?

**Organisation**

• Participants discuss amongst themselves possible visions that reduce their vulnerability to future shocks, build community resilience, and increase the sustainability of their tourism-orientated livelihoods.

• Participants discuss possible factors and steps required to achieve their vision.

• Participants discuss and design a possible action plan for reducing their vulnerability and enhancing their resilience (what, who, how).

**Framework:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Factors Facilitating</th>
<th>Action Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Timing**

• Facilitator introduces the tool to the participants (5 minutes)

• Participants discuss their visions for reducing their vulnerability (10 minutes)

• Participants discuss and identify steps that help them to achieve their vision and design a feasible action plan for achieving their collective goals (10 minutes)

• Total time = 25 minutes
APPENDIX 4: TOURIST MAP OF KHAO LAK SHOWING BUSINESS TYPES AND FACILITIES
APPENDIX 5: ANDAMAN TOURISM RECOVERY PLAN ZONING AND BUILDING REGULATIONS

The Stockholm Environment Institute

SEI is an independent, international research institute. It has been engaged in environment and development issues at local, national, regional and global policy levels for more than a quarter of a century. SEI supports decision making for sustainable development by bridging science and policy.

sei-international.org
The Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) is an independent, international research institute. It has been engaged in environment and development issues at local, national, regional, and global policy levels for more than a quarter of a century. SEI supports decision making for sustainable development by bridging science and policy.

sei-international.org